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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this research is to bring the literature on political agency and economics together 
in an analysis of whether social movements can play an important role in economic 
development in post-apartheid South Africa.  The entrenched discourse of sluggish growth 
and high inequality in post-apartheid South Africa can largely be attributed to the political 
decision to implement a neoliberal economic development orthodoxy.  On the one hand, 
there is an urgent need to shift the economic development model to an alternate 
developmentalist model.  However, no clearly articulated alternative developmental model 
has emerged.  As a result, economically, South Africa is seemingly stuck.  On the other 
hand, the selection of an economic development model and change in macroeconomic 
policies requires a political shift. Politically, formal politics has assumed the form of 
neoliberal democracy, characterised by a largely centralised state and the usurpation of the 
state and institutions by a national bourgeoisie.  Social movements have emerged in response 
to the failure of neoliberalism to fulfil the promises of early post independent periods.  They 
have been largely successful at highlighting the injustices and the inequalities in the country.  
However their ability to influence structural economic development has come into question. 
Firstly, social movements and their “politically destabilising distributive demands” have 
faced repression from the state as the state and institutions are aligned behind the interests 
of capital under a neoliberal democracy.  Secondly, social movements in South Africa have 
been largely ideologically under-developed. They have been largely fragmented and tended 
to contest specific single issues rather than aiming to shift the deeper underlying systemic 
drivers behind the symptomatic immediate discomforts.  The economic dimensions of such 
a shift are particularly unclear.  This fragmentation and apparent lack of economic 
pragmatism make management or suppression of disruptive movements by the state 
relatively easy.  The research uses a contrast between the Latin American social movements 
against a South African background in order to see what lessons South Africa can draw from 
social movements in Latin America.  The Latin American case is cautiously more positive 
and provides comparably more sanguine lessons.  In this way, this research seeks to 
construct a more comprehensive framework for the further study of social movements in 
South Africa and their potential impact on economic development in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Scope of the Research 
This project analyses social movements and the potential impact they may have on economic 
development in South Africa using lessons from the history of social movements in Latin 
America.  The history of social movements not only in Latin America but worldwide has 
revealed that social movements are powerful social justice tools capable of conveying real 
change on many levels including the macroeconomic level. By carefully studying social 
movement groups in Latin America and comparing these to the South African case this 
research aims to elaborate on the nature of social movements in South Africa in an attempt 
to broaden the understanding of the relationship between social movements and economic 
development policy implementation. In this way, this project contributes to the larger 
discourse on social movements in South Africa.   
1.2. Synopsis of the thesis   
No single definition of social movements enjoys scholarly consensus.  This can be attributed 
to the fact that definitions inevitably reflect the theoretical assumptions of the theorist and 
differ according to the theoretical framework of each scholar (Morris and Herring, 1984: 
528).  A few of the key definitions include defining social movements as “forms of collective 
action that emerge in response to situations of inequality, oppression and/or unmet social, 
political, economic or cultural demands.” They comprise “an organised set of elements 
pursuing a common political agenda of change over time” (Batliwala, 2012: 3).  In essence, 
social movements are dynamic human systems that contest and react to any unfavourable 
political or social changes and seek to bring about lasting and permanent change as well as 
reform (Fuchs, 2006: 101).  Social movements can also be defined as non-routine forms of 
collective action geared towards social change (Morris and Herring, 1984: 532).  They are 
emergent forms of non-institutionalised ‘preference structures’ directed towards social 
change (Morris and Herring, 1984: 537).   
These definitions point towards some common underlying notions.  Social movements are 
therefore conclusively and in summary any sustained coming together of a group of people 
who share a common grievance (collective action) making use of a large repertoire of 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised tactics in order to effect a positive outcome (socio-
economic change).  For the purposes of this research, this seemingly very broad and 
umbrella definition of social movements will be adopted.  The reasoning behind this large 
scope is that this research seeks to consider a very panoramic view of social movements. 
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This also allows the encompassing of a large repertoire and wide variety of non-
institutionalised and institutionalised (organised and unorganised) tactics and forms of 
collective action such as strikes, demonstrations and protests (violent and non-violent), 
marches, toyi-toying, picketing, assemblies, disruptions, using the judicial system, mass 
meetings, drafting of memoranda, petitions, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, 
blockading of roads, construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of 
buildings, chasing unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with police and 
forced resignation of elected officials (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 290) among others.  
 Defining social movements broadly in this context, is also useful because it insists from the 
outset that a distinction must be made between social movements and organisations.  If 
movements were single organisations then they would have been easy to identify, catalogue 
and categorise (Bebbington, 2010: 1). Social movements in this context are to be understood 
not as organisations but as a sort of subaltern discourse, a process that makes an argument 
for the legitimacy of identities and claims that are typically marginalised or excluded within 
the current social order. However, such a process might be carried forward by a composite 
of leaders, organisations and technologies (Bebbington, 2010: 1). 
There are two broad theoretical frameworks for conceptualising social movements.  The first 
of these is the neoclassical model. Bretton and Bretton (1969: 198) developed a theory of 
public choice that forms the main premise of the neoclassical analysis of social movements.  
They proposed that social movements emerge through the rational maximising behaviour of 
people. Where welfare deviates from expectations, people become frustrated and 
subsequently demand social change to offset the feelings of deficit and adjust back to their 
‘equilibrium state’ hence the emergence of social movements (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 
200).  Following this, Bretton and Bretton postulate that the ‘supply of social movements’ 
follows demand. They propose that the demand for social change creates opportunities for 
social profits that entrepreneurs would want to reap and therefore social entrepreneurs will 
supply or provide social movements for those who want them (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 
201).   
The neoclassical model is important because it offers an understanding of the emergence of 
social movements in economic terms and helps in clarifying the role of social movements 
in economic development.   It provides the economic rationality of social movements and is 
useful in answering the question of the relevance of social movements in economics.  The 
essence of the neoclassical model is that political activity including social movements is at 
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least in part motivated by ‘rational’ economic motives.  It provides a useful starting point in 
the discussion of social movements, however it does seem to ask more questions of interest 
than it answers which brings in the importance of the second framework to complete the 
analysis.  This will become more apparent in the discussion of this framework to follow in 
chapter two. 
The second broad conceptual framework discussed in this research is the Political Economy 
Framework. Similar to the neoclassical model, it is essentially a consideration of the 
interplay between economics and politics vis-a-vis the political basis of economic actions. 
The idea here is to contribute to reshaping and re-evaluating how social movements shape 
and get shaped by their political-economic context.  What is key is that it is not just economic 
rationality that determines economic development. Politics has a profound influence both 
on distribution as well as the economic development path.  
The ‘big debate’ that emerges is between ‘developmentalism’ and ‘neoliberalism’.  The 
Political Economy framework warrants a meaningful place in the progression of the research 
as it provides a descriptive analysis of the argument that in developing countries, social 
movements develop and emerge as important as a result of the failure of the economic 
development model to fulfil the promises of early post-independence periods, on the one 
hand, and the inability of conventional political mechanisms to respond to persistent crises, 
on the other (Escobar, 1992:426).   These ideas will again be further elaborated in the 
following chapter which discusses the conceptual frameworks in greater detail. 
Escobar (1992: 412) argues that social movements are of interest because they offer an 
alternative form of development and politics to the ‘conventional’ or mainstream political 
discourse.  This is important because one of the questions one may raise against the 
background of the structural problems in the South African economy is whether the 
conventional political discourse of democracy and the hegemonic economic models have 
failed to achieve the desired growth path and redistribution. For example, Jain (2014) 
attributes the subdued economic growth in the country in recent years to insufficiencies on 
the part of South Africa’s government to address crucial structural issues coupled with the 
unfavourable global economic conditions.  It would therefore not be a far-fetched inference 
to interpret social movements as possible alternative channels to policy reform and potential 
vehicles to deliver new, bottom-up perspectives outside the hegemony for much needed 
economic development.  
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The argument raised by Campbell et al (2010: 964) is that policy makers who hold the 
political and economic power generally require a ‘kick’ before they act.  Thus, the 
overarching idea is that social movements are key elements in providing the said kick 
(Campbell et al, 2010: 964) and therefore it is worth paying more attention to their potential 
effectiveness especially within South Africa.   
However this raises questions on the role of social movements.  Are they just there to give 
a ‘kick’ and keep the more formal political actors honest?   Or do they take a more active 
role in reform?  Is giving a kick enough?  Does it get things moving?  Or do things tend to 
revert when the pressure is eased?  This is particularly important when deeper structural 
issues are the problem.  That is, it is relatively easy to force the government to change on a 
single issues, like fee free education.  It is harder to achieve deep structural change on 
systemic issues such as the neoliberal hegemony that underlies financial exclusion.  South 
Africa’s experience, as is discussed in chapter three, suggests that so far post-apartheid 
social movements have tended to do the former.  For example, #FeesMustFall was very clear 
about not wanting fees, but a) it was quite vague about what alternative model it wanted and 
b) it largely failed to participate in processes of reform (for example the Fees Commission) 
and tended to be characterised as ‘unreasonable’. 
The post-apartheid South African case ostensibly provides a narrative of low quality and 
seemingly fragmented and weak social movements (especially the new social movements) 
despite the irrefutable socio-economic issues plaguing the South African economy that 
compel the need for relief for the majority in South Africa (Aliber and Cousins, 2013: 140). 
According to Rosa (2012:3), there has historically been a strong social movement group 
presence in South Africa; however, South African pressure groups have not been as 
successful or influential on the ground especially in the post-apartheid era.  Waves of social 
movement action such as protests have become a constant feature of life in the areas in which 
the poor ‘masses’ live (Friedman, 2012: 89). Despite this considerable upsurge of social 
movement action, for the most part, social movements have not achieved many concrete 
changes to law, policy and practice for their participants (Friedman, 2012: 92).  The state 
and effectiveness of social movements will be analysed in greater detail in chapter three to 
follow. 
The idea that if a particular group or class of people feels marginalised or disadvantaged in 
some way then automatically there will be some either organised or spontaneous collective 
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effort to try bring about change echoes in the Latin American case (Vergara-Camus, 2013: 
597).  This resonates quite closely with the arguments put forward by Bretton and Bretton 
(1969) that social movements emerge as part of a heightening sense of grievance around 
issues of identity and adverse social relationships.  
A comparison of social movements in countries where they played a major role in political 
and social change (Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil and Bolivia) and movements in countries 
where they were marginalised (Mexico, Peru, Paraguay, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay) reveals 
several fundamental differences. Wherever they had marginal or limited significance, the 
organisations were fragmented, dispersed and without significant national leadership or 
structure and without any political leverage on the institutions of national power (Petras, 
2009) which is reminiscent of the South African case. 
There are other interesting resonances between the South African and Latin American cases.  
Therefore using a ‘comparative’ perspective, this study will be useful in highlighting the 
gaps between the South African case and the Latin American case and the potential lessons 
that can be drawn to reconcile social movements and economic development in South 
Africa. Given the generally uncontested socio-economic problems plaguing South Africa, it 
is important to critically investigate whether these problems such as the widening inequality 
gaps and persistently high poverty and sluggish growth can be addressed through activities 
of social movement groups and the potential economic development that may arise.  
1.3 Goals of the Research 
The overarching goal is to bring the literature on political agency (especially social 
movements) and the economic developmental model together to answer the key research 
question: Are social movements a solution to South Africa’s structural and developmental 
economic problems?  Therefore, it follows that the sub goals of the research are to: 
i). investigate whether socio-economic problems can be addressed and improved through 
social movements in post-apartheid South Africa. 
ii). investigate whether social movements can be useful proponents in economic 
development in post-apartheid South Africa. 
iii). compare the social movement cases in Latin America to the South African cases and 
identify and interpret any gaps. 
6 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
In order to address the research questions adequately, the research is an exploratory, 
descriptive and qualitative study with a Post-Positivist Paradigm as the underlying 
epistemology (Aliyu et al, 2014: 81).  Qualitative research refers to a systematic subjective 
approach used to describe world views and life experiences and give them meaning (Burns 
and Grove, 2003: 356).  It involves the systematic collection and analysis of subjective 
narrative information in an intuitive manner in order to identify broad perspectives.  This 
was the most relevant method since this is a broad study that draws on perceptions on social 
movements and current affairs pertaining to social movements and is predominantly a 
reflection of current practice connected to the deeper theme. The idea is that future research 
might expand on the findings of this research.   
In order to tackle the research’s sub goal of comparing the social movement cases in Latin 
America to the South African cases in order to identify and interpret any gaps the research 
used a comparative research method (Collier, 1993: 106).  According to Collier (1993: 106), 
the comparative method is the analysis of a small number of cases by bringing into focus 
suggestive similarities and contrasts amongst the cases.  This may be adopted where there 
exist cases in which the phenomena under consideration are similar and exhibit attributes 
that are of interest to the researcher (Collier, 1993: 105).  In this case, Latin America was 
used as the comparative case since it exhibits similar economic development and economic 
structure to South Africa.  The World Bank Classification (according to Income Group and 
Lending Categories) (World Bank, 2016), classifies South Africa as well as the bulk of Latin 
American countries as Upper-Middle Income economies and therefore may be considered 
comparable economically.  
The overarching goal of the research is to bring the literature on political agency (especially 
social movements) and the developmental model (neoliberalism and developmentalism) 
together. Therefore, the data collection tool that was used was a Systematic Literature 
Review (Cronin et al, 2008: 40). According to Cronin et al (2008: 39), a systematic literature 
review is a more rigorous and well-defined approach to reviewing the literature in a specific 
subject area.  This study benefited most from a Systematic Literature Review because in 
conducting the research, the main aim was to understand social meanings, look at, describe 
and understand experiences, the political economy, beliefs and values, and draw 
recommendations based on such intangible variables whilst minimising bias. This 
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systematic approach was beneficial because information was gathered from several different 
sources thus using a standardised search method aided in avoiding personal biases. 
Because it followed a set method, the systematic approach avoided the bias of beginning 
with an idea and then selecting appropriate studies selectively (Creswell, 1998: 75).  The 
research followed an evidence-based non-statistical approach used to analyse, evaluate and 
interpret the findings of multiple existing researches (Cronin et al, 2008: 40) known as the 
PQRS system (Cohen, 1990). Using this method, the key was to, from each literature, 
Preview, Question, Read and finally Summarise key elements with the aim of transforming 
individual findings into one wholesome interpretation.  The process was as follows: 
i). Preview – this involved identifying, in a structured way, the appropriate and related 
information (Cronin et al, 2008: 40). In this study, electronic searches were done using 
standardised keywords or search filters on a number of economic, social and political 
databases and websites. The references of full-text papers were also searched to establish 
the necessary depth and breadth.  To supplement the electronic searches, journals and books 
were also hand-searched using the same standardised keywords. 
ii). Question – this involved assessing applicability, relevance and quality of material 
(Cronin et al, 2008: 40).  For an unbiased assessment, the search sought to cover all the 
literature however there was an overwhelming volume of literature available.  Therefore in 
this study, the criteria for selecting sources followed a standardised protocol in order to 
ensure the quality and relevancy of the literature included in the literature review. Namely, 
considering number of citations of each literature, establishing whether the literature has 
been peer-reviewed as well as the number of peer-reviews and assessing the source of the 
literature (date and author availability).  Further, grey literature material that is not formally 
published, such as institutional or technical reports, working papers, conference 
proceedings, or other documents not normally subject to editorial control or peer review 
were tested using the inclusion criteria.   
iii). Read – this involved assimilating the information contained in the literature (Cronin et 
al, 2008: 40).  In this study, this was done throughout the research process and a table was 
constructed highlighting each author, main arguments, and any criticisms, points of 
convergence or disagreement with other literature for ease of recording findings. 
iv). Summarise – this involved an analysis and interpretation of the findings (Cronin et al, 
2008: 40).  Given the subjective nature of this study, the ‘bottom-line’ of the key elements 
8 
 
in each literature were established with the aim of transforming the individual findings into 
a new interpretation.   
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
Following this introductory first chapter, the second chapter elucidates the important 
conceptual framework surrounding social movements. Here, the theories surrounding social 
movements are explored in great detail with the major focus being on two main frameworks 
namely the Neoclassical Model and the Political Economy Theory.  The main aim of this 
chapter is to set up the theoretical component of social movements and the theory will 
provide more clarity on the constructed role of social movements in economic development.   
The third chapter will highlight the South African case engaging deeply with the narrative 
of social movements historically and to date.   The main focus of this chapter is to elaborate 
on the discourse of neoliberalism in post-apartheid South Africa and how this has influenced 
the South African political economy.  The state of social movements in South Africa will 
also be reflected upon making inferences based on the discussions on the political economy.  
The analysis reveals that the landscape of social movements in South Africa is complex with 
social movements often being met with disdain and violent opposition from political and 
economic elites as a result of the dominant neoliberal democracy.  As a contrasting chapter, 
chapter four will focus on the Latin American case expanding on the history of social 
movements in Latin America and the subsequent impact on economic development in Latin 
America.  The Latin American case presents a cautiously more positive outlook with social 
movements forming more influential alliances and being at the centre of several socio-
economic as well as political changes. 
Chapter five will focus on two case studies from South Africa in an attempt to focus the 
discussion and hone in on the broad inferences in chapter three and four.  Making use of the 
reflections from preceding chapters as tools for analysis, chapter five will take a closer look 
at social movements in South Africa.  The idea is to use the case studies to bring the research 
to a focus as well as to highlight the differences between the South African case and the 
Latin American case in a practical manner.  The final chapter will conclude.   
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Introduction 
One of the tenets of neoclassical economics is that economic choices are often made based 
on the likelihood than an economic option will turn out to be lucrative or valuable in the 
future.  This is useful in thinking about the motivation for human behaviour, and in this 
particular context, participation in social movements.  Part of the attraction of economic 
theory is that it attempts to describe policies that will improve people’s lives.  In this way 
the neoclassical model warrants its place in the narrative of a phenomena which has, in the 
past, piqued the interest of scholars in its potential to improve people’s welfare; namely 
social movements.  The Neoclassical Framework that is discussed in this chapter is centred 
on neoclassical economic theory.  It forms a starting point in the discussion of social 
movements and provides insight on the emergence and development of social movements.  
Another important consideration is the political economy.  Bebbington (2010: 9) contends 
that there is a political relationship between democracy, the state and markets.  These 
domains are inherently related to one another as well as to society and largely cannot exist 
separately.  The ways in which markets work depends on how they are regulated by the state 
as well as dominant ideas on how markets should work (Bebbington, 2010: 9). 
There has been an increasing nostalgia for the developmental state in the South African 
political economy (Edigheji, 2010).  Edigheji states that South Africa revealed this through 
the expressed commitment of the ANC-led alliance and government to build such a state.  
The New Growth Path (NGP) in 2010 has been a policy framework that has attempted to 
solidify the developmental state in South Africa. However, questions have been raised in as 
far as whether adopting state-led development is the best development model in South 
Africa.  As such the big debate between neoliberalism and developmentalism warrants its 
place in this research as it theorises on the political economy in South Africa and assists in 
solidifying the relevance and role social movements may play in the economic development 
process. 
The main aim of this chapter is to better understand the function of social movements 
through setting up the theoretical arguments surrounding social movements.  This theoretical 
basis will set up the background and provide a descriptive analysis of the research questions 
at hand.  This chapter will also reflect on the theory and attempt to provide clarity on the 
role and relevance of social movements as well as the potential effectiveness of social 
movements in the development project.   
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The next section (2.2) will introduce the discussion on the Neoclassical Framework which 
deals with explaining the emergence of social movements and draws mainly on the work of 
Bretton and Bretton.  This section will help present the economic rationality behind social 
movements through analysing the demand and supply of social movements.   While the third 
section (2.3) deals with the Political Economy Framework in which the big debate on the 
effect of the developmentalist state versus neoliberalism on economic development 
emerges.  Section 2.4 reflects on the two frameworks and makes broad inferences on the 
theory.  The idea is to explore the more common premises underlying each model and try to 
link these with the broader issues (big debates) of social movements in this context.   
2.2. Neoclassical Model 
The neoclassical model helps explain the origins, development and outcomes of social 
movements.  The rationality behind this framework is guided by a general definition of 
neoclassical economics which, according to Dequech (2007: 280), is characterised by a 
combination of the following features:  
i) the importance of rationality with utility maximisation as the criterion for rationality, 
ii) the emphasis on equilibrium as the default state of stability and 
iii) the disregard of uncertainty.  
The relevance of these characteristics will become more apparent with the following further 
unpacking of the emergence and progression of social movements. These central variables 
in the neoclassical model constitute, among other things, an explanation of the structural 
composition of social movements and the role of shared beliefs in guiding social movements 
(Morris and Herring, 1984: 538).   
Bretton and Bretton (1969: 198) postulated that social movements emerge in relatively well-
defined circumstances and tend to be associated with specific socio-economic factors. Thus 
the development of their ‘theory of public choice’ which attempts to theorise the progression 
and emergence of social movements by using the neoclassical framework of market clearing 
forces of supply and demand.   
They argued that people hold a more or less defined opinion about the size and timing of 
their income streams based on the state of the world (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 200).   A 
key assumption of this theory is the rationality of human behaviour which is testament to 
the first feature given by Dequech (2007: 280).  They argued that people rationalise and 
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compare in order to come up with what they expect to be their level of income and quality 
of life based on some factor such as level of education or years of experience. They then 
compare their quality of life with other people falling in similar ‘brackets’.   Any changes in 
their income and quality of life deviating from their expected trajectories that cannot be 
explained by changes in personal factors will lead to people looking to changes in their 
environment for an explanation. For example, a reduction in welfare may be attributed to a 
personal change such as illness or infirmity which would lead to the individual in question 
adjusting their expected income prospects.  However, if it is not explained by any personal 
attributes then individuals will blame the ‘environment’ for any changes in economic 
welfare (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 200) and attempt to adjust back to the expected 
trajectory. This is testament to the second feature of neoclassical economic behavior as 
described by Dequech (2007: 280) namely the emphasis on equilibrium as the default state 
of stability.  The higher the need for adjustment the higher the need to change the 
environment and therefore creating a ‘demand for social change’ (Bretton and Bretton, 1969: 
201).  
Morris and Herring (1984: 552) also argue the Frustration-Anger-Aggression explanation 
that is closely linked to the argument raised by Bretton and Bretton.  They put forward that 
when people identify marked differences between the privileges they enjoy and what they 
feel they ought to enjoy they become frustrated and angered and consequently participate in 
social movement action such as protests to compensate the feelings of deprivation (Morris 
and Herring 1984: 552).  
Social movements provide their participants with a vehicle to demand the social change they 
desire.  They allow participants the opportunity to collectively demand change on issues that 
were otherwise individual in nature. If there is a general sense of incongruences between 
what people expect and what society delivers the response is the emergence of social 
movements in an attempt to reverse the adverse circumstances (Morris and Herring, 1984: 
552). Essentially socioeconomic changes such as economic downturns or depressions lead 
to politicised anger which finds expression through participation in movements and protests 
(Morris and Herring, 1984: 552).   
Adding to Bretton and Bretton’s (1969) argument, Frank and Fuentes (1987) take it a step 
further and explain that social movements decline in number and strength during economic 
upturns and revive during economic downturns (Frank and Fuentes, 1987: 1504).  This is 
consistent with Bretton and Bretton’s theory that when there is a deviation from expected 
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welfare and income not attributable to personal factors individuals will blame their 
environment and demand social change.  In this case a slowdown in economic growth would 
be the triggering factor.   When the economic downturn most detrimentally affects people's 
livelihood and identity, the social movements become more invasive and robust (Frank and 
Fuentes, 1987: 1505).   So the demand for social movements varies as frustration varies and 
is cyclical in nature. 
The supply of social movements is based on the premise of economic theory of the firm and 
markets that asserts that demand for products creates opportunities for profits and therefore 
supply. In this way, Bretton and Bretton (1969: 201) propose that the demand for social 
change creates opportunities for social profits which entrepreneurs would want to reap and 
therefore will supply or provide social movements for those who want them.  In this way 
supply follows demand and social movements emerge that actively seek to adjust the 
environment back to the perceived stable or satisfactory state (equilibrium).  
An important point that Frank and Fuentes (1987: 1505) describe is that as the demands of 
a particular social movement are met, it tends to lose force or it becomes an organisation 
and ceases to be a social movement according to the broad definition adopted in this study.  
More often than not, however, the negative circumstances themselves eventually change and 
movements lose their appeal and force through irrelevance or it is transformed or its 
members move to another movement with new demands (Frank and Fuentes, 1987: 1505).  
Supply of social movements essentially dwindles where people get tired or issues go away.  
The question then becomes how can social movements ensure longevity of supply?  
In order to be continuous, supply requires at least some form of structure or organisation 
(Ballard et al, 2005: 627; Bebbington, 2010: 3).  Here the argument is that social movement 
actions and processes require financial, human, informational, social and other resources 
that are more localised and that informal social networks are unable to mobilise. Such 
resources can almost only be channelled through some form of formal organisation and plays 
an important role in keeping movements “moving” by maintaining debates, supporting 
events, nurturing leaders during ebbs in movement activity (Ballard et al, 2005:627).   
The essence of the Neoclassical Model is that individuals are rational beings who seek to 
maximise their welfare and utility. Where individuals find themselves in disequilibrium they 
blame their environment which in this context includes the political actors, the government 
and the policies in place.  Thus the need to challenge these and demand change in order to 
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return to equilibrium.  This consolidates the neoclassical stance on the role of social 
movements.  Social movements provide the vehicle to demand the social change. They act 
as vessels to make otherwise individual problems into collective problems and provide 
individuals with a collective means to achieve their socio-economic goals.  They give 
individuals an opportunity to achieve economies of scale in social justice. The role of social 
movements in economic development therefore is to facilitate change and facilitate the 
return to equilibrium.   
Consolidating this, Campbell et al (2010: 963), assert that the role of social movements is 
to create an environment in which the demands of marginalised people are heard and acted 
upon.  Social movements facilitate the empowerment of the poor and marginalised in society 
and facilitate economic development through challenging power relations.  Social 
movements essentially give a voice to the poor people and allow collective engagement in 
what may have been individual issues.   
The Neoclassical Model is a useful starting point but begs more questions than it answers. 
Demand exists because of frustration and then supply emerges in response to this demand.  
But what then? Once social movements come into being how do they function? How do they 
organise themselves internally? How broad a set of issues should they focus on? Should they 
ally themselves with other social movements, business, and political parties or should they 
emphasise autonomy? Should they aspire to be a permanent part of the political landscape 
or should they exist ‘for purpose’? Finally, what is it that determines the success or failure 
of social movements? 
In the discussions that follow, it is argued that what the neoclassical framework lacks is 
specificity.  Economically, the neoclassical framework tends to argue that the economy is a 
zero sum game, that is, social movements (and political interference in markets more 
generally) distribute resources to their constituents at the expense of others.  As will be 
argued in the following section, this is a crucial shortcoming. The neoclassical model is 
implicit in that there already is a “right” development model in place and it does not deeply 
consider the interaction between politics and economics.    Politics profoundly influence 
both distribution and the development path.  There is need to look at the specific political 
and economic contexts in which social movements are located in order to answer these 
questions.   
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2.3 Political Economy Framework 
Several strategies have been designed and implemented in developing countries in order to 
promote development.  Many have contributed to increased growth in some countries but 
they have largely failed due to several factors such as ineffective leadership, poor 
implementation, policy discontinuation and in some cases an environment that is not 
conducive for private sector growth.  The failure of these strategies has led to the continued 
search for the appropriate strategy to address the economic development problem in 
developing countries once and for all.  The relationship between the state and organised 
interests has been at the centre of this discourse.  Chibber (2012: 168) asserts that the 
discussion has been mainly centred on two forms of politics namely the neoliberal state and 
the developmental state in developing middle income countries.  
In the context of this research, the term developmental state is being used to discuss 
alternatives to neoliberalism more generally, including those forms that existed in Latin 
America before neoliberalism (and which worked fairly well albeit with the problems that 
Chibber predicts), and so-called social democracy (with its very interesting political model) 
and economically the social investment state.  The point about all these is that economic 
development is not left to market forces alone.   
The developmental state represents an emerging social and economic policy paradigm with 
one main policy logic namely social investment (Morel et al, 2012: 8).  Social investments 
policies such as investing in human capital, labour market policies, social protection 
institutions, are seen to have a positive economic role and are seen as essential to economic 
growth and development under the developmental state paradigm.  This represents a break 
from the neoliberal view of social policy which is seen largely as a wasteful cost and 
hindrance to economic development (Morel et al, 2010: 8). The developmental state 
paradigm emerges as a critique of the neoliberal policy stance but is also above all based on 
an understanding that there is a need to reconcile social and economic goals.  
Chibber (2005) argues that though early 20th century developmentalism went wrong, the 
neoliberalism that replaced it is, if anything, worse (Chibber, 2005: 227).  Neoliberalism 
gained popularity globally in the 1970’s and was initially championed in the industrially 
developed global north (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 247).  The rise of neoliberalism was 
connected to the globalisation of markets and the internationalisation of funds and through 
this a general international consensus on neoliberalism was formed and was spread across 
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the globe aided by international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
(Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 247).  
Neoliberalism, according to Harvey (2005: 3), is “the intensification of the influence and 
dominance of capital”. Basically the elevation of capital from being just a mode of 
production to being a set of political imperatives. So perhaps the best way of defining 
neoliberalism is political where neoliberalism is a realignment of the state behind the interest 
of capital. According to Harvey (2005: 3), neoliberalism can be seen as a project to 
strengthen and/or restore the power of economic elites whilst weakening the role of the state.  
Neoliberalism is precisely a partnership between the state and globalised capital, with capital 
dominant—the state in effect is the servant of capital.  Neoliberalism is a political ideology 
that has been conceptualised and implemented through macroeconomic policies (Segatti and 
Pons-Vignon, 2013: 539).   It is based on neoclassical policies such as deregulation and 
privatisation but it should not be confused with them (Bresser-Pereira, 2009:15).  
Neoliberalism is more about the idea that giving power to capital is the best way to achieve 
development—not deregulation and liberalisation per se. 
In Streeck’s terms (2015: 12) it is the dominance of ‘markets’ over ‘people’ (where 
‘markets’ means the financial elites and ‘people’ is the democratic force from below).  The 
neoliberal state according to Streeck (2015:7) is not committed to anything ideological such 
as free markets or deregulations per se and it is prepared to compromise on these if it is in 
its interest.  For example a certain amount of regulation stabilises capitalism and is therefore 
good for capital while some welfare policies are also good for capital.  This is corroborated 
by Cammack’s (2002) critique of the World Bank’s anti-poverty policies.  Cammack (2002: 
132) argues that the World Bank’s outwardly progressive anti-poverty strategy such as 
advocating for provision of education and good healthcare does not represent a shift from 
neoliberalism towards a welfare state, it is actually a programme for the establishment and 
consolidation of capitalism on a global scale.  What Cammack (2002: 132) argues is that 
some social policies such as improving basic education and providing health care for 
workers are in fact an ‘attack on the poor’ and are simply a means of exploiting poor people 
and a way to provide capital with numbers of people with sufficient health and education to 
be exploited as workers while simultaneously reducing the risk of investments.   
Increasing polarisation, increased poverty rates, growing problems of inequality and the 
costs of social exclusion gave rise to the critique of neoliberal politics (Morel et al, 2012: 
8).  These issues qualified that unfettered markets are not necessarily the most appropriate 
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and efficient organising principle in all cases (Morel et al, 2012: 10).  The issue of the 
potential of market failures reinforced the need for some government intervention and 
direction of market forces (Morel et al, 2012: 10).  The rise of China, East Asia and some 
Latin American countries as newly industrialised countries (attributed to their 
developmentalist stance) has also further renewed the interest in the role of the state in the 
development process.     
However interestingly, despite deepening social inequality under neoliberalism, many 
governments exhibit some inertia towards shifting the development model. The wider 
neoliberal view is that the social inequality that may arise due to market operations is in fact 
necessary to motivate economic actors (Morel et al, 2012: 13).  So what emerges is what 
Watkins (2010: 13) terms a moderated ‘regulatory liberalism’. What Watkins argues is that 
a convergence in thinking that neoliberalism is the best economic model precludes thinking 
about other varieties of economic models including the purely developmental state 
(Watkins, 2010: 13).  Thus rendering the economics stuck despite serious structural 
problems.    
Generous social policy is actually held responsible for a culture of dependency amongst 
citizens under neoliberalism (Morel et al, 2012: 7). As a result under neoliberalism political 
actions such as service delivery protests are shunned.  This idea is developed in chapter three 
where the notion that protestors in South Africa for example are understood as having a 
dependency syndrome where they simply want the government to give them things without 
working for them is used as a justification for the contempt for social movements.  So the 
state’s role in distribution of wealth is rolled back as its intervention is seen to be too costly 
and resulting in market inefficiency.  Social responsibility is shifted towards the market with 
less emphasis on security and more emphasis on incentives.  This notion resonates in chapter 
five when considering land reform in South Africa. Farmers are offered incentives to enter 
markets instead of simply giving away land. Too much support in the form of being given 
land is seen as a work disincentive. As a result the land reform agenda has failed to take off 
as the neoliberal stance stifles it.    
As a critique, the developmental state paradigm emphasises state led development. Under 
developmentalism, the state intervenes more directly in the economy through a variety of 
means to effect social and economic development.  Productive social policy is seen as a 
precondition for economic growth.  The idea is that social outlays can yield long run 
surpluses for both individuals and society as a whole (Morel el al, 2012: 5).  Chibber asserts 
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that in countries where free market or neoliberal polices have little credibility due to their 
failure to address structural problems such as inequality, it seems logical in principle to 
revert to developmentalism and implement a statist agenda.  
Early developmentalist states were successful in reconciling the dual goals of equality and 
efficiency which are seen as conflicting goals under neoliberalism (Morel et al, 2012: 5).  In 
the 19th century the more an economy lacked the conditions for spontaneous 
industrialisation, the more the earlier states were able to substitute the state for the market 
as the leading agent of economic development (Austin, 2010: 54).  There was an increasing 
emphasis on the state as a strategic regulator and playing the role of governor of the market.  
But Austin (2010) notes that this was not as effective in the 20th century.  The later 20th 
century states faced different circumstances than their predecessors due to several changes 
such as technology which allowed for spontaneous industrialisation (Austin, 2010: 55).  
Chibber (2005) contends that the early developmental state is even less likely to work in the 
21st century because of further changes in technology and trade rules amongst other things.  
The 2008 global crisis and the growth of the East as newly industrialised economies for 
example have given the developmental state a chance to rise as the new economic paradigm.  
But in order for it to be successful there is need to refine the developmental state ideas.  The 
success of implementing the developmentalist state today depends on it being broad enough 
to not only match the successes of past approaches but to supersede them.  The 
developmental state has gained steam as an alternative model primarily out of 
disenchantment with neoliberalism but its relevance depends on its ability to be adapted.  
New current developmental challenges demand a new and improved socio-economic policy.   
Chibber (2005) warns that before reverting back to the developmentalist state paradigm 
there is need to look deeply into the reasons why the early developmentalist state failed.  
Chibber blames the failure of early 20th century developmentalism on its reliance on a 
working political alliance between the state and national capitalists or ‘national 
bourgeoisie’- the so called developmental alliance.  According to Chibber (2005: 227), since 
national capitalists derived profits from the domestic market, the state assumed that they 
therefore naturally had an interest in domestic development.  So the state saw national 
capitalists as natural allies collaborating in the shared project of national development. 
Chibber (2005) argues that it is precisely this assumption that led to the demise of the 
developmentalist state and needs to be challenged going forward.   
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One of the early political assumptions was that within the developmental alliance, the state 
would take the lead but in reality the state struggled to direct, for example, the flow of private 
domestic investment into public sectors with high social benefits and away from private 
sectors.  The state thought that given the bourgeoisie’s own declaration in favour of rapid 
economic development that they would cede to state the autonomy it needed to build policy 
instruments that targeted welfare and thus improve livelihoods.   
However through state protection, the inadvertent consequence was that national capitalists 
grew to be dominant monopolists.  They accepted help (protectionist policies such as import 
protection and subsidies) from the state that allowed them to make large profits but resisted 
any discipline (industrial policy) from the state in terms of what they did with the profits.  
When it came to the state’s power to demand compliance from local firms in as far as 
directing profits towards constructive investment patterns or to punish speculative profit 
making activities, it lost the support of the business class.  
Firms resisted discipline and were not eager to ‘do the hard stuff’ because they were able to 
make large profits despite operating inefficiently through subsidies and import protection.  
State intervention was seen as an “unacceptable encumbrance in exploiting profits fully” 
(Chibber, 2005: 233).  As a result state power was more ceremonial than anything else and 
the state had very little to no power to influence private investment (Chibber, 2005: 235). 
The state could funnel resources to firms with attached stipulations and conditions regarding 
their use but had little influence to ensure enforcement.  Capitalists were thus able to divert 
funds away from targeted public sectors into their own preferred lines (Chibber, 2005: 237).  
So developementalism essentially led to massive transfer of national resources to local 
capitalists.  There was development and industrial growth but at an enormous cost to the 
public.  So the trajectory that the early developmental state produced was initial rapid 
economic growth followed by stagnation and rent seeking. 
This is a crucial point.  The progression described by Chibber highlights the natural tendency 
of the developmentalist state to deliver a particular trajectory characterised by rapid growth 
at first, followed by stagnation and rent seeking activities.  The resisted discipline idea 
explains why the early developmental state eventually failed to provide sustained economic 
growth.  This set the stage for neoliberalism to replace the early developmentalist state.    
So the crisp question that then arises is how can a new developmental state avoid this 
tendency? The key idea is political.  Evans (1995) argues that what governs a healthy 
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relationship between the state and the markets is not how much state intervention but what 
kind of state intervention.  Evans (1995) argues that states can foster a consistent trajectory 
of economic development through an ‘embedded autonomy’.  This outlines the conditions 
under which the developmental state can encourage private enterprise to pursue public 
interests.  
Firstly there is need for mature rationalised bureaucratic institutions (characterised by 
discipline, corporate coherence and professionalism) that cannot be manipulated. This is to 
ensure that political actors have the autonomy to resist corruption and capture by actors 
whose rent-seeking behavior would derail the state’s agenda of economic development 
(Evans, 1995). Evans highlights however that this is not enough and that this should be 
coupled with an embeddedness in social networks that places political actors in close contact 
with civil society and labour (Evans, 1995).  This combination of embedded autonomy 
ensures that the state has genuine capacity to pursue economic development but at the same 
time is sufficiently constrained by outside forces so that its actions do not simply foster the 
interests of state elites (Evans, 1995).   
Chibber (2005) also blames another problematic feature of the alliance between state and 
national capitalists for the failure of the early developmental state.  Namely that it required 
undesirable concessions from labour.  Labour became completely marginalised by the state 
in the hopes of getting favour from the national bourgeoisie.  The state narrowed the political 
space with the goal of allaying any fears that business had and maintaining business 
confidence. Further the state believed that national development could not be trusted to the 
labouring poor and policy was limited to the state and political elites as well the national 
capitalists (Chibber, 2005: 236).  Since unions were too confident in the state’s ability to 
protect their interests, labour allowed itself to be demobilised.  There was a tendency for 
labour to be seduced by all the talk about rapid development.  Labour fell into the false hope 
of corporatism and hoped that by getting formally incorporated into the state and its planning 
bodies this would make up for its lack of power but this proved to be a misjudgment.  Once 
demobilised, the balance of power shifted even more decidedly towards the business class 
further narrowing the political space and increasing the ability of capital to set the terms for 
policy and state building (Chibber, 2005: 237).   
The question that arises is how can the political space be broadened under a 
developmentalist state paradigm?  This is where new forms of politics come in. It sharpens 
the need to think about the possible role social movements can play. If the early 
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developmental state failed to produce the expected results of economic development this 
reflects the need for some other form of politics or political pressure in the new 
developmental state paradigm hence the justification of social movements.  Social 
movements would open up the political space to challenge the usurpation of the state by 
national capitalists given the incapacity of institutions such as labour unions to do so through 
their incorporation into the state.  What this highlights is the need for some different political 
arrangement than the one that characterised the early developmental state.  The key idea 
here is that it is important to get both the economic model right as well as the political 
coalitions to back it up.  
Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that “just as a swallow a spring does not make” social 
movements should also aim to be more than just once off mobilisations in order to be 
effective.  This inflection also reveals one of the shortcomings of the neoclassical analysis.  
Social movements should evolve beyond just mobilisation.  A short term campaign or a 
week of street protests might be dramatic and attract interest and attention but are ultimately 
short lived events (Bebbington, 2011: 1).  Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that when protests 
are linked to a series of other issues and other activities sustained over time all ultimately 
oriented towards making a similar set of arguments then they are of quality and likely to 
achieve real change.  This has important implications about the operation of social 
movements in this context.  Once social movements have emerged then they should shy 
away from identity politics and over emphasizing single issues and form meaningful 
alliances in order to consolidate their causes.  
Bebbington (2011: 3) also argues that there should be an overlap between goals amongst 
social movements in order for them to have sustenance and coherence.  That is though they 
are composed of different ideas and identities but when linked together they become one 
larger identity.  Social movements should essentially be a larger identity composed of 
organisations, ideas social networks and a repertoire of actors and actions.  As opposed to 
being focused on single issues and assuming that individual successes on singe issues will 
eventually cascade and result in a larger success overall.  What Bebbington (2011: 1) argues 
for is a sense of aligned social movements instead of fragmented isolated movements.  In 
this way social movements can be of quality in the sense that they are not just actors or 
individuals in a zero sum game (as implied by the neoclassical analysis) but rather are a 
process sustained by a set of actors and actions motivated by shared grievances.  
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Another important implication of Bebbington’s (2011: 3) argument is that social movements 
should not emerge around issues or immediate sources of discomfort and should go deeper 
than this simple neoclassical emergence (arising due to frustration).  Social movements 
should contest the processes that are linked to the production of the immediate sources of 
discomfort.  Movements should emerge round drivers rather than symptoms an address these 
issues through protest and political action.  Social movements should contest the existing 
distributional arrangements, economic and social policies on the ground that cause the 
surface problems.  For example, landless people should not protest their lack of land per se 
but they should challenge tenure agreements, poor people should not protest their poverty 
but should challenge the development model in place that is increasing poverty, students 
should not protest the lack of access to education but should instead challenge the economic 
policies in place that make education financially exclusionary and inaccessible to poor 
families.  The idea should be to aim to shift the system within which the injustices and 
exclusions are embedded.   
There is an important implication of Bebbington’s argument.  The neoclassical justification 
for participation in social movements is a mobilisation of people who individually feel that 
they have been denied or excluded from something or are being treated unjustly and 
inequitably either by particular actions or by institutions and policies that in their view 
discriminate against them. The nominal neoclassical view is that social movements look for 
something “different” for their participants.  However Bebbington challenges this view.  
Though what Bebbington describes does take social movements to be reflections of 
discomfort and disagreement with the status quo it understands their demands as being 
something “better” rather than just something different.  This means that when dealing with 
issues of injustice it brings the two themes together.  It requires a particular framing of issues 
as more than just the surface symptom but a framing in terms of the cause of the issue as 
being rooted ultimately in relationships of power and of policy as determined by political 
processes.  Social movements should make visible alternative ideas and concepts about the 
forms development should take and not just end at highlighting injustices and unfairness 
(Bebbington, 2011: 4).  This diffuses the risk that social movements may be viewed as 
simply a phenomenon that serves only to reflect weaknesses in political parties and therefore 
seen as transitional and of secondary importance (Bebbington, 2011: 31).   
This brings in the political relationship between democracy, the state and markets.  The state 
in this context encompasses the judicial and legal institutions, public bureaucracy, legislative 
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institutions and political parties (Bebbington, 2010: 9).  While markets refers to institutions 
and arrangements through which commercial and economic transactions occur (Bebbington, 
2010: 9).  These domains are inherently related to one another as well as to society and 
largely cannot exist separately.  The ways in which markets work depends on how they are 
regulated by the state as well as dominant ideas on how markets should work (Bebbington, 
2010: 9).  An adequate analysis of neoliberalism entails joining understandings of it as a 
class project (and/or economic policy) with conceptions of neoliberalism as governmentality 
and as hegemony of democracy (Hart, 2008: 687).  In the narrative of neoliberalism and 
governability, the focus is on the effect of neoliberal economics on governability and 
democracy and narratives on ‘neoliberal democracy’ as a political hegemony emerge.   
Looking at the interaction between economic development models and democracy, Mans-
Gorse and Nitcher (2008: 1400) contend that much of the disagreement over the impact of 
market reforms on democracy results from the different emphasis that scholars place on the 
consequences of economic liberalisation (the implementation of reform) versus the effects 
of increased economic liberalism (the outcome of reforms). By contrast, three primary 
scenarios underlie the arguments that market reforms foster or reinforce democracy. All 
three pertain to economic liberalism (the degree of economic liberty in a given country). 
First, there is dispersion of power.  Freer markets disperse economic resources, allowing 
those with economic power to offset the influence of those with political power.  Secondly, 
higher levels of trade and capital flows increase international constraints on domestic 
politics, facilitating enforcement of democratic norms. And finally, market reforms 
demobilise labour and peasant movements, reducing their capacity to make politically 
destabilising redistributive demands (Mans-Gorse and Nitcher, 2008: 1400).   
But this is precisely the issue. What this argument fails to consider is the quality of the 
democracy under given economic development models.  Where there is social 
demobilisation it represents low quality democracy.  The scenarios provided by Mans-Gorse 
and Nitcher that argue for neoliberalism promoting democracy may be true in the promotion 
of nominal democracy but not real democracy.  Liberal democracy involves a balance 
between the rule of law, electoral politics and free markets (Streeck, 2015: 24).  However, 
where this balance becomes uneven this shifts into neoliberal democracy and a consolidated 
state develops where the needs of business become more important than the needs of society 
and there is no real democracy on the ground (Streeck, 2015: 24). Citizen participation in 
politics becomes largely diminished by the state.    
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Mans-Gorse and Nitcher (2008: 1400) also provide that on the other hand the perception of 
the destabilising effects of market reforms on democracy often focuses on two scenarios. 
Both refer to economic liberalisation (the process of implementing reforms).  Firstly, the 
introduction of market reforms entails short-term social costs, which produce a politically 
destabilising popular backlash. And secondly the implementation of reforms requires the 
concentration of political power, risking the usurpation of democratic institutions by 
overzealous reformers.   
If the institutions through which citizens are able to access the political processes are 
democratic only in form rather than in content then what this essentially means is that a 
restrictive limited democracy is handed down from above in a reflection of some elite or 
dominant interests and reflects political impotence to challenge them (Cammack, 1991: 
544).  In that case, Cammack (1991: 544) contends that co-optation and repression are used 
to maintain this restricted democracy through stripping of formally democratic institutions 
of any accountable or representative character and rendering them channels for the 
maintenance of dominant class hegemony.  Secondly, this also entails the repression of the 
voice of the citizens through social demobilisation.  The state would seek to destabilise 
social movement action in order to reduce their capacity to make politically destabilising 
demands (Weyland, 2014: 145).    
The larger point here is that the ideas that govern how society perceives socio-economic 
issues (for example poverty, inequality) are causally related to the specific institutions that 
are put in place to act on these issues. However, the ideas that are dominant at any given 
time are not necessarily the ones that are true but the ones that are most powerful.   
Conventionally, citizens or society select political representatives through voting and 
convey their preferences over policy.  There are also unconventional ways by which citizens 
participate in democracy namely protests and demonstrations (which range from marches, 
blockades and at times violence as has been explained in chapter one).  
In that way democracy is not just about open institutionalised elections that give citizens 
access to participation in political processes (Bebbington, 2010: 9). These minimal 
conditions do not assure democratic quality and the opening up of political spaces for full 
participation (Valdivieso, 2009: 88).  Generally, a democratic system requires a level of 
commitment that exceeds the mere election of a parliament or a government (Welp, 2017: 
3).  This increases the level of institutional trust that citizens place in the politics (Welp, 
2017: 3).  Machado et al (2011: 343) argue that the strength and relevance of formal political 
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institutions are key determinants of the choice of political participation from citizens.  When 
institutions are strong and institutional trust in them is high, citizens are more likely to 
participate in conventional methods such as voting and using courts and other formal 
insititutions in order to air out their views.  Where institutions are weak and have low 
institutional trust then citizens are more likely to participate in unconventional methods such 
as protests (Machado et al, 2011: 343).   
Strong institutions represent a strong state which is not easily coerced by external actors 
who may derail it from pursuing its goals of economic development. This is testament to 
Evans (1995) ideas on the state maintaining its autonomy and resisting usurpation in order 
to be strong.  A strong state is also characterised by timely representation, transparency, 
accessibility to citizens and is not authoritarian or centralised. These factors improve 
institutional trust and represent real and quality democracy (Machado et al, 2011: 347).  
While a weak state is influenced by external groups pursuing their own interests at the 
expense of the state’s larger welfare goals.  
This elitist model of democracy represents a restricted democracy where citizens only 
participate in electoral politics.  State and institutions align themselves behind dominant 
interests.  Institutions are not easily accessible, courts may be too costly, biased or take too 
long and political representatives are unable or unwilling to listen to citizens.  Therefore in 
this case there is a higher payoff from participating in protests for example (Machado et al, 
2011: 347).  The more institutions lack the means to perform their duties well, the higher 
the incentives for citizens and groups to try to affect the policymaking process through more 
direct (and less institutionalized) channels, such as protests and demonstrations.  (Machado 
et al, 2011: 343).  When institutions are strong and capable, citizens expect decisions to be 
well thought of, to have longer term horizons, and to follow more transparent negotiation 
processes. They expect their input, conveyed through traditional institutional channels, to 
matter.  
Citizens in developed democracies know that by appealing to a court, for example, the 
constitutionality of a law will be considered (in cases where judicial review is present) and 
that their rights, if affected by a certain policy, will be safeguarded. Moreover, they know 
that if they bring their plights to their representatives there are good chances that these 
delegates, if willing, are able to do something about their concerns. When we move to an 
environment where institutions are weak, however, the prospects are bleaker. Complaints 
brought to the judiciary might drag for years and biases might arise. Representatives in the 
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legislature will often lack the expertise and the ability to make good decisions and to 
effectively advocate for their constituencies. Under such circumstances, people’s 
expectations of influencing policy through institutional venues decline. Moreover, systems 
characterised by such weaknesses tend to be more vulnerable to independent influences on 
the decision process. This, in turn, increases the expected payoff of protests and other group 
actions that can impose costs on decision makers if they fail to comply with the demands 
being made (Machado et al, 2011: 347).  
2.4 Reflections on the theory 
What the theory has done is to consolidate the place of social movements in the development 
project.  The two theories both view political activity including social movements as at least 
in part motivated by ‘rational’ economic motives.  Social movements are inherently 
economic in nature in the sense that they are centred on asking deeply economic questions 
about economic development and welfare improvement. Where the two theories differ is 
their conceptualisation of the underlying economy.  The Neoclassical Model essentially 
views the economy as a zero sum game. Political activity is at best competition over scarce 
resources and at worst rent seeking.  The role of social movements therefore is to help its 
participants gain at others’ expense or more positively defend its members against other 
powerful actors trying to gain at others’ expense.  People rationally join groups to achieve 
ends that they feel they cannot achieve individually.  So essentially social movements help 
people achieve economies of scale on social issues.  However, to end here would be an 
incomplete analysis. 
The Political Economy approach sees the economy as characterised by structural problems, 
inequality and other impediments to growth that are ultimately caused by power imbalances.  
So politics is not a zero sum game under this approach. The neoclassical approach talks 
about how pressure for social movements is strong when frustration is strong but it does not 
talk about structural issues.  The political economy brings the dynamic that there are 
incentives for social movements not only cyclically but whenever there are power 
imbalances.   
From the theory two issues emerge. The first is has the current development model or 
processes failed or got stuck? And secondly can social movements get things started up 
again?  On the first issue, Campbell et al (2010) assert that poor people are seldom able to 
make effective political demands or cause social change without the support of actors 
holding the political and economic power.  Escobar (1992: 412) argues that social 
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movements are of interest because they offer an alternative form of development and politics 
to the ‘conventional’ or mainstream dominant discourse.   
Morel et al (2012: 372) argue that to try and implement neoliberal recipes to cure a crisis 
caused by the application of neoliberal policies would not only be counterproductive but 
also creates an even deeper crisis economically.  Economically, there needs to be a paradigm 
shift away from neoliberalism but Morel et al (2012: 368) bemoan the lack of a clear fully 
fledged economic alternative model and the lack of political coalitions to back it up.  The 
developmental state presents itself as an alternate model however Chibber (2005) and Austin 
(2010) point out that the early developmental state had major internal problems and that it 
is unlikely to succeed if implemented in the 21st century.   
Evans (1995) and Chibber (2005) argue that this issue is political. It is not just economic 
reasoning that determines the economic model.  It is also political.  There is a need to ensure 
that the politics does not prevent the shift to a new economic development model coupled 
with not having a lever to move the economy from neoliberalism to a new developmental 
state.  This is where social movements have a potential role in the economic development 
model.  They provide a new form of politics that can help shift the politics towards the 
development of a new developmental state paradigm.    
In relation to the second issue, the effectiveness of social movements in this regard depends 
however on the quality of democracy in the political economy.  Where democracy only 
exists in its form of electoral politics only and not in a real sense, then the political space is 
too narrow for social movements to be effective.  Under a neoliberal hegemony of restricted 
democracy the state and institutions are aligned behind the interest of capital and social 
movements are often repressed and face demobilisation.     
Bebbington’s (2010) point is that issues are structural and have a common root.  This 
underlies both why social movements tend to fail to make the broader shift (from issues of 
immediate discomfort to broader underlying issues) and the possibilities for transcending 
this failure.   Clearly, the formula for transcending failure is obvious, even banal.   
Economically, social movements need to manage to deal with their ‘issue’ and articulate 
how this is part of a more system process.   
Social movements tend to fail because they face a structure rather which is more than a 
collection of ‘issues’.  Social movements addressing individual issues may make local 
progress or win victories on ‘issues’, but this progress can be fleeting (for example, 
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removing a corrupt local politician without addressing the problems that breed corruption; 
or getting housing delivered to poor people who do not have the means to maintain houses).  
More generally localised successes do not necessarily add up to fundamental change.  On 
the contrary, localised successes can be distortionary (or government funding free education 
by taking money from other critical area) and increase fragmentation of social movements.   
Finally, these issues interact with the state’s ability to manage and suppress social 
movements.  The state can become adept at managing protest.  It contains protest to ‘issues’ 
(like ‘service delivery’) and geographically (‘townships’).  The fire of protest can be damped 
down by selective ‘delivery’ and selective welfare—all part of the repertoire of the 
neoliberal state—as much as by state oppression. 
Furthermore, neoliberal democracy, while superficially liberal and democratic, makes 
considerable use of state violence and oppression, where protest proves difficult to ‘manage’ 
and especially where social movements’ “politically destabilising distributive demands” 
threatens the social order (for example, when it spill out of the township onto campuses).  In 
fact, neoliberal democracy dramatically limits the space for effective opposition against 
dominant elites.   ‘Politics as usual’ is captured, and ‘politics unusual’ is delegitimised and 
oppressed. 
The pertinent question that emerges is how can social movements overcome the oppression 
of neoliberal democracy?  King and Soule (2007: 414) contend that social movements can 
play an important role as extra-institutional proxies of change that try to reconstruct the 
institutional rationalities on which an overriding system of authority is based (King and 
Soule, 2007: 414).   Reflecting on this, it is important to unpack the underlying socio-
economic conditions, the internal political organisation of social movements (flat versus 
hierarchical) and how they relate to power (do they participate in processes or are they 
outside them or do they try to be inside without losing autonomy).   
There is a lack of consensus on what the best strategic approach is.  Politically, they need to 
find a way of making inside and against practical.   How do they engage, not only 
‘vertically’ with the state and other establishment stakeholders (landowners, business, etc.) 
but also ‘horizontally’ with other social movements?  There is room in the following 
chapters to further unpack how the need to be ‘outside’ and be oppositional can be reconciled 
with the need to also somehow be ‘inside’ and cooperative without losing effectiveness – 
what Tronti describes as being “inside and against” (Tronti, 2012: 122).    
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Under the neoclassical approach, the supply of social movements is spontaneous and flares 
up whenever demand for social movements flares up.  As soon as the demand falls, so does 
the supply.  As a result, social movements seem to blow up quickly and die down just as 
quickly. Arguably one way of establishing continuity is through some form of formalisation 
through institution or structure.  Social movements need to somehow achieve formal 
structure within themselves and not necessarily through being part of some other structure 
for increased continuity.  These and other issues will be dealt with in detail in the chapters 
to follow.   
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set up the theoretical framework of the thesis in order to provide clarity on the 
emergence, role as well as relevance of social movements.  This was important as a starting 
point in the understanding of social movements in this context. Based on the reflections on 
the theory in this chapter, the following chapters (especially chapter three the South African 
case and chapter four the Latin American case) will move from this theorised view of social 
movements to an applied view and make use of the reflections drawn in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE 
3.1 Introduction 
The theory established that in order to have sustained economic growth there are two aspects 
involved.  Firstly, there needs to be an appropriate economic model in place that yields a 
desirable growth path. There is no universally clear model that is fool proof however what 
is clear is that the neoliberal economic growth model has not yielded the expected growth 
path.  Many countries including South Africa have seen a need to develop a new economic 
model.  The developmental state emerges as an alternative economic model.  However as 
discussed in chapter two, it is important to shift to a developmental state paradigm that is 
refined and modernised to fit the 21st century economic environment and needs.   
Secondly, however, whether a shift can occur from one economic model to a new alternative 
depends on politics.  In neoliberal democracy, formal political processes are incapable of 
making such a shift.  This is where social movements emerge as important.  They have the 
role of being the lever that can pry the politics out of its inertia to shift the development 
project. 
However, social movement face considerable barriers in fulfilling this role.  As discussed in 
chapter two, neoliberal democracy provides a formidable opponent.  It has the ability to 
project itself as legitimate and its opponents as ‘violent’ or ‘populist’, and it has the tools at 
its disposal (the law, police action, selective delivery) to contain and fragment opposition.   
This exacerbates the organisational and ideological problems that social movements 
themselves face.   Nevertheless, these obstacles are not, in principle, insuperable.   As 
established in chapter two, social movements should centre on contesting systemic problems 
in order to effect systemic structural changes rather than the symptomatic effects of the 
underlying systemic problem.  The next chapters explore the specific of these problems and 
how they have been faced.  
Using inflections on the theory on social movements, the main aim of this chapter is to 
highlight the South African case engaging deeply with the narrative of social movements 
historically and to date.   The main focus of this chapter is to elaborate on the discourse of 
social movements in South Africa.  The analysis reveals the landscape of social movements 
in South Africa is complex with social movements often being met with disdain and violent 
opposition from political and economic elites.  South Africa is characterised by generally 
fragmented social movement action especially in the post- apartheid era. The next section 
of the chapter (3.2) will discuss the different development models adapted in post-apartheid 
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South Africa.   Section 3.3 will focus on the history of social movements in South Africa 
describing briefly the evolution of social movements in South Africa from the apartheid era 
to date. These two sections are closely linked and aim to reveal how the underlying political 
economy (section 3.2) helps shape the emergence, role and effectiveness of social 
movements in South Africa.   Section 3.4 will comment on and reflect on the state of social 
movements in South Africa based on the discussions in the preceding sections.  Finally 
section 3.5 will conclude. 
3.2 The hegemony of neoliberalism in post-apartheid South Africa 
One distinctive and important feature of the South African case to note is that the 
globalisation process was simultaneously accompanied by a political transition from 
apartheid to a democratic order.  The goal of toppling oppressive white rule was no longer 
relevant in the new South Africa, but at the same time the local black masses’ socio-
economic problems and concerns that fueled the struggle remained very much alive and 
kicking (Greenstein, 2003: 12).  Von Holdt (2013: 589) argues that South Africa was torn 
between the persistence of an exclusionary socio-economic structure marked by deep 
poverty and extreme inequality on the one hand, and on the other the symbolic and 
institutional rupture presented by the transition to democracy.  This is similar to the Latin 
American case (as will be discussed in section 4.2) where governments faced a similar set 
of circumstances in the 1980s with the advent of democratisation and the fall of military rule 
(Cammack, 1991: 537; Ocampo et al, 2011). 
The major challenge that faced the newly elected ANC government was how to forge a 
process of accelerated growth whilst easing the socio-economic imbalances acquired from 
the apartheid regime (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2003: 13).  Pre-independence, the ANC’s 
ideological orientation appeared to be firmly on the side of socio-economic socialist 
transformation.  This is evidenced by the 1955 Freedom Charter and Nelson Mandela’s 
declaration after his release from prison in 1990 where he stressed the necessity of 
nationalisation and redistribution (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 538). Its key features 
were an acceptance that the state would have to take a lead role in ensuring the level and 
direction of investment was ‘developmental’ by directly addressing social backlogs and 
racial disparities, and that the political model would emphasize social dialogue and 
democratic corporatism (Fryer, 2016: 128).  
Initially, the ANC enacted a socially democratic approach combined with free markets; in 
essence, capitalism with a social face (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 542). The 
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developmental vision was arguably most developed in MERG, the ANC commissioned 
policy platform which was abruptly dropped in 1993 and therefore never implemented. The 
RDP, which formed the ANCs 1994 election manifesto at the insistence of COSATU, was 
a much vaguer platform and was itself abruptly dismantled in 1996 (Fryer, 2016: 128). 
Vestiges of this policy process remain in the name RDP (used to denote government 
‘delivery’ of housing and other social infrastructure) and in the form of NEDLAC (Fryer, 
2016: 128).  
Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013: 542) argue that there was no sudden conversion of the ANC 
government from socialism to neoliberalism at the attainment of independence. The ANCs 
overall strategy was rapid growth first with compromise then socialism and socio-economic 
transformation later.  This however inevitably provided a convenient way to postpone the 
redistributive stage indefinitely (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 538). Byrne et al (2017: 
259) also validate this argument saying that there was a ‘suspicion that once the ANC 
achieved the first stage they may never get to the second stage’.  Segatti and Pons-Vignon 
(2013: 538) argue that this has led to South Africa state transforming into a cost controlling 
state rather than a developmental sate.  This is an important point.   
Critics (and indeed social movements) are able to say what is wrong (politically, socially 
and economically) but it is harder to say what must be done and how.  This is clear in the 
two case studies in chapter five.  For example, the students were certain of what they were 
against (fees, colonially tinged and exclusionary universities) and how they did not want to 
organise themselves.  However this proved to be a fatal flaw because when they were asked 
the detailed economic questions, they had no answers; and because they were unable to 
develop political organisation beyond the leaderless structures that were so useful at 
mobilisation, they were delegitimised. 
The full adoption of a neoliberal orthodoxy became official in 1996 with the implementation 
of GEAR (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 542).  Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) argue 
that this displacement was a matter of ideological conversion rather than economic or even 
political necessity.  Habib and Padayachee (2000: 246) contend the neoliberal stance was 
the result of the ANC's particular perception and interpretation of the balance of economic 
and political power, at both the global and local level. This understanding gave priority and 
prominence to the international financial and investor community rather than to the country's 
post-apartheid growth and development needs. The ANC placed unusually great stress on 
the importance of foreign capital inflows and on the supposed lower costs of raising capital 
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in international markets that would derive from strict adherence to principles of the 
Washington Consensus (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 246).  
It is also the case that IMF and World Bank emissaries along with South African capitalists 
moved quickly in the early 1990s to try to purge the ANC leadership of socialist ambitions 
and understandings, and instill neoliberal ideologies (Hart, 2008: 687).  Economic 
neoliberalism was offered as the preferred, if not the only, economic development model 
and was held up as the model to follow globally. The government announced unequivocally 
that GEAR was non-negotiable (Hart, 2008: 681).  This is similar to some Latin American 
countries where the argument that there was no other alternative prevailed, and some 
governments in Latin America assumed that the orthodoxy of neoliberalism was in some 
ways inevitable and that there was no other way to have proceeded (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 
2012:3; Figueredo, 2006: 113).   
GEAR as a structural adjustment model, was successful on its own terms.  There was some 
progress in certain areas such as constitutional democracy, improved housing and 
electrification (Hart, 2008: 687).   However, at the same time, the collapse of formal 
employment that accompanied the opening up of the economy devastated the livelihoods of 
millions of South Africans (Hart, 2008: 687).   
Barchiesi (2004: 11) argues that the adoption of neoliberal macroeconomic policies by the 
ANC imposed social costs on the South African working class. In the afterglow of 
independence, GEAR promised huge increases in employment but the 1990s saw the sharp 
contraction of jobs especially in the labour intensive sectors (government dismantled tariffs 
more rapidly than required by GATT and cheap goods from China flooded the South African 
market) (Hart, 2008: 681). Without protective tariffs, major industries such as the textile and 
footwear industries witnessed many closures, dismissals, lay-offs and relocations to areas 
with even lower wages. And for the working and non-working poor, few new opportunities 
have opened up, apart from backyard informal jobs where people invest and work long hours 
without any protection from labour legislation or trade unions (Desai, 2002: 156).  
In other words, poverty, landlessness, unemployment are products of the neoliberal capitalist 
processes of accumulation. Substantively, the outcome of the transition to democracy was a 
sharp transformation at the political level but a great deal of continuity at the socio-economic 
level.  The result was a tension between the democratic promise inherent in the political 
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break to empower the newly enfranchised citizenry which had previously been excluded and 
the continuing reality of socio-economic exclusion.  
Cottle (2017: 159) argues that before 1994, capitalism in South Africa had already reached 
a turning point. The economy could no longer develop in the same form and began to decay.  
A resumption of sustained economic growth required the emergence of a new economic 
model.  So the imposition of a largely neoliberal GEAR in 1996 was shocking.  This is 
similar to the shock at the imposition of neoliberal policies by some Latin American 
governments in the 1980s following democratisation (Cammack, 1991: 538; Biglaiser and 
DeRouen, 2004: 564).   
Morel et al (2012: 13) attest that to implement neoliberal policies in an attempt to cure 
economic problems caused by neoliberalism is both counterproductive and deepens the 
economic crisis.  Further, the adoption of neoliberal policies especially in countries already 
plagued by inequality inherited from colonial regimes also deepens those inequalities 
(Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 544).  In both cases neoliberalism was presented as the 
only choice (Hart, 2008: 687; Grugel and Rigirozzi, 2012: 3; Figueredo, 2006: 113).  Other 
alternatives were suggested but were rapidly sidelined during the period between 1993 and 
1996 (Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013: 547).  This highlights Watkins’s (2010: 10) point that 
the neoliberal hegemony precludes the consideration of other economic development 
models as discussed in section 2.3.   
Segatti and Pons-Vignon (2013) contend that South Africa serves as a textbook example of 
how globalisation plays itself out in the semi-industrialised world. Plenty of evidence 
suggests that the post-apartheid neoliberal development model has not yielded the corruption 
free efficient state as promised.  This echoes the poor results of donor driven state reforms 
in developing countries.  The idea that pro market institutions will ensure efficiency and 
development entails a deep misunderstanding of how policies work (Segatti and Pons-
Vignon, 2013 539).  
North et al (2007: 2) argue that most development policy today is based on models of the 
developed world and attempts to make developing countries look more like developed ones.  
However, the social dynamics of developed countries fundamentally differ from those of 
developing countries.  Development practitioners therefore face a mismatch between the 
development problems they seek to address and the available tools.   Development tools 
34 
 
based on industrial country experiences are ill-suited to the development goals in developing 
countries (North et al, 2007: 2). 
Substantively, the fundamental compromise of this transition was the incoming regime’s 
support for neoliberal economic policies in exchange for capital’s general acceptance of 
black economic empowerment and some affirmative action. An elite middle class has since 
developed and the poor (who are mostly black) have remained poor.  A new black elite has 
joined the old white elite, the black middle class is enjoying more opportunities in life, but 
the poor are becoming even poorer (Desai, 2002: 156).The advent of GEAR in 1996, and 
the negotiated end to apartheid made major concessions to corporate white-owned capital.   
National capitalists have become the primary beneficiaries of neoliberalism in South Africa 
largely at the expense of the poor black masses.  Some authors such as Gibson (2006: 3) 
argue that this is a result of the ‘elite’ transition ‘pact’ between the ANC, multinational 
capital and local elites which has had the effect of blindsiding the very social movements 
that brought about the end of the apartheid regime (Gibson, 2006: 3).  The ANC found a 
more durable and lucrative alliance with white corporate capital in order to create a black 
bourgeoisie than with the civics and promises that social movements and community based 
programmes would play important roles in post-apartheid South Africa were soon replaced 
with directives from government (Gibson, 2006: 20).  This strengthened the hand of white 
corporate capital and reinvigorated black bourgeoisie in South Africa (Hart, 2008: 689).   
In 2002, following deep tensions arising from unhappiness with the neoliberal outcomes, 
the ANC government fiercely denied that it is neoliberal.  It increased “pro poor” spending 
on the Child Support Grant, and funding going to local governments to finance Municipal 
Indigence. It also dismissed the idea of a modest Basic Income Grant in favour of Extended 
Public Works Programme.  These strategies to identify and ‘treat’ the poor segment of 
society were essentially strategies of containment (Hart, 2008, 686).  There was talk of state 
intervention in markets but the ANC was careful to make clear that the interventions were 
not meant to reduce official commitment to rapid capital accumulation.  Also these 
seemingly welfare policies do not represent a shift towards developmentalism.  Cammack 
(2002) argues that these may actually serve to strengthen capital by stabilising the political 
environment (provide lip service to quell protests) in order to reduce the risk of investment 
in South Africa as elaborated in section 2.3.   
Since the political transition in 1994, South Africa has been plagued by high unemployment.  
The official unemployment rate in South Africa rose from 22% in 1994 to 27.7% in 2017 
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and this figure is expected to rise (Trading Economics, 2017; Bangane, 2012) High income 
inequality and high levels of poverty remain pressing and persistent challenges in South 
African society.  Since 1994 the already high levels of income inequality have actually 
increased slightly and divisions along racial, cultural, linguistic and rural-urban lines 
continue to deepen despite some erosion in the post-apartheid era. To such an extent that 
such inequalities and divisions have become a defining feature of South African society.  A 
simple analysis of the GINI coefficient demonstrates that South Africa has one of the highest 
GINI coefficients in the world (Bosch et al, 2010: 1).  The GINI index in South Africa in 
1992 was just over 59 and in 2011 the GINI coefficient was reported at 63.4 according to 
the World Bank collection of development indicators (Trading Economics, 2017).   This 
demonstrates the dire situation in terms of the intensifying levels of poverty and inequality 
in the country since independence in 1994.    
 After the 2008 global economic crisis the economic conditions in South Africa continued 
to deteriorate. There is an important shift here, namely an increasing recognition that it is 
not just distributional questions that are the issue economically but that the growth path itself 
is a problem (Jain, 2014).  South Africa experienced a relatively weak recovery from the 
Global Recession of 2008 to 2009.  Growth continued to be sluggish and below expectation.  
By the end of the fourth quarter in 2015, growth had slowed down to 0.7% from 4.2% in 
2014 and continued to fall with South Africa experiencing a recession in the first half of 
2017 (Trading Economics, 2017).  Despite an increase in growth since then, it has been quite 
low with the growth rate only at 2% in the last quarter of 2017 (Trading Economics, 2017).   
It is clear that economically South Africa is ‘stuck in stabilisation’ (Segatti and Pons-
Vignon, 2013:538).  The economic growth has stalled, and the socio-economic environment 
features high unemployment, high poverty rates and deep inequality.  There is a sense of 
failure of the prevailing economic model.  Naturally, South Africa should be shifting away 
from the current model to an alternative sustainable model that may provide the consistent 
goals of increasing economic development.  However this shift has been slow and sticky 
and this can be attributed to the politics in the country.  Much of the concern with 
transformation of the state in the post-1994 period has focused on the need to change policy 
frameworks and the racial complexion of the public service, by formulating new policies 
and implementing affirmative action. Important as these are, little attention has been paid to 
the need to transform the ways in which state power is organised, distributed and exercised 
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internally, and the ways in which it interacts with civil society. Only by attending to these 
issues can meaningful political transformation be effected (Greenstein, 2002: 8).   
3.3. The hegemony of neoliberal democracy in post-apartheid South Africa 
This inability to shift the development project in South Africa despite the sense of 
unhappiness with the current status quo raises questions on the political landscape in the 
country.  As was established in chapter two, neoliberal reforms create a restrictive neoliberal 
democracy where the state displays an inertia to shift away from neoliberal economic 
policies.  The elitist neoliberal democracy enshrines a centralised state as best practice.  
Under neoliberal democracy, citizen participation in policy choice and decision making is 
limited to formal institutions and electoral policies alone. Thus a neoliberal democracy 
hegemony features repression of social movements from the state (Cammack, 1991: 544; 
Weyland, 2014: 145; Machado et al, 2011: 7).     
South Africa has shifted from liberal democracy to a more neoliberal democracy (Ngwane, 
2012: 11). What is particularly problematic is that the notion of centralisation that comes 
with neoliberalisation subverts the logic of participatory democracy. It replaces it with a 
logic that is based on the nature of the state which structurally serves to exclude popular 
participation, regardless of the intentions of politicians (Greenstein, 2002: 9). According to 
Greenstein (2002: 9), it tends to shift power upwards, away from people and structures closer 
to the ground.  
Liberalisation and democratisation brought an opening up of the state since the end of the 
apartheid regime through the electoral democracy and the legitimising of rights under a new 
constitution and a democratic judicial system and institutions.   This is also true in the Latin 
American case (which will be discussed in chapter four) where when the Cold War ended 
in the 1980s, a new wave of democratisation swept through the region (Ocampo et al, 2011; 
Cammack, 1991: 537).  Arguably it can be contested that it is not always necessary to operate 
outside of the legal framework in order to achieve results. Neither is it necessarily the case 
that an adversarial stance is required to deflect the state from its intentions.  The poor and 
marginalised are capable of influencing elites to take directions they might otherwise not 
have taken through the legal system.   
NEDLAC, the media, the courts, the constitution, formalised attempts to have public input 
into policies, local governments’ Integrated Development Plans, and even discoursal support 
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for mass demonstrations provide a significant repertoire of ‘in-system’ mechanisms for 
influencing policy and challenging the government.   
Rights can be an opportunity afforded by official processes to demand that the state put its 
money where its mouth is (Ballard, 2006: 11).  The new political, economic and social order 
is underwritten by a constitution that enshrines first and second generation rights, clauses 
that have been used by a number of social movements to either defend themselves or 
advance their campaigns instead of stifling them (Ballard et al, 2006: 16). For example the 
Homeless Peoples Alliance preferred a ‘politics of patience’ with a high degree of 
‘bureaucratic intimacy’ in order to achieve the delivery of housing (Ballard, 2006: 11).   
But how effective are these legal tactics in reality?  Catchpowle and Cooper (2003: 18) argue 
that institutions such as NEDLAC represent an attempt by the ANC to incorporate labour 
into decision making processes as a way of eliminating any large scale opposition to its 
policies.  The state has for example chosen not to approve some applications for protest 
action in the past and consequently attempted to silence and subdue opposition. For example, 
in March 2004 during the Anti-Privatisation Forum 52 arrests were made, in April 2004 on 
Election Day 62 members of the LPM were arrested (Ballard, 2006: 11) and in November 
2016 during the #FeesMustFall movement countless arrests were made (Kamanzi, 2016).  
In addition to the apartheid-era laws such as Regulation of Gatherings Act, which gave the 
security and intelligence agencies additional powers to regulate citizen participation, a series 
of similar Bills are in the making. These include the Interception and Monitoring Bill, 
Intelligence Services Bill, the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Bill, the 
National Strategic Intelligence Amendment Bill and the Anti-Terrorism Bill (Ballard et al, 
2006: 16).  The perception by some, therefore, is that the political freedoms anticipated for 
post-apartheid South Africa may not always be available in practice.   
As discussed in chapter two, where citizens perceive the institutions as well as the 
democracy to be unable or unwilling to heed their calls, they resort to more unconventional 
means of citizen participation such as protests. And this has been the case in South Africa. 
An analysis conducted by Ortiz et al (2013: 6) of main protests in 84 countries including 
South Africa in the period 2006-2013 shows that demonstrators mostly address their 
grievances to national governments, as they are the legitimate policy-making institutions 
that should respond to citizens. Protestors demand that policy-makers take public 
responsibility for economic, social and environmental policies that should benefit all, instead 
of just the few.  
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This is true of South Africa where residents of the Limpopo town of Vuwani, where the 
schools were vandalised in 2016, are quoted as saying that violence is the only way to ensure 
that politicians listen. This view is widespread and points to a major problem with the 
participatory aspects of South Africa’s democracy (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016).  This is 
corroborated by a survey of the Gauteng adult population conducted by the South African 
Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law at the 
University of Johannesburg, which reveals a growing sense of alienation and dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of representative and participatory democracy in South Africa (Bilchitz 
and Cachalia, 2016).  
Of the random representative sample of 608 adults, the survey revealed that only 40% of 
people believe Parliament represents them, with less than half agreeing that their politicians 
were responsive to their needs. Alarmingly, more than 60% of the sample perceived 
participation in, and access to, democratic institutions as a problem. For instance, 71% found 
contacting their political representatives difficult; 61% said the same about challenging a 
violation of their rights in court and 68% expressed difficulty in lodging a complaint at the 
Human Rights Commission.  One may argue that protestors simply do not value the 
democratic processes put in place but statistics from the same study reveal that this is not 
necessarily true. This can be gleaned from the high levels of voter participation in elections 
among Gauteng residents (82% in national elections and 78% in local elections); the fact 
that a majority regularly discusses politics with friends and family (57%) and that more than 
three-quarters follow the news daily (78%) all of which suggests a strong commitment to 
democratic values (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016).  These findings however do reveal a need 
to enhance participation in South Africa’s democracy and to render its institutions more 
accessible to the people (Bilchitz and Cachalia, 2016) further reflecting significant 
discontent with the working of current democracies and demand for real democracy (Ortiz 
et al, 2013: 6).   
As evidenced by this, South Africa has shifted from a liberal democracy to a neoliberal 
democracy and there is a sense of the ‘meaninglessness of democracy in South Africa’.  One 
would expect that numerous protests should be indicative of healthy, civic minded and 
democratic societies (one were people are free to voice out their opinions and have the 
freedom of expression) but the difference in South Africa is that the growing number of 
protests is actually a symptom indicative of the opposite.  The protests underline the freedom 
of expression people enjoy in post-apartheid society, but they also corroborate the accusation 
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that all is not well with the post-apartheid order (Ngwane, 2012: 11).  It is widely accepted 
that protests in South Africa are a tell-tale sign of the insidious feeling of underlying 
disenchantment, disenfranchisement and disillusionment from the masses aimed at the 
government and democratic values as a whole. 
The South African political field has largely been marked by a competition over the right to 
be the legitimate representative of poor people’s struggles.  Counter-hegemonic activists 
feel that the revolutionary economic change that was anticipated with democracy has yet to 
materialise, and this remains the major project. Some explicitly describe themselves as true 
custodians of the liberation tradition; a title, of course, also claimed by the ruling ANC party 
(Ballard, 2006: 3). Relations between state and civil society have taken three distinct forms 
in post-apartheid South Africa - marginalisation, engagement and adversarialism (Habib, 
2005: 671). 
In South Africa, the ANC believes in a single party state with the state at the centre of 
development policies and strategies (Ballard, 2006: 3). The present state is led by a liberation 
movement which continues to drive a nationalist project that it still embodies national 
aspirations (Ballard, 2006: 15). And as such the ANC has a paternalistic view that it has a 
mandate from the majority of the population to proceed the way they see best. Strengthening 
social movements to the one party state is synonymous with reducing the role of the state 
(Rucht, 2000: 4). The ANC has become increasingly enmeshed in the institutions of the 
state. The state constitutes the primary agency for redistribution and class formation, not 
only in the sense that it makes and implements policy for society, but also that it controls 
the biggest revenues, budgets, assets and payroll in the country, as well as access to 
broadcast rights and other lucrative opportunities (von Holdt, 2013: 594).  
 During apartheid there was ostensibly a single unified goal of removing the oppressive 
apartheid system. This sense of unity of purpose however papered over the different 
organisations differing views and ideologies. Following independence, the ANC expected 
all the organisations it has fought against apartheid to simply fall in line with them and carry 
on with a national development programme.  Any organisation not falling in line was seen 
as anti-developmental and anti-nationalism and the ANC tried to discredit and effectively 
silence it (Barchiesi, 2000: 27). 
It goes without saying that due to the past association of civil society with the ANC in the 
anti-apartheid struggle, autonomy would become a contentious issue post-1994 as the ANC 
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expected all formations that were opposed to apartheid to fold up and be incorporated into 
its structures. This assumption is still dogging the current relationship between the ANC and 
progressive social formations in civil society; those that are seen as not toeing the line are 
treated with distrust by the ruling party (Noyoo, 2006: 22). Supporters of the government 
like to see themselves as a vanguard representing the black population (elite and masses 
alike), who had been denied political rights by the apartheid regime, and are now moving to 
assume their full role in the new political dispensation (Greenstein, 2003: 2).  
Social movements have hit a nerve with the South African government.  The ANC dislikes 
how social movements have been able to upstage it and the ANC has shown considerable 
intolerance for dissent (Barchiesi, 2004: 4). Protests are the fly in the ointment of the “new” 
democratic South Africa. Frequent confrontational and sometimes violent social outbursts 
sit oddly with the image of the idyllic rainbow nation that many imagine emerged with the 
demise of apartheid and the transition to a free, non-racial society (Ngwane, 2012: 11). 
Social movements are plural and diversified and unpredictable.  This makes them radicalised 
and militant in completely new ways, which threaten not only state control but also the 
established left’s understanding of struggle and politics (Greenstein, 2003: 14).   
The state’s response to the new social movements in South Africa has largely been to 
marginalise them at best and at worst to criminalise them (Madlingozi, 2007: 81).  The state 
makes use of a large repertoire of tactics to marginalise social movements in post-apartheid 
South Africa. These include but are not limited to co-optation of movement groups through 
corporatism among other things, threats, violent oppression, scare tactics such as arresting 
social movements’ participants and later dropping charges, making social movements action 
illegal and arresting any members, banning social movements, using informants and agents 
provocateur, censoring newspapers and arresting dissidents, torture, disappearances and 
mass killings (Davenport, 2009: 378). Social movements have been met with intolerance 
and stigmatisation. As another marker of increasing authoritarianism, policing of protests 
and strikes has become more violent (von Holdt, 2013: 601).    
Social movements are seen as impertinent, not showing sufficient respect for government 
(Ballard, 2006: 11).  To justify this, the state mentions that though “illegal tactics” such as 
protests and demonstrations were justified under apartheid now they are insurrectionist 
against a legitimate democratic state (Ballard, 2006: 11). The techniques of violent 
resistance to authority that became widespread during the pre-independence era were 
encouraged by the ANC and its allies as part of the strategy of making the country 
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"ungovernable" (Bruce, 2014). Social movements have since triggered the post-apartheid 
reinterpretation of ungovernability. Separate from the liberation struggle’s once applauded 
success in putting an end to the apartheid government of the 1980s, the notion of 
ungovernability today carries predominantly negative connotations (Selmeczi, 2015: 53).  
Popular mobilisation has been delegitimised and, losing its emancipatory legacy, 
ungovernability has been reconfigured as opposing democracy (Selmeczi, 2015: 74).  The 
transition from ungovernability during apartheid to ungovernability during democracy is 
captured in the massive show of force towards protestors.  There is no understanding of 
protests or sympathy because the ‘poor’ have supposedly already been accommodated now 
that the apartheid regime is over (Desai, 2003).   
Some, particularly in government, see these social movements as a threat to stable 
democracy. Hence ‘state security’ discourses and responses. This is an overreaction inspired 
by the state’s oversensitivity to political criticism. Social movements contribute to the 
plurality of civil society, which is one of the essential elements in a system of checks and 
balances indispensable to all mature democracies (Habib 2005: 672). Just as important to 
note is the fact that most of the contemporary social movements operate within the 
parameters of the new status quo. There is no immediate challenge to the legitimacy of the 
government, and there is still much loyalty to the constitution. These movements are thus 
not, as yet, about overthrowing the existing order. Instead, they are about holding this 
government accountable for the delivery of promises it made, and prizing the political and 
socio-economic order open so that more constituencies can be included in its list of 
beneficiaries (Ballard et al, 2006:18).     
 Although bonds of solidarity were forged more easily in the common struggle against 
apartheid, poor people nevertheless are beginning to form new movements to defend 
themselves against insensitive bureaucrats and self-serving politicians.  Democracy is 
usually considered to be the direct opposite of violent contestation. To the extent that 
violence persists, it is regarded as symptomatic of the failure of democracy (von Holdt, 
2013: 590). It may be objected that a democracy marred with violence is not a democracy 
at all. Von Holdt (2013: 590) argues that this is not a helpful stance if we want to understand 
the dynamics of the kind of actually existing democracy emerging in South Africa.  Rather 
than democracy and violence being mutually exclusive, democracy may configure power 
relations in such a way that violent practices are integral to them producing a social system 
that Von Holdt (2013: 590) calls a violent democracy.  
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Democracy and its institutions structure and distribute power in particular ways and, in an 
unequal society such as South Africa’s, tend to distribute power in highly unequal ways. 
Violence is deployed to defend this distribution and to challenge or reconfigure it (von 
Holdt, 2013: 591). The state in South Africa is increasingly willing to use violent oppression 
against social protests as they become more and more robust. 
Protestors no longer seem interested in amicable solutions, having seemingly lost faith in 
such likelihoods, but rather seem bent on physically expressing deep seated angers towards 
a system that they feel has failed them.  According to study by Ortiz et al (2013: 6), the 
overwhelming demand for protests in South Africa, is at the core of it, not for economic 
justice per se, but for what prevents economic issues from being addressed: a lack of “real 
democracy”.  This, according to Ortiz et al (2013: 6), is a result of people’s growing 
awareness that policy-making has not prioritised them, even when it has claimed to, as well 
as frustration with politics and a lack of trust in the existing political actors who are failing 
to listen to the needs and views of ordinary people.   
Essentially the root of the problem lies in the perceived and real growing discrepancies 
between ANC leaders and their electorate. In a nutshell, the ANC government is not 
delivering on its promises, or at least not enough.  Post-apartheid South Africa has been 
characterised by promises of more democratic governance and better life for all citizens. 
However, the economic transformation following the first democratic elections in 1994 have 
witnessed increased economic empowerment for a selected few black elite, while the 
majority of black people still live in abject poverty (Langa and Kiguwa, 2013: 21).  
Government attempts to improve service delivery have not been sufficient to lessen the 
frustration and anger of poor people in South Africa (Alexander, 2012).  One may argue 
then that protests are just but a mere reflection of local entanglements with the governing 
ANC, sometimes referred to as ‘patronage politics from below’ but what cuts across the 
various so-called service delivery protests is the acute critique of the failure of a 
representative democracy to provide socio-economic equality for the masses (Runciman, 
2017). 
For most, the quality of post-apartheid democracy is linked closely to the provision of basic 
services. This is unsurprising considering that the apartheid government systemically denied 
the majority these basic rights.  Community protests are therefore inevitably fundamentally 
about the forcible exclusion from democracy experienced by many black working class 
citizens since the end of apartheid in 1994 largely due to their inability to afford socio-
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economic goods and not some rebellion (Runciman, 2017). Community protests can be 
interpreted as a form of dissatisfied citizenship in which citizens who feel excluded in the 
new democratic dispensation are forcefully demanding to enjoy full rights of citizenship to 
have access to work opportunities and to all basic services as enshrined in the Constitution 
(Langa and Kiguwa, 2013: 20).  They are realistic and quite logical responses to everyday 
hardships.  However, as will be discussed further, protests have largely taken on the persona 
of being rebellions due to their unfortunate political positioning in the South African 
political arena.   
What this section has done is problematized the neoliberal democracy hegemony in South 
Africa. As a result of it politically South Africa is stuck hence the inability to shift to a new 
economic development path.  Further, though social movements have emerged as important 
in trying to force the state to make economic changes, they have largely been ineffective 
and suffered repression. Essentially, protests are simply a symptom of the failure of the 
democratic processes which is the core problem and not just some act of rebellion from the 
masses.  The state has great inertia to change, the state is alienated from the interests of the 
masses and is inaccessible.  
3.4. A commentary on the state of Social Movements from apartheid to post-
apartheid South Africa 
In addition to the repression of social movements in post-apartheid South Africa 
consequently affecting their effectiveness in economic development, the organisation and 
structure of the social movements themselves also comes into question.  As theorised in 
chapter two, social movements need to be organised, and structured, and also need to contest 
underlying systemic problems in order to produce meaningful radical reform (Bebbington, 
2011: 1- 3). This section will consider broadly the state of social movements in post-
apartheid South Africa (what they contest and how they go about it) and problematise the 
state of social movements in South Africa.  This task will be carried on in chapter five as 
well, where using the inferences made in this chapter as a lens, the focus will be on two 
specific cases of social movements in South Africa.  
Three phases emerge in the discourse of social movements in South Africa: 
1. 1970s to 1980s: Anti-apartheid phase 
The struggle for independence was arguably the quintessential social movement during this 
phase.  Pre independence the mandate was clear: a united front against the oppressive 
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apartheid state in order to dismantle it (Ballard, 2006: 1).  This common grievance brought 
together political parties, unions, civics, religious organisations, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) across the board who all focused on an adversarial attack on 
apartheid. The significance of the organs of people’s power that had emerged by the mid-
1980s was their potential to begin and remedy decades (and centuries) of exploitation and 
oppression through allowing everyone to actively shape their lives.  
By definition of the apartheid regime, legislatorial processes in themselves could not 
guarantee the continuation of that process.  The legislative models that existed at the time 
(generally without considering “existing organisations, practices and traditions of political 
struggle”) where exclusionary. Therefore the ANC, United Development Front (UDF), 
Congress Of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), NGOs and Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) all banded together to form a strong oppositional force against the 
white minority government (Ballard et al, 2006: 16) outside of the protocol and processes 
that existed at the time making use of ‘illegal’ extra institutional tactics such as toyi-toying, 
marching and protesting publicly against the state in order to make the country 
“ungovernable”.  For the social movements at the time, democracy meant mass 
participation; the opportunity for people to gain control “over every aspect of their lives.”  
In this way the original idea of ungovernability carried a positive association.  It was “a 
political weapon in the hands of people with no access to political power,” (Selmeczi, 2015: 
60).    
However, the surface unity of the anti-apartheid movements (especially in the late 1980s) 
papered over the differences about the nature of the state, democracy and economic policy. 
The liberals (especially the white liberal parties in government) thought that the economic 
system could be reformed from within apartheid regime (Lipton, 2007: 34).  The Alliance 
of civic organisations with its ideology of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) and 
‘colonialism of a special type’ emphasised unity of struggle (and ‘internal democracy’ 
within the alliance rather than open contestation) and the need for the Alliance to lead the 
struggle (Ngwane, 2003: 42).  Groups, particularly on the Left were critical of the National 
Democratic Revolution (NDR) ideology, and emphasised grass roots democracy.  They 
predicted the transition would go wrong (Plaut and Holden, 2012).  
2. Post 1990s: Immediate Post-apartheid phase 
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This was a political honeymoon phase so to speak.  A transitional society emerged where 
state-social movement relations changed from the adversarial opposition that characterised 
apartheid politics, to a more collaborative and development-oriented focus (Habib, 2005: 
671).  Government’s attempt to create an enabling political and fiscal environment entailed 
trying to create collaborative relations between the state, unions and civic groups (Ballard 
et al, 2006: 1).  In a sense, this phase entailed the inadvertent creation of an economic system 
of neoliberal corporatism.   
The basic idea of corporatism is that the “society and economy of a country should be 
organised into major interest groups and representatives of those interest groups should 
settle any disputes through negotiation and agreement” with the state (Watkins, 2008). 
According to Watkins (2008), it is a system that emphasises the positive role of the state in 
guaranteeing social justice and supresses the opportunities for the population to pursue their 
own interests outside of the state.   
The neoliberal package employed a corporatist programme of the accommodation between 
labour and capital – what Catchpowle and Cooper (2003: 13) term neoliberal corporatism.  
For instance in South Africa government organised society into ‘corporations’ subordinate 
to the state with the formation of corporatist institutions such as the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the National Development Agency (NDA) 
and the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) which some scholars have 
described as “moribund allies” and “empty shells” with little capacity for opposition 
(Ballard et al, 2006: 16).   Perhaps this analysis manifests itself more clearly within the so 
called ruling tripartite alliance of the ANC, COSATU and the SACP, along with the de facto 
membership of SANCO. Their attempts to oppose the state’s chosen economic path from 
within this ruling tripartite alliance has limited the extent to which they can block this path 
and in this way the civic movement can be said to have been effectively neutralised (Ballard, 
2006: 2). The alliance requires a disciplined labour movement whose leadership is willing 
to accommodate the free market in return for a ‘voice’ in the political structures (Catchpowle 
and Cooper, 2013: 18).  
What existed became organs of political representation which reflected the will of the 
politics of the time rather than adjusting the interests of the economic and political groups 
(Ballard et al, 2006: 1).  Catchpowle and Cooper (2013: 14) argue that neoliberal 
corporatism is the voluntary subordination of class interests to the requirements of the 
interests of capital.  Organised labour was repressed or allowed itself to be demobilised.  The 
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problem is exactly that facing social movements.  Should workers remain largely 
automomous and self-organising, or should they form a strong alliance with the political 
party (the ANC)?  This ties in with Chibber’s argument in chapter two.  If the developmental 
state is implemented in South Africa with the same political alliance (for example ANC and 
supposedly deracialised business class with a corporatised labour) we are doomed to repeat 
the same mistakes of the failed early developmental sate.   
The SACP is able to justify its position in the alliance in Marxist-Leninist (actually Stalinist) 
terms. SACP claimed that South Africa’s objective conditions required postponing 
socialism in favour of a stage of ‘national democracy’ (Byrne et al, 2017: 259).  Hence its 
support of the dominance of the ANC (a vanguard party) and even GEAR (Byrne et al, 2017: 
259).  SACPs recent opposition of the ANC is against state capture rather than deeper 
structural issues.  COSATU on the other hand has been in an ambiguous position since its 
formation in 1985, and this reflected an unresolved debate that went much further back 
(between ‘workerism’ and the ‘national democratic revolution’) (Byrne et al, 2017).  
COSATU was wary of the centralisation of power and the dominance of the ANC, and the 
shift to neoliberal policy.   There was strong contestation between ‘workerism’ (with an 
emphasis on autonomous unions, based at the point of production) and outside of party 
instruction (Byrne et al, 2017: 255). COSATU remained in the alliance but tried to be a 
critical ally.  However, this means it is effectively sniping from the side lines and defending 
its workers.  It has very little effect on policy about the deeper structural issues and has been 
losing significance throughout the post-apartheid period (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2013: 
24).  There has been polarisation between leaders and its members over its weakened ability 
to mobilise (Catchpowle and Cooper, 2013: 24).  COSATU, and even some branches of the 
ANC (as reflected at the policy conferences) have been noisy critics but have had little effect 
on the overall structural trajectory. 
Interpretations of this phase could best be described as a hiatus in popular and radical activity 
during which proponents of social justice attempted to align their agendas with the state 
through the drafting of the new constitution and the apparent implementation of policy to 
redress the inequalities inherited from apartheid (Ballard, 2006: 17).   The primary objective 
of gaining independence from the oppressive apartheid regime had been accomplished and 
seemingly there was no longer any need to oppose the state.  The new mandate was clear: 
redress the inequalities brought on by apartheid and work towards building the new ‘rainbow 
nation’.   
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The newly democratically elected government seemed to be working on the residual 
problems of inequality, poverty and deprivation amongst the black majority.  Though social 
conditions remained difficult for the poor masses, communities were not inclined to mobilise 
against the government or to protest against it (Ballard et al, 2006: 16).  And even if they 
had wanted to they had no voice as the civic organisations that had historically provided the 
enabling platform were now integrated into government or were in close collaboration with 
the government. 
There were some mild uprisings in the mid- and late-1990s related to discontent over 
municipal services, housing and the lack of infrastructure. These protests included the one 
day anti-privatisation strikes by COSATU after only a brief honeymoon (Bond, 2000: 217-
223). Researchers identify a period of “lull” in protest action between 1994 and 1999 
(Ballard, et al. 2006), with some saying the lull might actually have been shorter in duration, 
and others suggesting that there was no such lull (Bond, 2000).  
But a political lull should be understood as much more than just the absence of mass action; 
it also involves the level of confidence of the working class, its clarity of purpose and its 
social weight. From this point of view, despite the continued occurrence of protests when 
the new order was ushered in, the political lull was deeper and longer because, as will be 
argued further in this chapter, the transition from apartheid to democracy entailed a process 
of demobilisation of the working class movement as other classes (and politics) wrested 
leadership of the mass movement from the proletariat. 
Key activists from the pre independence era had taken up key positions in government. The 
call from government was now to move from ‘resistance to reconstruction’ and therefore 
social movements’ oppositional role to the state was at this point deemed inappropriate.  
According to the African National Congress (ANC) in the mid-1990s, any mass oppositional 
action involved “a process of tearing down rather than building up” and almost inevitably 
leads to “ungovernability and instability” (Selmeczi, 2015: 61). So now the concept of 
ungovernability was becoming difficult to relate to the liberation social movements in as far 
as it was understood to mean localised and destructive or instigated by outside agitators 
(Scelmezci, 2015: 59).  A new definition of ungovernabilty emerged at this point authored 
by the ANC.  Where this phenomenon of ungovernability fell from grace and acquired a 
negative denotation.   
3. Late 1990s to date:  “The Rebellion of the poor in South Africa” 
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Table 1 shows a summary of the periodisation of post-apartheid movements which is 
discussed in detail below.   
This phase of social movements took hold in the early 2000s and is linked with the rise of 
the new social movements such as the Anti-Privatization Forum (APF), the Soweto 
Electricity Crisis Committee (SECC) and the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).   In this 
phase, divergent opinions, both within the state and within civil society, on the best 
development path began to emerge and become more prominent.  Social movements began 
challenging the hegemony of the ANC and the state, and in so doing creating a new political 
landscape (Anciano, 2012: 143).  The growth of social movements was seen to redefine the 
terrain of political identity and solidarity. The advent of opposition to government’s 
neoliberal macroeconomic strategies from government, sparked a reinvigoration of a new 
generation of social movements with the new mandate of challenging government’s growth 
policies (Ballard, 2006: 17). Thus emphasising the connection established in chapter two 
between protest, social movements and economics.   
Table 1: The Periodisation of post-apartheid social movements 
1994-1997  1997-1999  1999-2000  2000-2004  2004-2008    2008-present  
Low level of 
strike 
activity  
  
Ideological 
contestation 
over GEAR in 
Alliance; some 
strikes  
Trade union anti 
privatisation strikes  
Miscellaneous 
strikes   
Strike wave:       
Public sector  
national strike 
(2007); massive 
private sector  
strikes                    
Strike wave: 
Public sector 
national strike 
(2010); massive  
 private sector  
strikes  
 “Lull” or 
reduced level 
of protests  
Protests by  
“concerned 
residents” and 
“crisis 
committees”  
  
Community and 
student protests in 
support of the 
unions; increase in  
community protests  
Massive protests 
organised by the 
new social  
movements  
Massive 
“spontaneous” and 
often disruptive 
service delivery  
protests;               
demarcation        
struggles    
Xenophobic 
violence (2008); 
proliferation of 
community  
 protests  
  
(Source: Ngwane, 2011: 16) 
New localised movements and organisations emerged in ways that revealed a growing 
distance from both ANC-aligned civic structures and trade union organisations which were 
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historically strong but increasingly coming under pressure from the left (Barchiesi, 2004: 
11). Socioeconomic realities were increasingly highlighting the need for policy debates.  
Moreover the structure of governance makes matters worse. The ANC’s policy of 
‘deployment’ (an attempt to increase ANC control of all centres of power through the 
deployment of cadres particularly into positions of authority within the institutions of 
policing, justice and law (von Holdt, 2013:601)) is an element of this. Combined with the 
ANC’s political hegemony and the neoliberal democracy, this meant that elected 
representatives became more concerned about the support of an elite capitalist class than 
that of their electorate (Alexander, 2010: 38). 
As noted in the preceding section, the ANC government at independence preferred an 
alliance between white corporate capital and created a new class of black elites.   Far from 
stabilising a new dominant coalition between white capital and new black elite classes, the 
democratic breakthrough has stimulated intense and violent conflict between different black 
factions over access to rents (von Holdt, 2013: 602). This may be a viable explanation for 
the increasing number of violent protests over time.  Because cash connection is the judge 
of civility in a neoliberal economic environment, the local poor people and their activism 
and protests are considered uncivil.   
 In post-apartheid South Africa poor people are no longer discriminated on the basis of race, 
but continue to be discriminated on the basis of class. Nowadays, people are no longer 
relocated, evicted from their house, or cut off from water and electricity because they happen 
to be black or brown, but because they cannot afford to pay rents and rates (Desai, 2002: 
156).  This relationship produces a highly unstable social order in which intra-elite conflict 
and violence are growing, characterised by new forms of violence and the reproduction of 
older patterns of violence, a social order that can be characterised as violent democracy (von 
Holdt, 2013: 589).  The result has been a considerable degree of insulation of the economic 
sphere from large-scale political intervention.   
Mottiar and Bond (2012: 309) attempt to identify a common thread across the protests, and 
suggest that social protests reflect the distorted character of ‘growth’ that South Africa 
witnessed after adopting neoliberal macroeconomic and micro development policies 
following the demise of apartheid in 1994.  Such policies date, after all, to the late 1980s 
and informed many of the early 1990s community protests of SANCO, for example (Mottiar 
and Bond, 2012: 309).   
50 
 
One of the global issues that Burawoy (2015) argues unites different struggles across the 
world is the generalised critique that ‘electoral democracy has been hijacked by capitalism’. 
It is also worth considering in the South African case as well, that perhaps this critique, that 
‘democracy is only for the rich’, is what also unites all the thousands of fragmented protests 
happening across South Africa (Runciman, 2017).  The protests reflect a deepening 
disappointment with the fruits of democracy. While some people have gained, the majority 
are still poor. Privatisation of local services has opened up new opportunities for private 
accumulation by a few elites (Medeiros, 2009: 111). It can be argued that protests represent 
resistance to the commodification of life for example the commercialisation of municipal 
services and to rising poverty and inequality in the country’s slums (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 
285).    
Findings from Runciman (2015), show that community protests had been declining between 
1997 and 2004 and then increasing from 2005 onwards, with a peak in 2012.  The vast 
majority (80%) of protests are orderly in nature, but there has been an increasing trend 
towards disruptive and violent protest action since 2008.  Alexander (2010) describes protest 
in South Africa since 2004 a ‘rebellion of the poor,’ although all such community unrest 
since the end of apartheid can be readily characterised in class terms.   
A key point to note here is the ‘newness’ of the social movements. In South African writing, 
the term ‘new’ refers to movements surfacing post-1999, which is different to European 
‘new social movement’ theory (Anciano, 2002: 156). The new social movements are 
characterised as a diverse set of organizations with the objective of organising and 
mobilising the poor and marginalised to contest and engage the state around the failure or 
lack of policy that would effect social change (Habib, 2005: 672).  The old avenues of 
opposition were absorbed into government leaving opponents of the government without a 
mechanism to organise opposition hence the term ‘new social movements’ which, in many 
regards, are very different from their traditional counterparts (Ballard, 2006: 17).   The 
context of the rise of the new social movements was the rapid shift from the ideology of a 
state driven developmentalism and a shift from the corporate arrangement between unions 
and government (Gibson, 2000: 20). The new social movements are in no way unitary and 
uniform and no longer affiliated to one political agenda and were often times disjointed and 
fragmented (Ballard et al, 2006: 18).  
They come in all shapes and sizes with varying agendas (Madlingozi, 2007: 86) and are 
more fragmented on what it is they oppose (Ballard, 2006: 1).  A quick scan of the issues 
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they represent indicates a massive diversity of concerns: land equity, gender, sexuality, 
racism, environment, education, formal labour, informal labour, access to infrastructure, 
housing, eviction, HIV/AIDS treatment, crime and safety, and geo-politics among several 
other agendas (Ballard et al, 2006: 18).  Some also speak to legal rights, social and 
environmental justice, and stigmas and discrimination of certain categories of people rooted 
in everyday society and culture.  In addition to issues, social movements also vary according 
to geographic scale, size, institutional form and tactics (Ballard et al, 2006: 19). Further, the 
new social movements are fragmented in the sense that they are often generally located 
within the ‘militant particularisms’ of a specific geographical community, most frequently 
disconnected to other nearby struggles and despite the similarities in demands have not 
cohered around a central target or demand (Runciman, 2015).   
Also in this phase of social movements are the current ongoing protest actions, which 
according to Ngwane (2011), “include local community uprisings and confrontational 
national strikes but which do not exhibit sustained ideological tendencies of either the 1990s 
Mass Democratic Movement or the 2000s new social movements”. From about 2004 to date, 
South Africa has seen a surge in massive “spontaneous” and often disruptive service delivery 
protests.  It is a type of protest in SA:  it is often cast as being about people wanting 
government to deliver to people—so quite limited in scope and localized (Bianco, 2013; 
Runciman, 2017).  However, the participants often deny this and claim they are responding 
to deeper structural issues and do not want ‘stuff’ but want dignity (Ngwane, 2011).   
However, most are dismissed as ‘popcorn protests’ and dissolve into the normalcy of just 
another protest in the protest capital of the world.  This is deeply problematic as it dismisses 
the political content of these protests, with all their fragmentations, simply because they 
have not, as yet, coalesced into a movement. At the same time, it fails to critically unpack 
and engage with the political and structural issues that shape the protest wave and arguably 
inhibit the emergence of a new movement. It also neglects an appreciation of the disruptive 
power and the political impact protests have had.   
The wide-ranging nature of such protests makes them difficult to enumerate (Alexander, 
2010: 26). Comparing protests per capita figures, South Africa is the 11th highest per capita 
protester in the world (GDELT, 2017).   Some 410 major service delivery protests have been 
recorded by monitoring agency Municipal IQ between 2009 and 2012. An average of 2.9 
unrests occurred a day during this time frame (Alexander, 2012).  Based on estimates from 
the South African Police Service data, between 1997 and 2013 there were, on average, 900 
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community protests a year. In recent years the number has reportedly risen to a possible 
2000 protests a year (Runciman, 2017).  As discussed in section 1.2, social movements have 
a wide range of tactics and methods of collective action (Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 290).  One 
thing that resonates however, according to analyses circulated around the internationalist 
left, is that South Africa has one of highest per capita number of uprisings of developing 
countries of its size, and as a result branded the nation the “protest capital of the world.” 
(Levenson, 2012).   
According to Bilchitz and Cachalia (2016), in general, black South Africans have the highest 
levels of political participation, followed by coloureds, and then by Indians whilst the lowest 
participating racial group is white South Africans.  This is in line with the neoclassical 
theorisation of social movements.  Social movements vary as frustration varies and in this 
case the levels of social movement participation seems to track frustration. The implication 
also reflected in other studies is that these ‘service delivery protests’ are mainly a movement 
within urban areas, but within those areas most participants can be regarded as poor and a 
high proportion come from informal settlements where services are especially weak 
(Alexander, 2012).    
Though these statistics are important to build a comprehensive picture of protest activity, 
such figures tell us little about the politics of such protests.  The main focus of this chapter 
is to go beyond the impressionistic media accounts that often dominant the public arena and 
delve deeper into the core issues of protests in South Africa in order to figure out where they 
fit in development and economics.   
3.5 Reflections on the state of social movements post-apartheid in post-apartheid 
South Africa 
Can social movements in South Africa then help push the state out of its inertia? 
Undoubtedly, the new social movements and protests have had an impact. “The most 
obvious tangible effect of social movements on the political landscape of this country is that 
they represent the interests of the poor and marginalised and apply pressure on the 
government to pay greater attention to the welfare of these groups,” Ballard et al. (2006: 
413).  Social movement formations have played the role of “watchdogs”, by keeping the 
government accountable to its various commitments and by making sure that government 
honours its promises during elections or follows through its election manifesto (Noyoo, 
2006: 25).  
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One distinguishing feature of new social movements in post-apartheid South Africa and 
especially the multiple service delivery protests is their ideology. Social movements in South 
Africa evolved over time to what Hart (2008) calls ‘movements beyond movements’ and 
what Alexander (2012) calls a ‘rebellion of the poor’.  New social movements in South 
Africa manifest as protest action that occurs in waves (Cottle, 2017:150).   
They are usually contesting very singular issues and emerge in direct response to some 
immediate discomfort.  This is testament to the neoclassical model’s analysis where social 
movements arise out of frustration and dissatisfaction.  The emergence of these as has been 
established in the preceding sections is the idea of injustice.  The new social movements 
frame their contestation as pivoting essentially on the defence of their rights from other 
actors (the neoclassical approach of seeing social movements as a zero sum game).   
Whether or not this is explicitly expressed, the idea behind the ‘service delivery protests’ is 
that single issue causes become vehicles for achieving broader ideological objectives and 
particular campaigns on narrow issues should be taken to be a means to an end.  This is a 
crucial theoretical point.  For example, in the student protest #FeesMustFall: force the state 
to provide free higher education.  The idea was that this could cascade into the state being 
forced to rethink its public finances; into rethinking the demands for fixing basic education 
as well rethinking the demands to fix the economy to ensure graduates can get jobs.  This 
will be explored further in chapter five to follow.   
This rights based approach has several difficulties in engaging effectively with 
transformation. Taking this approach is good for mobilisation as elaborated in chapter two. 
Under the neoclassical approach, the supply of social movements is spontaneous and flares 
up whenever demand for social movements flares up.  As soon as the demand falls, so does 
the supply.  As a result, social movements seem to blow up quickly and die down just as 
quickly. A short term campaign or a week of street protests might be dramatic and attract 
interest and attention but are ultimately short lived events (Bebbington, 2011: 1).  
Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that when protest are linked to a series of other issues and other 
activities sustained over time all ultimately oriented towards making a similar set of 
arguments then they are of quality and likely to achieve real change.  Focusing on single 
issues or identity politics (Hudson, 2013) leads to a narrowing of the scope of concern.  
Social movements become involved or pertinent only when a violation occurs.  It involves 
concern with apparent violations while failing to problematize the exploitative social 
relations and impoverishing underlying practices and systems that constitute the normal 
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operations of capitalist economies. Purely rights based approaches have little traction and 
can all too easily be marginalized or appropriated by liberal politics (du Toit, 2013: 20). And 
this is precisely the case of post-apartheid social movements in South Africa. 
Ballard (2006: 3) notes that struggles in post-apartheid South Africa respond in the first 
instance to particular manifestations of exclusion, poverty and marginalisation usually in a 
very local and immediate manner.  Despite the fact that such activists operate to achieve 
direct relief for marginalised groups on particular issues rather than primarily opposing the 
state’s economic path, this is not to say that they necessarily agree with current national 
programmes because in most cases in pursuing particular gains activists end up opposing 
the state by default.  In other words, these so called ‘service delivery’ protests, have simply 
emerged as one of the primary and more popular methods through which this disillusionment 
manifests itself (Bruce, 2014).  While the material improvement of poor people’s lives is at 
the core of many of these movements, they are not limited to demands for delivery or to the 
concerns of the poor. At the very core of the social unrest in South Africa are the socio-
economic issues that plague the country’s masses and the growing disillusionment of the 
masses with the policies and the existing hegemony of neoliberalism in South African 
democracy today.   
But however, politicians and media have coined the term ‘service delivery protests’ (Bianco, 
2013) to describe these uprisings. A dismissive term that does not fully encompass the core 
issues at hand and part of the process of delegitimising social movements in South Africa. 
While protests have earned the name ‘service delivery’ protests it has been pointed out that 
protest often has more to do with citizens attempting to exert their rights to participate and 
have their voices heard rather than simply demanding ‘service delivery’ as passive recipients 
(Mottiar and Bond, 2013: 290).  This plays into a ‘dependency’ narrative as discussed in 
section 2.4 (Bebbington, 2010).  That is, people want the state to give them stuff and the 
state giving them stuff makes them lazy and ungrateful. Service delivery protestors have 
been accused of having a dependency syndrome where they simply want handouts from the 
government which under neoliberalism is seen as inefficient and a costly hindrance to 
growth.  
Further, due to their ‘pop up’ nature, new social movements in the form of protests are 
largely flat in structure often leaderless and spontaneous.  Social movements’ engagements 
with the state fall on a continuum between in system collaborative interactions on the one 
extreme, and out-of-system adversarial relations on the other (Ballard et al, 2006: 16). It is 
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important to highlight immediately that there is a lack of consensus within movements over 
the best strategic approach. Some fear co-optation by the government and therefore wish to 
avoid collaboration, while others favour reformism and constructive engagement.   
This is to avoid capture form the state, to increase honesty and transparency and authenticity.  
Also they usually do not want to be a part of the system they are opposing.  They associate 
institutionalism with ‘selling out’. Looking at the history of social movements, there is a 
sense of corporatism with the forming of alliances such as the tripartite alliance between 
COSATU, SACP and ANC.  But critiques have stated that this effectively represented a 
capture of social movements by the state as they became largely demobilised (Catchpowle 
and Cooper, 2003; Watkins, 2008; Ballard et al, 2006: 16).   
However, the alternative (flat, leaderless structures) affects their continuity.  Also it is easy 
to discredit protests that way as illegitimate and illegal.  They idea is to have structure within 
themselves and find a way to be ‘inside yet against’.  How can they effectively engage with 
the state if they do not have some form of organisation?  Bebbington (2011: 1) argues that 
when protest are linked to a series of other issues and other activities sustained over time all 
ultimately oriented towards making a similar set of arguments then they are of quality and 
likely to achieve real change.  This has important implications about the operation of social 
movements in this context. Given this, movements need to recognise that the most 
belligerent tactics may not be the most expedient way of achieving material goals and it is 
often useful to apply both ‘friendly’ and ‘unfriendly’ pressure. Further, once social 
movements have emerged then they should form meaningful alliances in order to 
consolidate their causes.  
Bebbington (2011: 3) argues that there should be an overlap between goals amongst social 
movements in order for them to have sustenance and coherence.  The idea is that though 
they are composed of different ideas and identities but when linked together they become 
one larger identity.  Social movements should essentially be a larger identity composed of 
organisations, ideas social networks and a repertoire of actors and actions.  Bebbington 
(2011: 1) argues for a sense of aligned social movements instead of fragmented isolated 
movements.  In this way social movements can be of quality in the sense that they are not 
just actors or individuals in a zero sum game (as implied by the neoclassical analysis) but 
rather are a process sustained by a set of actors and actions motivated by shared grievances. 
The value of the coming together of different movements consists in posing a unified 
challenge to state power, countering state power with the power of the masses. In this 
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process, the incoherent and untidy diversity and multiplicity of social movements becomes 
the source of strength of social movements (Greenstein, 2003: 15).   
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the implementation of neoliberalist economic policies in the 
South African developmentalist state among other things has had immense social costs as 
highlighted in chapter two such as the growing inequality, poverty and unemployment in the 
country.  There is a clear need for transformation. Social movements in South Africa have 
historically been shown to have been responsible for addressing issues for example during 
the apartheid era, however in the post –apartheid South Africa they have increasingly 
become fragmented and marginalised by the state, testament to the repression under 
neoliberal democracy. Reasons for this marginalisation include the fact that the definition 
of ‘ungovernabiltiy’ over the years has evolved from apartheid days to the post-apartheid 
era.  Social movements were hailed during apartheid as being at the forefront of pushing a 
just cause.  Since gaining independence however the neoliberal democracy in South Africa 
has since been skewed towards benefitting the national capitalists at a great economic cost 
to the general public. Therefore the state’s response to social movements has largely been 
to marginalise and silence them in order to maintain good relations with the national 
capitalists.  The ‘kick’ that policy makers and political elites require in order to effect 
changes that benefit general masses has effectively been weakened.  The natural conclusion 
one can infer therefore is that the room for equal economic development for all walks of life 
in South Africa is greatly narrowed given the prevailing stance towards social movements.  
The following chapter will zero in on two specific post-apartheid social movements using 
these and other deductions as a lens to create a sharper picture of social movements in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE 
4.1 Introduction 
The Latin American case offers an interesting comparison to the South African case in many 
ways.  The larger majority of Latin American countries are economically comparable to 
South Africa (both South Africa and the bulk of Latin American countries classified as 
“upper middle income economies” using the World Bank Classification according to Income 
and Lending Categories (World Bank, 2016))  coupled with Latin America also experiencing 
a similar neoliberal economic development model.  It is therefore interesting to compare 
social movements in the two cases in order to identify any gaps and lessons.  
 The idea that if a particular group or class of people feels marginalised or disadvantaged in 
some way then automatically there will be some either organised or spontaneous collective 
effort to try and bring about change resonates. Whether it be “the Zapatista movement in 
Chiapas, the Landless movement in Brazil, the Piquetero movement and the occupied 
factories in Argentina, or the peasant indigenous movements in Bolivia and Ecuador” 
(Vergara-Camus, 2013: 597).   The deep economic crisis and refutation of neoliberalism 
marked the emergence of the social movements as major players in shaping the contours of 
Latin American politics and economics (Siotos, 2011: 52). What emerges is that there are 
some lessons from Latin America that can be useful in the South African case. Generally 
the Latin American case presents a more cautiously optimistic reality in some regards 
however some subtle and nuanced lessons emerge which are in some ways hard lessons.  
Having justified the interest in the Latin American case and continuing with the key 
investigation (bringing the literatures on social movements and political agency together), 
the aim of this chapter is to apply the broader theories of social movements as outlined in 
chapter two to the Latin American case.  In this chapter, the idea is to examine the broad 
sense of the Latin American social movements.  How they interact with the overall macro-
economic environment and the political economy.  The idea is to come up with a broader 
view of the general state of social movements in Latin America and compare this with the 
broad South African case.   
Following this introductory section, section 4.2 will consider the rise and crisis of the 
neoliberal hegemony in Latin America, section 4.3 will consider the underlying political 
economy in Latin America, section 4.4 will give an account of the state of social movements 
in Latin America, section 4.5 will give reflections and comparisons on Latin American social 
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movements and draw some considerations based on the discussions in sections 4.2 and 4.3.  
Section 4.6 will conclude. 
4.2 The rise and crisis of the neoliberal hegemony in Latin America 
Neoliberalism and the mechanisms of the free market are often claimed to lead to greater 
prosperity for all, including those in the poorer countries who had been marginalised 
traditionally. However, neoliberalism was largely unsuccessful in dealing with the severe 
historical economic problems of Latin America (Ronchi, 2007: 6).   
As a result, neoliberalism was replaced from the 1930s to the 1950s by a period of a more 
state led model characterised by an inward based economic development. The strategy of 
“development towards the internal market” or “import-substituting industrialisation” (ISI 
model) was applied in order to deal with the crisis of the 1930s. (Ronchi, 2007: 6).  The 
major ISI achievements were higher GDP growth rates in Latin America during the periods 
1945-1972 and 1972-1981 than it had achieved before or since and faster growth of GDP 
per capita (Valdivieso, 2009: 6). ISI was successful in increasing industrialisation in Latin 
America but the model had internal problems. ISI reinforced structural problems for 
development (protective barriers, lack of effectiveness, high-cost production, more 
dependence) (Valdiviesto, 2009: 6) and ISI also lacked efficiency.  Various authors have 
however contested that it was the ineptitude of ISI per se that led to inefficiency and rent 
seeking.  For example Chibber (2005) gives a more nuanced perspective.  And Astorga et al 
(2005).  Ocampo et al (2011) argue that the debt crisis of the 1980s were not caused by ISI 
but by reckless borrowing during the period of low interest rates in the 1970s.  Latin 
American countries were otherwise doing fairly well in the post-war period 
What followed was an economic model known as “desarollista” also characterised by 
increasing state intervention over certain areas as a model of development.  State control of 
the financial system was considered a necessary measure to promote economic development 
(Ronchi, 2007: 7).   Astorga et al (2005) establish that Latin America developed understated 
levels of success under this social democratic economy model and that there was 
“outstanding progress made by nearly every country in the region” (Astorga et al, 2005: 
784).  It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that greater reliance on the domestic market was 
a major source of growth during the so-called 'import substitution' phase of state-led 
industrialisation. Urbanisation, associated with industrial employment, and public 
expenditure on health and education were key drivers of improved standards of living. This 
period also saw the greatest structural change in the Latin American economy, and was 
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marked by sustained and relatively stable growth and social improvement (Astorga et al, 
2005: 784). Here it is interesting to note that Latin America, unlike the South African case 
where there has largely been failed attempts, was able to shift its development model to a 
more developmental state and achieved some success.   
However neoliberal critiques blamed the state intervention for hyperinflation in this period.  
Neoliberalists stated that the state was an inefficient entrepreneur and slowed down growth 
through its participation and in the 1980s there was shift back to more neoliberal policies 
(Ronchi, 2007: 5-7).  
From the 1980s on, economic neoliberalism was offered as the preferred, if not the only, 
economic development model. Neoliberalism based on western liberalism was endorsed by 
international financial institutions like the IMF as prerequisites for a first-class democracy 
and economic development and was held up as the model to follow globally (Ronchi, 2007: 
6). Starting from the second half of the 1980s, the agenda of Latin American governments 
was dominated by a wave of structural reform policies aimed at the radical transformation 
of the economic institutions established after World War II (Ronchi, 2007: 6).  As far as 
political proposals are concerned, there was growing consensus for the neoliberal position 
that permeated the dominant economic thought of the international financial institutions and 
governmental circles of the creditor countries. Neoliberal policies were based on a set of 
principles such as market supremacy as the main, if not exclusive, means to redistribute 
resources, reduce the state’s role in the economy and deregulate the markets of goods and 
services, labour and capitals (Ronchi, 2007: 6).  
Aggressively neoliberal government policies were implemented that involved privatisation 
of state-owned companies, privatisation of natural resources including mines, which were 
the most dynamic sector of the economy, and a cutting of government services (public 
services) (Siotos, 2011: 51).  For example, this first wave of neoliberal adjustments hit Latin 
America in countries such as Bolivia in 1985 under the New Economic Policy (NEP) 
adjustment program which was promoted by the IMF and the World Bank.  Foreign capital 
and transnational corporations infiltrated economies in the following years as trade barriers 
were removed in order to make the region friendly to foreign investments (Siotos, 2011: 51).  
A second round of neoliberal reforms were implemented under conditions of 
democratisation. This round of reforms allowed for and induced the widespread transfer of 
property, productive resources and incomes from the working class and the majority of 
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direct producers to an emerging capitalist class of investors and entrepreneurs (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2006: 86). 
The return to neoliberalism shocked many in the ‘80s. The state was expected to take a more 
redistributional approach to economic growth following the end of World War II (Biglaiser 
and DeRouen, 2004: 564).  Especially as the social costs of the neoliberal reforms were 
borne by low income groups; for example they saw decreased salaries and increased 
unemployment (Ronchi, 2007: 11). In some cases governments embraced neoliberalism in 
office in direct contradiction with their electoral promises such as in Argentina in 1989.   In 
others the argument that there was no other alternative prevailed, such as with Chile’s centre-
left coalition, Concertacion Democratica (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012:3).  Figueredo 
(2006: 113) also contends that some governments assumed that the orthodoxy of 
neoliberalism was in some ways inevitable and that there was no other way to have 
proceeded.  This follows quite closely with the South African discourse as elaborated in 
chapter three once South Africa established GEAR as its development model after apartheid.   
An international debt crisis dominated the decade, and was accompanied in country after 
country across the region by either severe recession, or rampant inflation, or both 
(Cammack, 1991: 538). By the end of the 1980s levels of per capita income across the region 
had fallen back to those of the late 1970s, while worsening patterns of distribution brought 
about even sharper falls in the living standards of many. In this sense the 1980s represented 
‘a lost decade’ (Cammack, 1991: 538).   
In the 1990s the neoliberal stance was further established through the effect of the 
Washington Consensus (Ronchi, 2007: 20) which was to be implemented worldwide 
through the policies of the World Bank and the IMF (just as in South Africa during this 
period).  The key ideas were reduced government spending and downsizing, privatisation of 
state run utilities and industries, and trade liberalisation carried out through regional trade 
agreements. There was continued withdrawal of the state from the process of economic and 
social development and its replacement with the free market.  The IMF and the World Bank 
focused on political stabilisation and prioritised the institutionalisation of Latin American 
politics. The goal for successive governments throughout the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s 
was to create an investment-friendly environment and the macroeconomic stability needed 
in order to attract foreign investments (Siotos, 2011:51).  A structure that was theoretically 
free from the constraints of government regulation and other interferences in its allocation 
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of society’s productive resources to determine “who gets what” materialised (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2006: 86).   
In the early 1990s these ideas resonated well with the political elites in Latin America as 
well as all of the region’s governments, with the exception of Cuba. This even included the 
traditionally nationalistic government of Argentina, which also embraced the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus model (Prevost et al, 2012:4). There was a sense of optimism in the 
1990s because there was a transition to democracy following the end of the Cold War and 
the end of military dictatorship (Figueredo, 2006: 107).  This is reminiscent of the South 
African case were with the end of the apartheid regime there was great optimism for 
neoliberal policies to correct the severe inequalities of the apartheid regime.  In the same 
way there were high expectations for neoliberalism to redistribute resources and result in 
increased economic growth.  
However similar to the South African case, neoliberalism did not provide the wild success 
promised by its instigators in Latin America. Based on the annual GNP growth rate, the 
results were not the ones expected. The region’s GNP grew by 4.9% per year in the ‘50s, it 
rose to 5.5% in the following decade and it continued growing by 5.1% in the 1973-1980 
period. The “lost decade” of the ‘80s, that opened the doors to the debt crisis, meant a meagre 
1.6% growth rate for Latin America.  Although the outcome was better than that of the ‘80s 
in the 1990-2004 period with a 0.9% growth per capita, it remained unsatisfactory (Ronchi, 
2007: 25).    
Neoliberal policies generally did succeed at cutting inflation and stimulating some 
macroeconomic growth. However, beyond this these policies did little to improve the lives 
of the majority poor and the consequent higher unemployment rates and cuts in government 
subsidies actually worsened the situation of growing numbers of poor Latin Americans. 
They also did not improve the huge disparity in wealth and income that was a long standing 
problem in Latin America (Prevost et al, 2012:6).  
The starting point for the breakdown of the Washington Consensus occurred when the 
promises that these policies would lead to better social and economic indicators for the 
region’s poor majority were not realised, especially in Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil. For 
example, Brazil saw an increase in the GINI coefficient from 53.2 in 1992 to 59 by the end 
of the ‘90s (1999). Other countries such as Bolivia and Argentina also experienced similar 
trajectories (GINI coefficient of 42 in 1992 rising to 58.1 in 1999 in Bolivia and 45.3 in 
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1987 rising to 49.8 in 1999 in Argentina (World Bank, 2017)).  Labour organisations were 
weakened and the social costs were immense for the poorest parts of the population, 
especially the indigenous peasants. Poverty rose more than 20% under neoliberalism and 
large parts of the working class (ex miners, peasants, the unemployed) found occupation in 
the informal sector or in small-scale agricultural production (Siotos, 2011:  51). 
 In Argentina, for example, in the period of rapid expansion between 1991 and mid-1994, 
the unemployment rate increased from 6.5% to 12%. In 1995, with ongoing recession, the 
urban unemployment rate rose to 18.6%. In Bolivia, unemployment increased from 6% in 
1993 to 10.9% in 1997.  While in Brazil, unemployment rose from 6.4% in 1992 to 9.6% in 
1999 (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2017).    Poverty persisted throughout the region and 
increased in many countries.   In Argentina for example, poverty headcount increased from 
16.7% in 1980 to 21.6% in 1988.  Bolivia had a high poverty headcount of 30.3% in 1999.  
Brazil’s poverty headcount was at 25.3% in 1992 (CEDLAS and World Bank, 2017).  As 
evidenced by these indicators, the early neoliberal form of capitalist development was not 
only economically dysfunctional but profoundly exclusionary in social terms and politically 
unsustainable (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 87).    
Neoliberal policies yielded results in terms of economic growth and social development that 
were a far cry from the prosperity and economic growth promised by the World Bank and 
the ideologies of neoliberal capitalist development.  Others previously supportive of this 
economic model were constrained to recognize the fundamental dysfunctionality of the 
neoliberal model and the need for fundamental reform of the development model (ultimately 
to move beyond the Washington Consensus) (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 86).  As 
discussed above, state-led industrialisation drive in the middle of the 19th century was 
associated with rapidly rising living standards for a large part of the Latin American 
population, while the liberalisation strategy of the closing period has not had that effect 
(Astorga et al, 2005: 787). It is not difficult to understand therefore why there was nostalgia 
and political support for the former model and continued political doubts about the latter.  
This conclusion fueled a widespread search for “another form of development”. The result 
has been a veritable ﬂood of proposals and alternative models for bringing about 
development.   There is some resonance with the South African case here.  The failure of 
neoliberalism to bring promised economic development is reminiscent of the post-apartheid 
South African case.  And similar to the South African case, there is also a sense of the need 
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for a shift from the prevailing neoliberal economic development model to a new and better 
one.  
Astorga et al (2005: 787) argue that there is little serious popular or intellectual support in 
the region for return to the previous economic model namely the more developmental ISI 
paradigm (perhaps with the exception of Venezuela). They argue that this is because it is 
not possible to repeat the early gains from import-substitution, urbanisation, and public 
sanitation in any case. However, they contend that in order to significantly raise living 
standards in Latin America there is not only need for several decades of sustained economic 
growth, but also radical fiscal reform in order to prevent further increase in inequality 
(Astorga et al, 2005: 787).  .   
In Latin America the consequences of the failure of neoliberalism included a loss of faith in 
governing elites, culminating in the election of ‘new Left’ or ‘post-neoliberal’ governments 
in Venezuela (1998), Brazil (2002), Argentina (2003), Uruguay (2004), Bolivia (2005), 
Ecuador (2006), Nicaragua (2007) and, for shorter periods, in Paraguay (2008), El Salvador 
(2009) and Peru (2011). These governments all promised to begin the task of neoliberal roll-
back, focusing in particular in building more effective and more ‘national’ states, immediate 
relief for those citizens worse affected by neoliberal attrition and a new approach to social 
spending (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3).   
Unlike most critics of neoliberalism, the Latin American Lefts were able to propose 
alternatives and to win office. That era is now gradually drawing to a close. Nevertheless, 
there is no evidence of an enthusiastic embrace of markets once again on the part of voters.  
Undoubtedly, some of the issues that have led to the Left’s loss of office reflect the typical 
cycles of electoral governance, which at some point will always favour alternation in office. 
There is not, in other words, a consensus or a new neoliberal project as yet articulated in 
Latin America – merely an exhaustion with the limitations and venalities associated with 
political figures who have perhaps been in office too long (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3).  
What happened was that the Left won office and set about undoing the neoliberal legacy 
with the massive and vocal support of those who were paying the highest price for economic 
liberalisation and state roll-back. But, and almost inevitably, the Left failed to win the 
argument over the long term in that it could not persuade those who thought differently of 
the rightness of its views and it was, as a result, unable to pioneer a genuinely national or 
consensual shift to a more moderate form of capitalism. In short, the Left was unable to 
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articulate an entirely convincing critique of a model that prioritised economic growth based 
on the global market and the exports of natural resources, or as some would say, of 
neoliberalism itself.  There is some shift to a new economic model but fundamentally the 
precepts of neoliberalism have not been completely abolished.  The hegemony of 
neoliberalism is deeply entrenched so what has seemingly emerged is a ‘reformed 
neoliberalism’ (Watkins, 2010: 13). 
The outcome was the construction of a new policy regime namely a neoliberal programme 
of macroeconomic policies combined with a new anti-poverty social policy and the 
institutionality of a “new economic model” (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 86).  For much of 
Latin America, from the early 2000’s onwards the new economic model can be defined as 
“post-neoliberal.” This means two things: the neoliberal period left its structural imprint and 
at the same time, many of its core principles were cast aside. Despite some inevitable 
historical continuity, there has been noteworthy divergence, as evidenced by changes not 
just in the content of public policy but also in its formulation (Lewkowicz, 2015).  
Bresser–Pereira (2009: 12), describes the post neoliberal economic model as a new 
developmentalism in Latin America.  The neoliberal orthodoxy sought to strengthen markets 
through weakening the state.  It viewed the two as a zero sum game, that is, markets can 
coordinate production optimally but only if they are free of interference.  However new 
developmentalism requires a strong state as well as strong markets.  There is no 
contradiction between them.  Markets are seen as coordinators of production but it 
recognises the need for limitations and regulation (Bresser-Pereira, 2009: 17).  Governments 
initiated important social assistance and employment protection programs.  Political change 
led to greater state intervention in the economy. The emerging model was a decentralised 
and participatory form of local development based on more sustainable forms of 
“democratic” or “good” governance (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 87). The idea was to bring 
about development on the basis of social capital, i.e., though the agency of “self-help” and 
community-based or grassroots organisations, with the assistance and support of partner 
institutions and “international cooperation” for development (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2006: 
87).   
The state, according to Bresser-Pereira (2009: 13), plays a more nominal, enabling role 
rather than a direct role in production. The state is not an investor but rather a defender of 
competition.  The state is responsible ensuring proper operation of markets and providing 
the general social conditions for capital accumulation such as good health and education 
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(Bresser-Pereira, 2009: 13).  How far this moderate shift towards welfare, in the context of 
capitalist economies, represents a break with neoliberalism or simply neoliberalism with a 
human face is the subject of fierce debate. These state-led reforms to the model have not 
fundamentally changed the Washington Consensus on macroeconomic policy. Nor has it 
effectively changed the character of capitalist development in Latin America (Petras and 
Veltmeyer, 2006: 90).   
‘Post-neoliberal’ governments have not offered a turn to socialism. Only Venezuela 
constitutes an exception to this combination of welfare, state activism (including 
nationalisation) in the economy, in particular in the lucrative natural resource sector and, in 
some cases, the introduction of more equitable tax systems (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 
3). Almost all post-neoliberal governments (again Venezuela here is exceptional) have 
maintained some core aspects of the Washington Consensus, including fiscal prudence and 
foreign investment (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 3). What Latin American post-
neoliberalism rejected is the inevitability of inequality and challenged the neoliberal 
consensus that inequality is functional for growth. Instead it offered a vision of improving 
equity, social justice and citizenship. Its appeal to voters lay precisely in the promise to 
tackle the rising levels of poverty and inequality following decades of neoliberal governance 
(Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2017: 4). 
The Left in Latin America has succeeded in establishing a precedent for successfully putting 
together electoral coalitions in support of an alternative political economy and it has set out 
some concrete ways in which the terms of neoliberalism can be redefined through policies 
for social inclusion, citizenship and new approaches to welfare. As such, Left governments 
have offered an alternative to the dominant global development agenda by focusing 
discussion on inequalities of income, class, place, ethnicity, and (dis)ability rather than 
simply poverty. These are significant achievements and they should be recognised   (Grugel 
and Riggirozzi, 2017: 24).  
Recent data for the largest economies in Latin America are lacklustre but are improving.  
The recovery is uneven with countries such as Brazil and Argentina pulling out of recessions 
while countries like Peru, Colombia and Chile have slowed growth (World Bank, 2017).   
However contrastingly with South Africa, growth is expected to rise in 2018 (World Bank, 
2017; Khumalo, 2017).  Though the economic outlook for Latin America is less than perfect, 
it is still much more positive compared to South Africa.   
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4.3 The underlying political economy in Latin America 
As has been established from the theory in chapter two as well as in chapter three, the 
political economy of a country greatly impacts the development model that prevails.  Where 
the political economy is sticky then there will be greater inertia to shifting the developmental 
project in line with desired economic growth and development paths.  Where the politics is 
stuck then social movements emerge as having an important role in being the lever that 
forces the politics to shift towards a new and better development model.  However, the 
prevailing political landscape also determines whether social movements will be effective 
in this regard or not. 
Most countries in Latin America democratised in the 1980s after the Cold War ended and 
massive human rights abuses and state-sponsored violence almost ceased to exist (Ocampo 
et al, 2011).  For example a regional process of democratic reform launched in 1979 when 
the military stepped down in Ecuador and the Sandinista-led revolution overthrew the 
Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua.  This trend continued unabated into 1990, culminating in 
the replacement of General Pinochet in Chile by a Christian Democrat, Patricio Aylwin 
(Ocampo et al, 2011).  
Over the period, liberal democracy was also restored in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and 
Uruguay; the military withdrew from direct executive control to give way to formally 
democratic regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras; dictators fell in Haiti and 
Paraguay; the US replaced a client-dictator with a client-democrat in Panama; Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela maintained semi democratic or 
democratic regimes; and civilian Mexico, for 60 years under the control of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), showed signs under Salinas of gradual movement towards 
genuinely competitive politics. No country in the region was left unaffected, except perhaps 
for Cuba; and, singularly, no military intervention succeeded in reversing a democratic 
opening once under way (Cammack, 1991: 537). 
The process of seeking redress for past human rights abuses spread across the region.  This 
was similar to the South African case after the end of the oppressive apartheid regime as 
discussed in chapter three. The very fact of having transitioned to democracy produced an 
enormous challenge: how to fortify an authentic and modern rule of law in societies whose 
political culture and customs were for centuries distant and unconnected to the practice and 
mindset of liberal democracy (Ocampo et al, 2011).  There were concerns that neoliberalism 
would destroy democracy and these fears reflected the experience of the 1980s, when many 
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new democratic regimes in the region postponed economic stabilisation and structural 
adjustment. Governments in fragile, unconsolidated democracies feared that neoliberal 
reforms, which impose high short-term costs on important, powerful sectors and large 
segments of the population, would trigger social turmoil and political conflict and thus 
endanger the survival of democracy (Weyland, 2004: 136). 
In Latin America, the transition to democracy prompted the opening of the political system 
to new forms of citizen participation. Over the last 30 years, most Latin American countries 
have adopted strong, vibrant liberal democracies. One of Latin America’s top priority is to 
continue building institutions that reinforce the rule of law, tolerance and democratic culture 
(Ocampo et al, 2011). Latin America, for the most part, has embraced freedom of the press 
and transparency, which reinforce democratic practices and principles.  Governments are 
more transparent, there is greater respect for human rights, and democratic values have been 
strengthened 
As has been discussed in section 2.3, generally speaking, participatory approaches agree 
that: a democratic system requires a level of commitment that exceeds the mere election of 
a parliament and/or a government (Welp, 2017: 3). The elitist model of democracy namely 
neoliberal democracy, which shaped the political system along the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, gave citizens an active role only in electoral processes in which they had to choose 
a party or leader, allowing them to exercise power over a given period of time. Elections 
were seen as the only necessary mechanism for exercising accountability and inducing 
responsiveness through the confirmation or replacement of those who held power. As a 
result, social movements emerged as an important new form of politics.  Since the 1960s 
this model, which was labelled instrumental, elitist or restricted democracy, has been 
increasingly challenged by new visions which gave an outstanding role to non-electoral 
political participation through social movements (Welp, 2017: 3).  
The first initiatives, developed in the late 1980s, were promoted by the arrival of new social 
movements and/or leftist parties to the local government with the objective to renovate 
democracy from the inside. The protests that developed against austerity since the 1990s 
were path breaking not only from the perspective of the emergence of new collective 
identities but from an organisational point of view.  While unions and other historical 
institutions of the developmental state were targeted by neoliberal reforms as jeopardizing 
the free market, new organisational forms gradually developed promoting and practicing 
alternative forms of democracy (della Porta, 2015: 15).     
68 
 
Since the 1990s a new realm has been promoted through constituent assemblies which have 
‘constitutionalised’ citizen participation by including a wide range of mechanisms in new 
constitutions. This model incorporates and regulates both institutions for direct decision-
making and for deliberation as well as other institutions of transparency, accountability and 
control (Welp, 2017: 2). While at first glance it appears as a novel and promising experience 
of democratisation, what participation is and the role it plays leaves room for debate, 
indicating that there is a conflicted view of what democracy should be and how it could be 
realised (Welp, 2017: 2).  Similar to the South African case, social movements were 
constitutionalised with the Constitution recognising the ‘right to protest’ but this level of 
nominal democracy as was highlighted in preceding chapters is not enough and there is need 
to consider the quality of democracy. 
Vanden (2007) argues that the traditional forms of conformist democracy and limited citizen 
participation have not served the people. Valdivieso (2009: 4) argues that there are still some 
contradictions and tensions in Latin America as a consequence of legacies of some specific 
patterns and experiences of development since the time of colonisation in the 16th century. 
Marginalisation and social exclusion, restricted autonomy, lack of stability, and lack of 
consolidated democracies are some of the current conditions in Latin America that are a 
result of long historical precedents (Valdivieso, 2009: 4).  The mechanisms that were 
presumably designed to communicate the general public’s sentiments to the decision makers 
so that they could govern in accordance with popular desires and needs have historically 
been weak at best (Vanden, 2007: 19).   
This is consolidated by Streeck (2015)’s argument that there has been an unravelling of 
liberal democracy in favour of capital, representing an increased shift from a liberal 
democracy to a neoliberal democracy.  The free-market system, by contrast, is an elitist 
project that is often associated with support for or acquiescence to authoritarian political 
rule. Neoliberal democracy therefore involves the forceful dismantling of the established 
development model, and therefore requires a significant concentration of political power 
(Weyland, 2004: 136).  As a result citizen participation has in some cases been weakened 
by the neoliberal democracy in Latin America.    
The available evidence suggests that since then the record has been mixed, but overall more 
favourable than many observers feared. In some countries, the public institutions’ processes 
do not work as indicated by expanding corruption in most Latin American countries. Two 
of the world’s ten most corrupt countries (Venezuela and Haiti) are in Latin America, and 
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fourteen of the region’s countries are ranked in the bottom half of the Corruption Perception 
Index (Transparency International, 2016). This affects the trust of the population resulting 
in citizens who tend to then opt for more unconventional methods of expression 
(Validivieso, 2009: 4). As described in section 2.3, the weaker the state, the lower the trust 
in the state’s capabilities in selecting good policies and therefore the higher the incidence of 
protests.    
Although ‘all is not well with democracy in Latin America’, there are signs that there is no 
deadlock. Citizen’s protests have indicted and sometimes toppled presidents and parliaments 
that were considered corrupt, have contributed to legal and constitutional reform, and have 
participated in participatory planning and budgeting (Salman, 2008: 91).  In Latin America, 
protests and other contentious strategies were common and played an important role during 
democratisation, declining somewhat afterwards. Examples range from the broad, 
community organized “piqueteros” of Argentina that brought down three governments in 
the space of one month in 2001 to the indigenous-based movements of Ecuador and Bolivia 
that have been instrumental in toppling five governments in the two countries within the last 
decade, the Landless Movement in Brazil (MST), Afro-Colombians resisting displacement 
in a region coveted by investors, the cocalaros and the mobilisations against water 
privatisations and gas pipeline investments in Bolivia, to the Zapatistas in Mexico, who 
burst on the scene to challenge the formation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the marginalisation of the mostly indigenous peasants in Chiapas (Prevost et 
al, 2012 :1).   
Weyland argues that neoliberalism helped to secure the survival of democracy, as defined 
in minimal procedural terms.  As is supported by Mans-Gorse and Nitcher’s arguments in 
section 2.3 that neoliberalism can strengthen democracy in form rather in quality. Mans-
Gorse and Nitcher (2008: 1411) also argue that there is a J-Curve in Latin American 
democracy. There is initial short term deterioration in democracy reversed by a long run 
positive association with neoliberalism. In crisis situations, people do not dig in their heels 
and strenuously defend their immediate material well-being; instead, they are willing to 
make sacrifices and trust their leaders' plans for straightening out the economy (Weyland, 
2004: 138). They are willing to accept substantial risks by supporting adjustment plans that 
promise to turn the country around but that, for economic and political reasons, have 
uncertain prospects of success (Weyland, 2004: 138).   Weyland does qualify further that 
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drastic market reform, however, seems, on balance, to have limited and weakened the quality 
of democracy in Latin America (Weyland, 2004: 137).   
The most important changes in the Americas revolve around the widespread acceptance of 
market-based economies with representative democratic politics. Latin America has 
developed premier social programs.  Those programs target the poorest segments of the 
populations and reward families for sending children to school and ensuring medical care 
breaking the cycles of intergenerational poverty that have historically dogged the region 
(Ocampo et al, 2011).  The ultimate outcome of these changes has been the improvement in 
human dignity through freedom and democracy. However the study of policymaking in 
contemporary Latin America reveals important variations across countries and over time in 
the strength and relevance of specific institutions such as the congress, the judiciary, and the 
bureaucracy (Machado et al, 2011: 2).  It is no accident that countries that have established 
strong, representative democracies, such as Chile, have progressed.     
4.4 A commentary on the state of social movements in Latin America  
Social movements in Latin America have a rich history which cannot be developed here in 
great detail but what is observed is that they arose out of the social and economic condition 
of the continent (Cammack, 1991: 541).  As highlighted in the preceding section, Latin 
America went through several political and economic changes.  Economically, neoliberal 
policies were fairly successful in some ways but undoubtedly entrenched inequality and 
poverty in the region.  Thus social movements in their different forms are inherently 
economic as they arise to act in direct response to the economic circumstances and demand 
change economically in order to restore social consistency.  Even when, as in some cases, 
movements lack radical political edge, their focus on issues such as defending living 
standards and civil rights co-exist with the broader questions of social and economic 
transformation (Petras, 1989: 187).   
In countries where social movements have been more successful such as Venezuela, 
Mexico, Brazil and Bolivia social movements formed horizontal alliances and garnered the 
support of similar social movements. For example Bolivia’s social and union movements 
were highly organised and politically powerful. Labour organisations built their strength in 
opposition to the dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s but were then weakened when 
neoliberal reforms were implemented in the 1980s and 1990s (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 529). 
This led the peasant unions from the highlands in the west of the country and peasant and 
indigenous movements from the east to come to the fore, often defending territorial interests. 
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These trade union and social movements, together with ‘neighbourhood organisations’ and 
unions of informal workers are now represented in government by the Movement Toward 
Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo) (MAS) party (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 531). 
By its election in 2005, the MAS party had formed a pact between the most powerful social 
movements in the country: the peasant unions, indigenous organisations and the landless 
movement. Allied with these organisations were the cooperative miners, the neighbourhood 
organisations, the union of manufacturing workers, unions of informal workers, and the 
teachers’, pensioners’ and miners’ unions (Bottazzi and Rist, 2012: 533). One of the central 
demands of the social movements had been for the convening of a Constituent Assembly to 
re-write the Bolivian constitution. This would be a way to‘re-found’ the Bolivian state, to 
include Bolivia’s diverse ethnic and cultural groups and to enhance the rights of all 
Bolivians. Once in power, a final constitutional text was approved and ratified into law. The 
new constitution recognises the 36 indigenous groups in the country, and guarantees many 
important rights, including those relating to trade unions, workers and the right to organise 
(Bottazzi and Rist, 2012:544).  
Another example is the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), an indigenous 
armed organization which declared war on the Mexican Government, demanding work, 
land, housing, food, health, education, independence, liberty, democracy, justice and peace. 
Throughout Mexican history, Chiapas’s indigenous people had been excluded from the 
governmental decision-making process as well as from enjoying basic human rights and 
services such as education and healthcare (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1135). Consequently, the 
EZLN was formed, to represent the rights and aspirations of Chiapas’s indigenous peoples. 
EZLN demanded that the Mexican Government put an end to indigenous segregation and 
oppression. This oppression was exacerbated by the enactment of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which was viewed as a threat to indigenous interests. The 
EZLN and indigenous agricultural workers in Chiapas feared that international competition 
would wipe them out of the local markets (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1134).  
In 2001 the Mexican Congress passed an indigenous law recognising the multi-cultural 
nature of the Mexican state.  Consequently, autonomy was granted to indigenous 
communities, as well as political participation (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1142). As a 
consequence of the Zapatista insurgency in Chiapas, the indigenous peoples in Mexico were 
granted the constitutional right of self-determination.  The incorporation of this right into 
the Mexican constitution was essential for the development of Mexican indigenous 
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communities as well as for the Mexican democracy as a whole, because it encouraged the 
respect of indigenous traditions and practices within the country.  
During these years the movement also received the support of other independent peasant 
organisations of the state that created the Consejo Estatal de Organizaciones Indı´genas y 
Campesina (State Council of Indigenous and Peasant Organizations, CEOIC) to support the 
Zapatista struggle and jointly address the land question.. The EZLN was indeed building a 
national alliance with other indigenous movements in order to negotiate the constitutional 
recognition of indigenous autonomy that could inter alia serve as an alternative legal 
framework that would protect indigenous peasant right to land and control over resources 
(Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1151). 
Another instance is the Landless Workers Movement, Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais 
Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil. The MST had significant impact on Brazil’s contemporary 
struggle for agrarian reform.  MST developed a new pattern of struggle for agrarian reform 
in Brazil grounded on the formation of grassroots movements and the use of direct action 
tactics such as occupying of rural estates and public buildings and long distance marches 
(Rosa, 2015: 375).  The MST was able to form alliances and get the support of the Homeless 
Movement, the Catholic Pastoral Rural (Rural Pastoral Agency) and sectors of the trade 
union movement, as well as the left-wing of the Workers Party (PT) (Vergara-Camus 2012: 
1149). MST developed a discourse of productivity and intensive use of land for productivity 
and was therefore able to incorporate some of the state’s agenda into their own agenda.  That 
enabled the state to act in the name of development allowing the state to tolerate MST’s 
presence and actions (Rosa, 2015: 51-53). The MST and other rural organisations also 
successfully obliged the state to help settler families with a start-up credit that allow them 
to buy the minimal equipment for a farm and buy a few heads of cattle to secure a monthly 
monetary income (Vergara-Camus, 2012: 1150). The movement has also tried to organise 
cooperatives to provide families with technical assistance, cheaper inputs and better 
commercialization mechanisms.  
Bebbington (2010: 10) argues that overt direct action can disrupt thinking about issues. The 
massive marches and mobilisations for territory and land that have occurred since 1990 in 
Bolivia, Ecuador and even Peru more recently have the effect of challenging dominant 
notions about the ways in which land should be titled if the goal is national development 
with both inclusion and well-being. However, these techniques do relatively little to 
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elaborate clear alternative ideas, and far less ideas that have the potential to translate into 
policy (Bebbington, 2010: 10).   
Engaging politicians and political parties is a thornier and debated issue within movements. 
In some cases, political parties have been created by or emerged from movement 
processes—examples here might be the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia. In these 
instances, the projection of movement ideas to a far wider terrain with policy impact is more 
likely (Bebbington, 2010: 10).  
The last decade, however, has witnessed a resurgence of new social movements in the form 
of protest activity but to varying degrees of intensity and political relevance across countries. 
Institutional systems differ significantly in their capacity to absorb and process conflict.  In 
some countries, for example Argentina, almost every contentious issue finds thousands of 
people on the Plaza de Mayo, tractors blocking roads, and pickets cutting a bridge in 
Neuque´n   (Przeworski, 2009: 2).  In Argentina, decisions are made as often in Congress as 
in the streets. Routinely, the main arteries of Buenos Aires and some of the main highways 
connecting strategic locations in the countryside are shut down by protestors as well as in 
countries like Ecuador and Peru, street protests have also become a very salient and 
meaningful way to achieve certain political objectives and to express policy demands 
(Machado et al, 2011: 3). Yet in other countries, say Costa Rica, almost all conflicts are 
disciplined by political parties and processed through the Congress, the Presidency, or the 
Courts (Przeworski, 2009: 2).  Social movements also emerged in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, 
Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia, and (to a lesser extent) in Paraguay and Venezuela. In other 
cases, like Chile, protests are more sporadic and far less relevant to policymaking in general. 
The issues they raise range from the distribution of social benefits, to fiscal and trade policy, 
down to the country stance on foreign affairs.  Protests and road blockades have also become 
a popular means of affecting public policy in Bolivia and other countries in the region 
(Machado et al, 2011: 3).  
The tactics employed by the social movements and how they contest power include cortar 
ruas (closing streets) and other actions by the piqueteros in Argentina. The indigenous 
movements and their supporters in Bolivia and Ecuador utilized the tactic of blocking 
ground access to the capital city and transit on other major thoroughfares by barricading 
roads with material at hand and in the process stalling much of the transit and commercial 
activity of their countries (Prevost et al, 2012: 9). The new social movements in South Africa 
also employ a wide range of tactics in their operation. 
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The social movements that have arisen in recent years in Latin America have tended to 
practice horizontal and participatory processes in decision making and to seek social justice 
based on race/ethnicity, gender and/or traditional marginalisation from the political process 
or economic benefits (Prevost et al, 2012: 8).  For instance in Mexico (the Zapatista, who 
forced the state to provide them with a measure of autonomy),  Bolivia (where there is an 
interesting dynamic of the peasant unions, who manage to ‘free’ themselves of the urban 
mining-dominated unions and Brazil where the state ‘toleratates’ land invasions by the MST.   
della Porta (2015: 28) proposes that organisational structures are, for social movements, 
instruments.  General episodes of contention began with separate streams of protests which 
then linked as the common origin of highly varied grievances and demands facilitated the 
articulation of horizontal linkages amongst protest organisations (della Porta, 2015: 16).  
The mechanisms used included summit meetings, organisational networks, open assemblies 
and communal forms of social organisation (della Porta, 2015: 16).    
4.5 Reflections and broad comparisons with the South African case 
Some key broad lessons begin to emerge here.  The neoclassical explanation of social 
movements seems to be applicable across both the South African and Latin American cases.  
The idea that when people become frustrated they rationally seek a vehicle to address their 
issues and mobilise to demand change is also true in Latin America. The hegemony of 
neoliberalism in Latin America resulted in unfavourable conditions of increased inequality 
for the poor masses such as the indigenous people and peasants in southern Mexico, 
Ecuador, and Bolivia, rural labourers and the poor in Brazil, those who live in the slums and 
have been left out of the oil wealth in Venezuela, and large segments of the lower and middle 
classes in Argentina and Uruguay (Vanden, 2007:20).  Similarly, in South Africa, the new 
government adopted the neoliberal economic development model which deepened the 
inequality and poverty crisis for the historically underprivileged black masses in South 
Africa.  This set the stage for the emergence of social movements in both cases where social 
movements’ role was to act as a vehicle for change in challenging the political status quo.  
The economics in Latin America also seemingly became stuck with the failure of 
neoliberalism and a failure to come up with a sustainable and effective alternative 
development model. The South African case present a similar narrative.  The difference is 
the political space. In Latin America, although the picture is mixed, an alternative 
development model more receptive to social movements started to become apparent in the 
‘post-neoliberal’ period.  The new model proposed in Latin America following 
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disillusionment with the Washington Consensus welcomed grassroots “do it yourself” 
politics of local development.  This meant that the political space was wide enough for social 
movements to operate. 
The modus operandi of social movements in Latin America is also another area of 
divergence.  Social movements in Latin America were largely well organised and structured 
organisations.  In this way through perhaps through effective leadership they have been able 
to penetrate the political structures directly and to be taken seriously by the establishment.  
Social movements in Latin America have also formed horizontal alliances with other social 
movements with similar agendas.  However, in the South African case, social movements 
are generally dispersed and fragmented with no real alliances being formed.  This is probably 
attributable to the dilemma of institutionalism.  That is the risk of corporatism that comes 
with institutionalism under a neoliberal hegemony.  Social movements would want to 
maintain their autonomy and act outside the hegemony. So somehow social movements have 
to find a way of being inside without losing their autonomy in order to gain more influence. 
At a local level, movements created electoral instruments (where electoral law allows this) 
through which movement leaders contest mayoral or similar positions, and often on an 
electoral platform closely linked to their movement’s agenda. For example in the Bolivian 
case with MAS.   How far this legitimates the position and ideas of the movement is less 
clear, because such easy translations from movement to formal political process are just as 
likely to attract scepticism and criticism that movement leaders used the movement only to 
enter into formal politics. Whatever the case, such instances are relatively rare, and the more 
usual scenario is one in which movements have to decide whether to ally with a political 
party or figure whose social bases, moreover, might be quite distinct from those of the 
movement. Again this might happen at both national levels or more locally.  Managing such 
relationships is, however, complex and there seem to be few examples where such 
conjectural alliances lead ultimately to longstanding relationships. Such alliances seem far 
more likely to lead ultimately to the political instrumentalisation of the movement. Perhaps 
for such reasons, some movements shy away from any clear allegiance with parties or 
politicians (Bebbington, 2010: 12).   
Another key difference between the Latin American case and the South African case is the 
emphasis on the history of apartheid in South Africa.  This has coloured almost every social 
movement that has emerged since abolishing apartheid.  One prime example is the issue of 
land reform in South Africa.  The Landless People’s Movement (LPM) was formed by black 
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people for black people.  The land question is opposed by white landowners defending 
agrarian policy that safeguards the interests of the commercial sector while the LPM 
advocates for a land policy driven by a racially oriented past of loss and dispossession.  Land 
reform is not only about a unit of production, the market and the economy but it also an 
issue of reparation and justice.  
By contrast the Brazilian Landless Workers Movement, Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais Sem Terra (MST) is built on an identity of rural workers who have the skill and work 
the land but do not own it.  The main disputes are about monoculture and land being in the 
hands of the unproductive as well as labour exploitation (Rosa, 2014: 51-53). While there is 
nothing wrong with contesting historical injustice, the problem is a narrowing of the scope 
of concern and limiting it to a single issue.  As discussed in chapter three, this rights based 
approach has several difficulties in engaging effectively with transformation (du Toit, 2013: 
20). It is implicit with the LPM that in correcting social injustices this will also economically 
empower a largely marginalised group of people who were previously historically 
disadvantaged leading to overall economic development.  And this is common to several 
other social movements in South Africa.  This is a key point. There is a tendency towards 
‘single issue’/identity politics fragmentation but some very interesting organisation points 
emerge and there is an appreciation of the need to focus on structural change and solutions.  
Not just to ‘look back at injustice.    
 
4.6 Conclusion  
This chapter has considered the broad Latin American case and also juxtaposed it against 
the broad South African case citing some of the major similarities and differences and drew 
inferences based on them.  The idea was to contrast social movements in South Africa versus 
those in Latin America in order to draw the broader lessons from the contrast.  The following 
chapter will hone in on these two cases and consider specific case studies in order to sharpen 
the focus and enhance the comparative results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARATIVE LENS ON SOUTH AFRICAN SOCIAL   
MOVEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 
5.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapters two, three and four have served a mainly exploratory and descriptive 
purpose. The South African case chapter has reflected on the general state of social 
movements giving a broad perspective of social movements in South Africa.  The Latin 
American case chapter has also attempted to do the same in the Latin American context.  
The major issues that come up are that economically things have gotten stuck. Essentially, 
the failure of the neoliberal economic development model to provide a sustainable growth 
path has highlighted the need to shift to a new economic model.  However in both cases it 
has not been clear which is the best alternative hence becoming economically stuck.  Social 
movements have in both cases emerged as a result and in an attempt to challenge and push 
the political actors to come up with a good sustainable economic model.   
In chapter two and three there is an emphasis on the emergence of social movements in 
response to these frustrations.  However, at this point there is need to account for the success 
and failures of social movements in South Africa.  As noted in preceding chapters, these are 
not just a factor of the demand for social movements.  Firstly, while they have been good at 
‘putting out fires’ they have been less clear in articulating plausible systemic alternatives.  
As a result they tend to be successful at highlighting injustices while the deeper structural 
issues from which the injustice stem remain unaddressed and festering. 
Secondly, social movements have also struggled for political cohesion and to find “the 
synthesis of inside and against”. Clearly these two issues reinforce each other.  A lack of 
ideological clarity about how specific and system struggles cohere means that struggles tend 
to be specific and hence fragmented.  Fragmentation plays into ideological 
underdevelopment: social movements tend to be fighting specific issues and hence resort to 
formulae for the systemic issues (neo-colonialism, monopoly capitalism, corruption) rather 
than thinking about systemic alternatives clearly.  Nevertheless, these are separable issues 
and the chapter treats them as such. 
Using the theory and ideas from the preceding chapters as tools for analysis, the aim of this 
chapter is to hone in on social movements in South Africa and focus on specific case studies 
in order to refine the investigation and get more focused results. Carrying on with the 
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overarching goal of the thesis, the key construct is to bring the literature on political agency 
and economics together.  This chapter looks at two iconic post-apartheid social movements, 
#FeesMustFall and the Landless People Movement (LPM).  These movements reflect two 
axes of a deeper structural problem, namely the exclusion of black South Africans 
respectively from the land and from the educated classes (the middle classes).  Although 
these issues (landlessness and lack of access to higher education) are separate issues at 
another level they are dimensions of the same structural problem.  The problem is systemic 
and has to do with the way that the neoliberal system has evolved post-apartheid as described 
in chapter three. Participants of these movements exhibit varying degrees of awareness of 
the deeper structural issues (for example #FeesMustFall is couched in the language of 
decolonisation) but a critical gap seems to exist in linking these movements to the debate 
about economic viability of their causes. 
Section 5.2 to follow will look at #FeesMustFall closely describing the movement, 
considering the goals of the movement and how the movement sought to achieve those goals.  
The section ends by reflecting on these discussions. Section 5.3 will consider the LPM in 
South Africa.  Following a similar progression, the section begins by describing the LPM, 
its goals and how they aimed to achieve those goals and finally ends by reflecting on the 
discussions.  Section 5.4 concludes and summarises the chapter.  
5.2 #FeesMustFall: Overview 
A 2016 study reviewing 40 developing countries over the period 1999 - 2007 found that 
education is the most significant contributor to poverty alleviation by increasing 
employability (Krugel and Viljoen, 2016: 4).  Because of the role higher education can play 
in an economy with high levels of unemployment such as South Africa #FeesMustFall is of 
great interest and relevance. Some would argue that education in South Africa has been 
about elite transition within the framework of an ethic defined by the present market-driven 
neoliberal system. This has created an alienation of marginalised people and this has sparked 
the rise of the disillusionment with the state of higher education in the country. 
Problems with historically black universities can be traced back to the politics of higher 
education funding post-1994 and the decision by the state to reduce higher education 
institutions from 36 to 23 through the mechanism of mergers (Jansen 2003: 4). Three new 
ones have been created since, taking the number to 26 (Davids and Waghid, 2016). One of 
the key reasons for the merger of institutions of higher learning was to facilitate 
transformation and improve (especially black) students’ access to higher education and 
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financial support (National Commission on Higher Education, 1996). The Ministry of 
Education’s 2001 National Plan for Higher Education was designed to redress past 
inequalities. Its aims were to: transform the higher education system to serve a new social 
order, meet pressing national needs, and to respond to new realities and opportunities. The 
mergers, which were hotly debated and widely criticized, sought to unify the fragmented 
higher education system inherited from the apartheid government. It was hoped the process 
would address the system’s profound inequalities (Davids and Waghid, 2016). However, it 
appears that many of these ideals were not achieved following the mergers because many 
universities are still marked by differences based on the material, cultural and social 
positions of their separate histories (Jansen 2003: 11). For example, Tshwane University of 
Technology (Soshanguve campus) appears to have been negatively affected by its merger 
with Technikon Pretoria, a historically white institution, while Cape Peninsula University 
of Technology, in its merger with Cape Technikon, a former white institution, has resulted 
in inequalities between campuses along class and racial lines (Ndelu, 2016: 16).  
A clear pecking order of universities emerges.  University of Cape Town, Wits and 
Stellenbosch for example are the high ranking more sought after universities and students 
want to get into these.  Then followed by the likes of Rhodes and University of KwaZulu 
Natal then Fort Hare and at the bottom are the colleges (Rogan and Reynolds, 2015: 15). 
The lowest ranking institutions are the worst resourced, have the highest failure rates and 
the worst records in the labour market and are the blackest institutions (Rogan and Reynolds, 
2015: 15).   Student enrolments at historically disadvantaged black universities have 
dwindled as students have flocked to the better resourced, historically advantaged white 
institutions (Ndelu, 2016: 16). This was already happening in the decade immediately after 
apartheid, but was exacerbated by the mergers. Essentially a process that was supposed to 
redress past inequalities has had the effect of entrenching them, and in some cases widening 
them (Davids and Waghid, 2016). As such one could conclude that the driving force of 
protests was the unfulfilled promises of 1994 as is commonplace with most other recent 
protests.  That is the failure to secure social equality between black and white, rich and poor 
(Suttner, 2015). 
 Student-led protests gained momentum in 2015 as well as in 2016 and spread across the 
country fairly quickly. Subsequently, the #FeesMustFall movement has sparked heated 
debates on fee increases in universities and the possible provision of fee-free tertiary 
education in South Africa. Over the past two years, universities have become increasingly 
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contested spaces. Student movements rejected the current status quo and worked to reorder 
not only the principles that govern universities, but ultimately the principles that govern the 
country (Spaull, 2017). Scholars of protest have identified a number of common themes: 
this generation of students is profoundly disillusioned with current processes. They are angry 
with neo-liberalism’s perceived “capture” of higher education and the consequences for fees 
and increasing inequality (Shay, 2016). Further, according to Scott (2017), the persistently 
high and racially skewed failure rates in higher education are also a major but largely 
unacknowledged contributor to the anger and alienation underlying the student protests as 
well as being an obstacle to economic growth. The demands put forward by the students 
included the abolishment of university fees, the clearance of historical debt, 
decommodification of education, the decolonisation of the educational system, 
transformation of universities to address racial and gender inequalities in terms of staff 
composition, as well as insourcing of general workers.  The main message of the protests 
was that the costs of higher education were too high and unaffordable for the majority of 
poor black students.   
5.2.1 The economics of #FeesMustFall: the beginning of the end of neoliberalism? Or no 
such thing as a free lunch? 
Arguably one of the key weaknesses of #FeesMustFall (the other is its structure) is its 
vagueness about economics, except at the most general level.  Students were talking about 
very specific issues (scrapping fees) and very general issues (decolonisation and 
transformation) but were very vague about the details in between.  There are two crucial 
points here.  Firstly, students did not nail down how illegitimate the South African system 
is.  For example, there were sporadic reports about how far behind other middle income 
countries South Africa has fallen in terms of higher education spending and enrolment 
(Fryer, 2016b; Vally et al, 2016).  These however never managed to dislodge the ‘official’ 
discourse that South Africa had ‘done as well as could be expected’ in broadening access to 
higher education.  Secondly, students were also unable to articulate what alternative they 
wanted: for example, a fully free education for all funded by general taxation (which would 
require a more radical change in economic policy), or some sort of ‘free education for the 
poor’, with means testing that could be accommodated in the existing fiscal space or a loans 
based education (NSFAS and the commercial system).  The fact that the students themselves 
did not clearly articulate these issues, made it relatively easy for the establishment to say 
that the demands were unrealistic and issue warnings that free education would ‘destroy’ the 
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system and  insert their own models into the debate. This is a clear exhibition of du Toit’s 
(2013: 20) argument about the flawed nature of a rights based approach to social movements 
as discussed in chapter three. 
The #FeesMustFall social movement generally has followed the patterns described in the 
preceding chapters. The emergence of the social movement was in response to the 
oppressive neoliberal model prevailing in the country which saw the gradual 
commodification of higher education since 1994. Most notably, student fees rose as state 
subsidies failed to keep up with the growth of student numbers (FFC, 2012).   The movement 
gave students the voice to express their frustration at the fact that they felt that they faced 
‘structural violence’ from universities and the state in the form of fees, exclusion and 
colonised spaces (Free Education Submission, 2016: 4-5).  It can be argued that 
#FeesMustFall was successful in providing the kick that pushed government to reconsider 
higher education in South Africa however progress has been slow and in essence the 
movement was successful only in as far as to ‘put out the fire’ in higher education.   
The 2015 #FeesMustFall protests put the state under pressure and in response Jacob Zuma 
announced a 0% fee increment for the 2016 academic year (Allison, 2015). The cost to the 
state of this ranged between R2.6billion and R4.2billion‚ depending on which methodology 
used (Spaull, 2017). Forcing the government to temporarily freeze fee hikes was by far not 
the only achievement of the student movement.  In 2016, after the government announced 
an 8% hike in fees, protests garnered enough support essentially to force the government to 
allocate an additional R17 billion to higher education (Spaull, 2017) mainly to cover fee 
increases for students on NSFAS (Kamanzi, 2016). Since the protests, government has also 
committed to putting additional funding into NSFAS to financially support university 
students. It could be argued that some of these changes would not have happened if the 
students had not organised protests.  However, the movement was vague about the 
economics of free fees and left this bit out in its demands.  
The movement asked far more questions than they answered, at the political level but even 
more so at the economic level, about the kind of higher education system and more generally 
the kind of economic system South Africa aspires to. As noted in the previous section, one 
of the weaknesses of the movement was that it demanded free education without providing 
a clear convincing economically viable path (Free Fee Submission, 2016).  There are at least 
three alternatives to “fix” the higher education problem.  One is fully free education for all, 
another is free education for the poor (which would involve means testing) and a third option 
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is a loan based approach through NSFAS and/or the commercial system.  These options 
require the injection of additional funds to the tertiary education sector (Mabena, 2017).  As 
a result it was easy for the establishment to delegitimise the movement and dismiss their 
demands as unrealistic and economically impossible.   
There is resonance with the hard lesson from the Latin American case: the debate between 
classical reform and radical reform. Classical reform is changing one thing—for example 
fee free education without changing the system as a whole.  Radical reform is trying to get 
away from ‘single issues’ (as explained by Bebbington, 2010 discussed in chapter two).  
Radical reform is that reforms such as free fee education must take place in the context of a 
systemic shift away from neoliberalism. 
 Revolutionary thinking is that if political pressure results in victory in fees reforms or land 
reform then this will lead to other pressures. If political force is applied to these single issues 
then one thing will lead to another.  For example the assumption students made was that if 
they force the state to provide free higher education this will cascade into the state being 
forced to rethink it public finances; consider demands for fixing basic education; and look 
into demands to fix the economy so graduates can get jobs and thus effect economic 
development and improved welfare generally (Fryer, 2016b, Spaull, 2017). However, the 
problem is the inertia of the state and social movements will continue to be stuck in ‘single 
issues’ unless pressure is applied to these other things.  The movement took this inertia for 
granted and assumed that redressing injustice would automatically lead to eventual 
economic development.  They needed to strike a balance between asking the specific 
questions (symptomatic social issues) on transformation and higher education funding and 
addressing the general core underlying structural problems (structural economic problems) 
such as the funding crisis. 
Looking at the developmentalist versus neoliberalism argument in some detail.  Critics have 
argued that the reason South Africa is facing budget issues is not because of too much 
spending, but because of too little.  South Africa has chronically underinvested in higher 
education, and this underinvestment is led by the states’ underinvestment in key areas like 
infrastructure, education, and healthcare. The budget problems are ‘political’ because they 
reflect political choices that is the choice to implement neoliberal policies instead of more 
developmentalist policies (Forslund, 2015; Segatti and Pons-Vignon, 2013).  South Africa 
spends approximately 0.7% of GDP on higher education (Burger, 2016).  By contrast, 
successful developmental states invest heavily in higher education and charge fees with 
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financial aid schemes for the poor. For example developmental states such as Malaysia 
spend 1.75%, and China almost 3%. Cuba spends 4.5% from a very small and stagnant 
economy (Vally et al, 2016). 
What the movement did do was reveal the funding crisis in South Africa.  The World Bank 
(2010) in its report on Higher Education in Africa noted that countries that have attained, or 
are on the verge of attaining, universal primary school enrolment such as South Africa would 
be expected to allocate a larger share of their education budget to higher education. Yet in 
South Africa where at least 70% of each age group completes primary school, higher 
education absorbs less than 20% of public education resources. In 2013, the committee on 
the review of university funding recommended that government increase spending levels on 
higher education (University Funding Report, 2013: 153). The committee noted that 
expenditure on higher education was too low.    
The World Bank noted five years before the #FeesMustFall protests began that “at worst, 
inadequate funding may lead to student protests and strikes” (World Bank, 2010: 22).  The 
World Bank’s report was used as a basis for the conclusions of the Ministerial Committee 
for the Review of Funding of Universities in their 2013 University Funding Report.  The 
recommendations arising from this Report were unequivocal: “Government should increase 
spending on higher education. It is evident that expenditure on higher education is too low, 
especially in light of the desire to move towards a knowledge economy. If participation rates 
of, in particular, African and coloured students need to be improved, more funding will have 
to be allocated to the public university system”  (University Funding Report, 2013: 153).   
This claim has appeared in critical reports such as in Chapter 9 of the 2012 NDP and the 
2013 Ministerial Committee Review on funding of universities (Muller, 2016). In 2011, 
South Africa’s state budget for universities as a percentage of GDP was 0.75%, which is 
more or less in line with Africa as a whole (0.78%). But when compared to OECD countries 
(1.21%) and the rest of the world (0.84%), South Africa lags behind in this regard. Within 
the G-20 group of countries, South Africa has the lowest levels of higher education funding 
(Universities Funding Report, 2013:150).  Cloete (2016) argues for a greater proportion of 
the state budget to go to higher education, from 0.75% to 1%.  
Vally et al (2016) also argue that the government must increase funding by at least an 
aggregate amount equal to the ratio achieved in OECD countries.  However, Muller (2016) 
argues that this is a flawed logic.  Muller (2016) contends that simplistic comparisons across 
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countries fail to account for a variety of important local factors. In higher education these 
include the proportion of the population who are young, different structures of higher 
education funding systems, different forms of post-school education and the quality of basic 
education.  Muller (2016) puts forward the point that because university fee income is not 
included in the total expenditure number due to the fact that it is not government expenditure 
it is not reflected in the percentage. If government scrapped fees, raised the same amount 
through taxes and gave this back to universities, “government expenditure on higher 
education” would rise significantly but the resources available to the system would be the 
same (Muller, 2016). 
Further, pressing for a higher proportion of funds be allocated to higher education creates a 
high risk that a disproportionate share of new education funding will be allocated to student 
financial aid at the expense of resourcing the operation and development of the universities 
and other education-related sectors, which is equally important for student success (Scott, 
2017).  The danger is that a disproportionate share of resources will be shifted to student 
financial aid, at the expense of institutional funding which will negatively affect teaching 
quality and academic and psychosocial student support or of other key areas of social 
spending, including early childhood development. 
The 2017 national budget indicates that this counterproductive situation is already coming 
about. On top of the R32 billion recently reprioritised to higher education for the current 
budget period, another R5 billion has been earmarked for 2019/20 (Budget Review, 2017: 
54). It appears from the budget details that the bulk of these large sums is going to financial 
aid, which means that the critical backlogs in per capita university subsidy are not being 
adequately addressed. The downfall is that other critical programmes have had to face 
budget cuts.  For example, the budget provides for considerable enrolment growth at the 
universities but none in Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET), which 
is the education sector that most needs strengthening (Scott, 2017).   
Some economists have put forward that the government would have to increase its budget 
to bypass the problem of potential budget cuts elsewhere to fund higher education. Either 
by increasing taxes or introducing additional taxes in order to raise the funds required to 
fund fee free higher education.  Koch and Mabugu (2015) suggest that in addition to raising 
taxes, the government would also have to improve its tax revenue collection strategies and 
clamp down on tax evasion loopholes such as the use of transfer pricing by multinational 
companies for example. Other options put forward by Koch and Mabugu (2015) include an 
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increase in value-added-tax (VAT), personal or corporate income taxes or the introduction 
of new taxes, such as a carbon tax, wealth tax or higher education tax. They proposed that 
VAT would have to go up by around 0.6 percentage points from 14% to 14.6% in order to 
raise revenue by R60 billion. For personal income tax, the feasible increase rate would lie, 
according to Koch and Mabugu, between 1 – 5 percentage points, depending on the degree 
of bracket creep and spread assumed (Koch and Mabugu, 2015).  The Financial and Fiscal 
Commission also proposed levying an annual R167 tax on graduates (Mabena, 2017).   
However there are many potential drawbacks associated with additional or increased taxes. 
The combination of the required tax increases and the sheer magnitude of the additional 
revenue required would substantially erode disposable income. It would also lead to 
significantly weaker growth (Koch and Mabugu, 2015).  From a corporate point of view, 
any taxes levied upon businesses would drive up the cost of doing business in South Africa. 
This could potentially come at the cost of jobs as the additional taxes and levies may make 
other markets more appealing for businesses (lower cost markets).  On the other hand, 
imposing higher taxes on individuals may be the breaking point for an already overburdened 
tax base (Morton and Blair, 2016).  
Vally et al (2016) argue in favour of a structure of personal taxation that could be levied for 
the top 10% of income earners in the country and for high-net-worth individuals – people 
who earn an annual income of more than R7 million or have assets of more than R70 million. 
This could generate a substantial increase in available public revenue to fund higher 
education. This approach concentrates on the structural aspects of inequality. Vally et al 
(2016) maintain that this proposal supports the idea that those who earn the most pay for 
their children’s education through taxation and the distribution of public funds rather than 
through an individually based “wealthy user pays” model (Vally et al, 2016). In this model, 
universities receive a subsidy per student from the public funds generated from the tax on 
the high earners which is sufficient for its recurrent operations.  
However Cloete (2016) argues that this is not sustainable as nowhere in the world do the 
super-rich pay for free higher education (Cloete, 2016). Further, allocations to higher 
education where all students are equally subsidised are socially regressive and anti-poor 
according to Spaull (2017). This is largely because the children of the wealthy attend fee-
charging schools that give them a much better prospect of qualifying for university than the 
children of the poor.  Spaull (2017) highlights that fewer than one in ten children from the 
poorest 70% of households qualify to go to university compared with one in two or three 
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children (40%) among the wealthiest 10% of households. And because of this, if one 
allocated an additional R10 billion for example to higher education in a blanket fashion, then 
about R6.8 billion (68%) would end up benefiting the wealthiest 10% of South African 
households because it is their children who are disproportionately at university (according 
to two fiscal incidence studies) (Spaull, 2017).  Spaull’s argument has some validity 
however saying that we should not fix higher education in South Africa because it is 
currently disproportionately benefiting the rich seems to be simply finding reasons not to do 
things. 
South Africa’s funding for higher education is low not just compared to other countries, but 
also funding has not kept pace with enrolment.  The DHET regularly boasts about increasing 
enrolment numbers from 14% to 18% in 2010. Actually it has at times forced such increases 
upon universities. According to the Universities Funding Report (2013: 160), for 
example, “Various universities are also put under extreme pressure to enrol more students 
than planned for, especially in instances where the NSC results improve drastically for a 
particular year and where more students qualify for university entry.”  But such increases 
are of little value to society and are unsustainable especially if enrolment outstrips funding, 
and drop-out and failure rates continue at high levels.  In 2010 the World Bank found that 
in a context of “inadequate public financing and resource diversification, admitting 
increasing numbers of students results in a deterioration in quality” (World Bank, 2010:22).   
There is no contention that financial need should not be an obstacle to students who qualify 
to enter university at a suitable academic standard. However, in allocating public finances it 
is critical to recognise that even carefully designed changes in funding will not materially 
reduce inequality in society as a whole. Using the most recent Statistics South Africa 
Quarterly Labour Force Survey 30.5% of 15 to 34-year-olds are unemployed and only 3.5% 
are in university education. Muller (2016) argues that removing university fees is not 
necessarily the best way to help South Africa’s young people who are poor.  
The majority of young South Africans feel they are being failed by the government and 
society at large. This begins long before they reach university. Cloete (2016) argues that, in 
South Africa free higher education will widen, not reduce, inequality. According to his 
argument this is because the main problem for the poor in South Africa is that less than 5% 
qualify for entry into universities.  The percentage of students in this 5% whose parents earn 
over R600 000 bracket is over 70%.  The children of the new political and business elite 
who have the significant social, cultural and economic capital are the ones who are likely to 
87 
 
succeed in school and gain access to tertiary education. Installing a free university system 
on top of that will only serve to solidify and expand inequality.  Essentially the argument is 
that the issue is not whether there is enough money for free tertiary education. So while the 
general discourse is money, the issue is in fact much deeper and is not only economic but 
also inherently political and systemic (Cloete, 2016).  In other words, the demand is not for 
free fee education on top of the inherent inequality, rather it is or should be a wholly systemic 
shift away from neoliberalism which has entrenched that inequality.  Social movements need 
to somehow shift to social investment state mentality and away from a cost cutting state. 
(Morel et al, 2012).   
There is little to be achieved by making access to higher education more readily accessible 
unless systemic and other deficiencies in the basic education system are simultaneously 
addressed.  But in a neoliberal democracy the state will not do things unless forced to.   This 
is why political pressure from social movements such as #FeesMustFall is important but it 
needed to get past the single issue of fees and ask whether free higher education in the 
context of wider systemic change is feasible.  Fixing ‘one issue’ like fees is not going to be 
radical if it happens in isolation.  In fact it may make things worse in some ways (because 
the government will take money from elsewhere).  
5.2.2 The politics of #FeesMustFall: A failure to be ‘inside and against’ 
What is interesting to note is that protests at South Africa’s universities did not suddenly 
‘erupt’ in 2015 with the #FeesMustFall movement contrary to the narrative that has 
dominated the public record. Students from poorer predominantly black universities and 
universities of technology such as Cape Peninsula University of Technology, University of 
Limpopo, Fort Hare University and Tshwane University of Technology have been routinely 
waging battles against the infrastructural conditions at their universities, the effectiveness of 
the National Student Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS) and the payment of university 
registration fees since 1994 (Godsell and Chikane, 2016: 60) often resulting in harsh 
consequences for both the protesting students and the university (Mama and Feni, 2012).  
But their protest action was largely ignored and often did not make headlines beyond 
regional newspapers (Davids and Waghid, 2016).  
The most recent #FeesMustFall protests have involved students from both historically 
advantaged and historically disadvantaged universities and have as such attracted 
widespread media coverage nationally and internationally even sparking solidarity protests 
in London and New York.  On some campuses students formed a sustainable alliance with 
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campus workers and also foregrounded workers’ demands alongside their own demands for 
example lobbying for insourcing and the provision of free education for workers’ children 
(Suttner, 2015).   When considering one of the lessons from Latin America, forming 
horizontal alliances improved the effectiveness of social movements and their ability to 
garner enough influence on government which echoes here. 
The #FeesMustFall protest movement was in a sense democratic in its nature. In the case of 
most campuses, weight was placed on decisions made by the student body as opposed to 
made by representative bodies such as the SRC (Suttner, 2015).  #FeesMustFall in many 
campuses strategically rejected the vertical hierarchies of student representative councils as 
the only "legitimate voice" of student demands (Kamanzi, 2016). The #FeesMustFall 
protests comprised a group of students without a political mandate, and not elected by 
anyone with almost no resources. The movement experimented with a flat structure and 
open, direct democracy during mass occupations.  It also embodied the unionist slogan of 
“an injury to one is an injury to all” in the sense that those who could afford fees stood in 
solidarity with those who could not (Suttner, 2015).  This lack of organisation and 
hierarchical structure may be argued to a have been another key weakness of the movement. 
A nuanced lesson from the Latin American case is the question of structured movements 
versus relatively unstructured leaderless movements without an organised hierarchy.    
It is evident that the protests served as an effective tool of communication, but questions 
have been raised about the violent acts associated with the protests. The movement was also 
unsure about how to engage with the state or how to give the authorities a ‘kick’.  The lack 
of a clear hierarchical structure and effective organisation is arguably another flaw of the 
#FeesMustFall movement.  The narratives around what happened were easily hijacked by 
the establishment.  An example of this was the claim by Habib and Mabizela (2016) that the 
2015 protests were only peaceful and ‘successful’ because the universities were at the head 
of them whereas at the end of 2015 and in 2016 protests were not because the students took 
matters into their own hands.  Mainstream media also focused on student violence. There 
was also an alternative media that tended to have the opposite bias for example Vox.  
However, the establishment attacked outlets like Vox for providing a one sided view with 
Habib (2016) for example calling it “the online left-wing manifestation of Fox TV where 
information, propaganda and skewed analyses all morph into a toxic mix that is peddled as 
legitimate journalism”.   
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The protests generally started peacefully within various universities, supported by 
academics and other concerned stakeholders.  The protest modus operandi across several 
universities was generally the same: disrupting university operations, campus shutdowns, 
chanting and singing historic struggle songs. Initially universities were fairly tolerant of the 
protests especially in 2015 when they first rose up, however as the protests became more 
robust the response became largely violently oppressive.  Universities’ and the state’s  
response was mainly sanctioning the use of force by the police, commissioning the use of 
force by private security offices, securing interdicts and instituting disciplinary procedures 
against protesters. The protesters turned violent in most cases with some students burning 
and vandalising property and some facing arrest and imprisonment.   
The right to protest is enshrined in and protected by the South African Constitution because 
this right is “recognised as an essential form of democratic expression rather than viewing 
it as a threat to democracy” (Duncan 2016: 3). The question is, why did protests become 
violent? What are the limitations of the right to protest, especially when this right infringes 
on others’ rights? It is important to acknowledge that protests are disruptive in nature but 
not always violent. And it is important to acknowledge that rights are characterised by 
tensions. When a group of people gather to protest, they disrupt the rights of those who are 
not protesting. Duncan (2016) puts this aptly when she argues that protests are acts that 
“communicate grievances through disruption of existing societal arrangements, and bring 
problems in society to public attention”.  This is why it becomes such a grey area.  
The universities tried to draw a sharp line and say only ‘legal’ protest is legitimate.  Habib 
(2016) argued that any disruption of lectures or blocking of roads is ‘violent’ even if it is not 
actually violent because it disrupts people’s rights.  This is the mirror image of the student 
argument claiming that they were facing structural violence in the form of fees, exclusion, 
and cultural alienation around and therefore had no choice but to protest. Also, protests 
happen because things are clearly illegitimate and because the formal channels are 
unresponsive. Students asserted that university management was highly unresponsive to 
their demands. This involved vice-chancellors refusing to engage with student leaders or not 
coming to scheduled meetings and through a common response by the university 
management in most universities which was to get court interdicts against the protesting 
students.    
Habib’s argument that any disruption is ‘violent’ ignores the contradictions, but it effectively 
won the day.  It legitimised the heavy handed response from the state through the police.  
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What followed was mass arrests, internal expulsions and court interdicts, including denial 
of bail in some cases; more than 830 protesters have since been arrested since the advent of 
#FeesMustFall (Kamanzi, 2016).  The widespread media attention on property damage, 
along with the establishment of a security-heavy government task team, signalled to the 
movement that the state was ready to intensify the repression.  
For the most part students blamed the police for instigating violence (although there were 
instances where some protesting students were also responsible for fuelling violence).  
Granted the violence engulfing the university protests cannot be blamed solely on the police, 
the dominant feeling among students was that the police too easily resorted to shooting 
protesters with rubber bullets and stun grenades without any attempt at negotiating or 
engaging with them. Students described their destruction of property as retaliation for the 
university management deploying police and private security officials in response to their 
demands. As noted in The Smoke that Calls (Von Holdt et al, 2011), the deployment of 
police often leads to more violence as police represent the state’s symbolic power and 
repression in the eyes of protestors (McKinley and Veriava, 2005). The state's increasing 
use of repression had the effect of hurting the movement and encouraged perceptions of its 
violent nature.  
The movement was an important cause but it was flawed in its approach and goals.  On the 
whole, the #FeesMustFall movement has been widely commended for its achievement in 
raising awareness about the funding crisis in higher education in South Africa. This is a 
long-standing problem that universities have been battling for years but the #FeesMustFall 
movement brought the crisis to public attention within a period of two to three weeks. The 
movement achieved a number of positive things at various universities, including the 
renaming of university buildings, curriculum transformation and the insourcing of general 
workers. The state has also been pushed to explore other options and models to fund higher 
education, although the progress has been slow so far.   
5.3 Landless People Movement: Overview 
Land ownership in post-apartheid South Africa is still heavily skewed across racial lines.  
There are under 40 000 farming units covering about 67% of the country that are mostly 
white owned and also owned by a small number of blacks with access to capital (Walker 
and Dubb, 2013), 15% is black communal areas and 10% is other state land which includes 
urban areas. (Walker and Dubb, 2013).  Under apartheid, 85% of the land was deemed white 
politically and the rest a periphery of ten ethnically defined African homelands plus a 
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number of tiny coloured reserves.  However throughout the twentieth century a large number 
of Africans and coloureds continued to live in so called white South Africa with varying 
levels of tenure security on white owned farms and conservation lands, in urban areas and a 
small number of black owned properties that escaped forced removals (Walker and Dubb, 
2013). It is against this backdrop of uneven land ownership that land reform has become an 
issue of contention and discussion in South Africa (Lahiff, 2008: 1).   
Despite a rhetorical position on land reform, since coming into power in 1994 the ANC has 
exhibited little interest in pursuing land and agrarian reform with vigour (Anseeuw and 
Alden, 2011: 25).  Binswanger-Mkhize (2014: 253) argues that after years of land reform in 
post-apartheid South Africa there are some islands of success, especially in horticulture, but 
these exist in a sea of partial or complete failure, and the number of beneficiaries and the 
land area transferred is disappointingly low. Redistributive land reform has remained slow, 
affecting only around 5% of South Africa’s farm land by 2010 (Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 
25). Aliber and Cousins (2013) show that the beneficiaries are still active on only 40% of 
agrarian reform projects while the outcome in terms of agricultural production and 
beneficiary income and livelihoods is poor on a large number of projects. Anseeuw and 
Alden (2011: 25) argue that the ANC committed itself publicly to pursue significant land 
reform (first as a liberation movement and then as a party in power), but has achieved so 
little in terms of land reform due to its relatively weak commitment to land issues, 
manifested in small budgets and low profile actions.   
Further land reform policy has also been unstable, with new models introduced every few 
years, as well as new legal and institutional initiatives (Binswanger-Mkize, 2014: 253).  For 
example, between 1994 and 1999, the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) 
programme was introduced. Through SLAG qualifying rural dwellers, farm workers and 
farm dwellers received a grant to purchase and develop agricultural land. The programme’s 
objective was to improve secure tenure and livelihoods by providing access to and 
productive resources for beneficiaries. Following various challenges with the SLAG 
programme, in 2001 the department introduced the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development programme (LRAD) to replace it (Lahiff, 2008:1; Mfaise, 2017: 3).  
LRAD was aimed at improving nutrition and incomes of rural communities, stimulating 
growth from agriculture and empowering beneficiaries to improve their socio-economic 
wellbeing. LRAD was also aimed at creating black commercial farmers. Some of the 
challenges which led to its failure include lack of access to capital and market, poor 
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infrastructure, lack of mentorship and limited financial management skills. Further, the 
LRAD programme was critiqued for its slow pace in transferring land to previously 
disadvantaged persons. These, and many other challenges led to the phasing out of this 
programme between 2007 and 2010 (Lahiff, 2008:1; Mfaise, 2017: 3).  Both SLAG and 
LRAD were phased out not because they had reached their finality, but rather because they 
failed. Both lasted only five years respectively and less than 3 per cent of land has changed 
hands from white to black since the end of apartheid in 1994 (Lahiff, 2008: 1, Alexander, 
2006: 3).   In 2015, the Minister of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform 
launched the One Household One Hectare programme to provide land to the landless and 
fast-track the establishment of agri-parks in district municipalities. Since it began, more than 
4.7 million hectares of land have been acquired for redistribution and 1 496 farms have been 
created.   And in 2017 government pledged to intensify the One Household One Hectare 
initiative through providing mechanised irrigation, mentorship and inputs so that 
redistributed land becomes productive and profitable. About R4.3 billion will be spent on 
this programme over the medium term. (Budget Review, 2017: 66).  
These partial shifts on the ideological terrain, reveal a growing pressure to acknowledge the 
legitimacy of land demand and a tacit recognition of a ‘landless’ identity. However policy 
continues to be guided by the provisions of the White Paper on South African Land Reform 
Policy of 1997, with its emphasis on a neoliberal market-based approach loosely captured 
under the slogan of ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ (Lahiff, 2008: 3) 
Overall, South Africa’s approach to land issues appears to have reached a crossroads. The 
pace of land redistribution is far too slow to meet the expectations raised by the 
government’s target that blacks should own 30% of commercial agricultural land by 2014 
(CDE, 2008: 6). Many land reform projects involving large numbers of people have failed. 
Attempts to improve tenure for black people in rural areas have made little if any progress. 
Promising land initiatives in the private sector have been aborted or put on hold because of 
the scale of claims on private land and delays in resolving them; and also because of a lack 
of capacity within provincial and national state structures to engage constructively with 
private interests. Some new black farmers who had benefited from redistribution are now 
finding their new property under claim as the restitution process proceeds in isolation from 
other policies. The amount of money required to deal with land issues is far larger than 
originally assumed. And dealing with all these issues is far more complex than anticipated. 
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In this context, dissatisfaction is growing on all sides (CDE, 2008: 6). And land reform has 
failed when measured against the above criteria. 
The Landless People’s Movement (LPM) emerged in 2001 against the backdrop of this 
growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the post-apartheid government to fulfil its 
promises of redistribution and restitution.  The state’s political choices in selecting 
neoliberal instruments such as adopting a market-based approach to land redistribution, 
largely based on the ‘willing buyer-willing seller’ principle also led to the emergence of 
LPM.  The Bredell land occupation in early July 2001 which saw thousands of impoverished 
settlers “buying” plots of land for US$ 3 but were promptly thrown off the land by agents 
of the post-apartheid state (Hart, 2008: 681; Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 30) propelled the 
emergence of LPM in 2001.  This represented a profound moral and socio-economic crisis 
of the post-apartheid state and fed into the accelerated rise of the LPM protesting the snail 
pace of land redistribution.   
Though LPM began as a rural-based movement, it spread rapidly into the urban centre of 
Johannesburg, and then throughout Gauteng province, during 2002 (Rosa, 2012: 4). It was 
intended as a national instrument of pressure on the government for the fulfilment of 
promises made at the end of apartheid namely that land would be restituted to the Black 
population by 1999 (Rosa, 2012: 4).  LPM developed around a program designed to pressure 
the South African government to drastically increase the speed of land redistribution and to 
enforce the promises of tenure security to those Africans who work for white farmers in 
exchange for access to land (so-called labour tenants).   
5.3.1 The economics of land reform: the viability of redistribution 
Arguably a key weaknesses of LPM is its vagueness about economics, except at the most 
general level. The movement has not nailed down how illegitimate the South African system 
is. For example they have not been able to dislodge the ‘official’ discourse that South Africa 
has ‘done as well as could be expected in terms of land reform within the parameters of the 
law’. Further, LPM was also not clear on an economically viable agrarian reform model.  
The fact that these issues have not been clearly articulated made it relatively easy for the 
establishment to say that the demands were unrealistic.  Several economic schools of thought 
have brought forward arguments with regards to the viability of land reform which are 
detailed in the following table.  The LPM in essence advocates for a more radical political 
economy model but has largely failed to articulate this well enough in their demands.   
94 
 
 
 
Table 2: Economic Schools of Thought: Arguments on the viability of land reform  
Economic 
School of 
Thought 
Neo-classical 
economics 
New 
institutional 
economics 
Livelihoods Welfarism Radical political 
economy 
Marxism 
Central  focus Well- 
functioning 
markets vs 
market 
distortions  
‘imperfections’ 
Linking 
equity  and 
productivity 
Development 
as livelihood 
improvement 
and poverty 
reduction 
Poverty 
alleviation, 
social 
protection 
Development 
as agrarian 
transformation 
The Agrarian 
Question,  focusing 
on the  transition to 
capitalism in 
agriculture 
Key concepts Efficiency in 
factor 
productivity 
(land, labour, 
capital) 
Transaction 
costs, 
institutions, 
the  inverse 
relationship 
Multiple and 
diverse 
livelihoods;  de- 
agrarianisation 
Household 
food security; 
vulnerability; 
social 
protection 
Peasants are a 
social class 
exploited by a 
global corporate 
food regime 
 
Food sovereignty 
Social relations of 
production, 
property and power 
(class); dynamics of 
accumulation in 
agriculture; Land and 
agric in 
wider 
context 
Declining 
role of agric 
in economy; 
globalisation 
of agro-food 
markets is 
positive  in 
lowering 
food costs 
Unequal land 
distribution 
can constrain 
economic 
growth 
Key role of 
agriculture in 
kick-starting 
growth; 
globalisation 
offers 
opportunities 
but  often 
negative for 
the  poor 
Small-scale 
agriculture as 
residual,  as 
safety  net 
A global 
corporate global 
food regime 
dispossesses 
peasants via 
market discipline 
& renders them 
‘redundant’ 
Links between 
agricultural 
development & 
industrialisation are 
a key issue. 
Globalisation is a 
key feature of 
contemporary 
capitalism 
Policies Market-led land 
reform: reduce 
market 
imperfections; 
register private 
property rights; 
provide  credit 
to promote 
investment 
Market- 
assisted land 
reform: reduce 
policy biases 
favouring large 
farms  or urban 
consumers; 
promote 
efficient 
markets; 
secure 
property rights;  
credit; land 
taxes 
State  action to 
support 
smallholder 
production e.g. 
land reform, 
targeted 
subsidies,  co- 
ordination of 
marketing; 
 
. 
Enhanced and 
secure access 
to land for 
small-scale 
food 
production as 
a safety  net 
Radical agrarian 
reform that 
secures rights to 
land and 
resources by 
peasant 
farmers. Food 
sovereignty 
(a) Retain  efficient 
large  capitalist 
farms  & improve 
conditions of 
labour),  or (b) 
reforms that 
promote 
accumulation 
from below, or (c) 
support struggles 
for land by 
exploited classes 
Beneficiaries Efficient 
farmers at any 
scale; (often 
economies of 
scale apply and 
larger  farms 
seen  as socially 
efficient) 
Efficient small 
farmers who 
maximise 
returns to land 
The rural  poor 
with  multiple 
livelihoods; 
small  farmers 
The rural  poor 
and 
unemployed 
with  limited 
access  to   jobs 
or alternative 
incomes 
Peasants (small 
family farmers); 
landless  farm 
workers; the 
rural  poor 
Landless workers, 
semi-proletarians, 
petty  commodity 
producers, emerging 
capitalist farmers 
Measures of 
‘viability’ 
Farm efficiency; 
rates of return 
on investment; 
minimum 
viable farm  size 
Farm 
efficiency; 
distribution 
of income; 
poverty 
impacts; 
growth 
multipliers 
Livelihood 
impacts; 
poverty 
measures 
Levels of 
household food 
production that 
make efficient  
use of 
household 
resources 
Rurality, 
agriculture & 
food are central 
to social and 
ecological 
sustainability 
A function of class 
relations and 
dynamics. 
Agriculture’s 
contribution to 
national economic 
growth 
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Key 
questions 
How efficient i s  
production on 
redistributed 
land? Returns to 
land, labour, 
capital? 
What factors & 
conditions 
influence the 
efficiency of 
different scales 
of production? 
What are the 
multiple 
sources of 
livelihood for  
land reform 
beneficiaries? 
What difference 
does food 
production 
make to 
household 
welfare of land 
reform 
beneficiaries? 
Does land reform 
transform 
exploitative 
agrarian 
structures and 
food regimes? 
What dynamics of 
class differentiation 
and accumulation 
occur within Land 
Reform? 
(Source: Cousins and Scoones, 2009: 20) 
In the South African context, the dominant technical framings hardly centre on a broader 
focus on agrarian restructuring, livelihoods and welfare issues. They centre on narrow 
business and target income criteria of viability (Cousins and Scoones, 2009: 21).  It is largely 
the neoliberal school of thought discourse that dominates.  The land reform stance is 
neoliberal at core (believing essentially in the thorough commercialisation of land) but with 
distributive and developmental bits tacked on.   Land reform might be necessary for political 
or even social purposes, but economically, there should be few or no obstacles placed in.  
Marxists have a position that has some affinities to this one.  They see that economies of 
scale are important in agriculture so ‘rural capitalism’ is necessary.  Land redistribution may 
be necessary only to break the power of the big landlords and for political reasons (Sender 
and Johnstone, 2004).  The really big distinction is the radical political economy/food 
sovereignty argument.  This is based on a very deep critique of the ‘food regime’ (industrial 
agriculture and globalised marketing of food) as well arguments about an alternative, 
sustainable, small scale, local system which is what the LPM in South Africa should have 
provided in its defence of land reform.   
Much of government policy buys into a deracialised capitalist agriculture and pays lip 
service to deeper transformation.  The discourse of a conservative alliance of landowners, 
agricultural economists and officials is opposed to changes in agrarian structure, and argue 
instead for de-racialisation of land ownership and the establishment of ‘viable and 
sustainable upcoming commercial farmers’.  This the orthodox view—that the modernised 
corporate globalised system is the only viable one.  
Such visions of viability are located in terms of a neoliberal/neoclassical framing of land 
reform that emphasizes business profitability but with some political consideration. This 
view is expressed by private sector-funded think tanks such as the Centre for Development 
and Enterprise (CDE 2005, 2008), as well as organisations representing large-scale farmers. 
Given the legacies of colonial rule and apartheid, it is acknowledged by such groupings that 
the commercial farming sector has to be de-racialised, but the beneficiaries will be a few, 
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relatively better-off black farmers and landowners, not the rural poor, because land reform 
‘is not the answer to rural poverty’ (CDE 2005: 30). 
This vision underpins the Strategic Plan for Agriculture agreed in 2001 between farmers’ 
unions (representing white and black commercial farmers) and government. The strategic 
goal for the sector is ‘to generate equitable access and participation in a globally competitive, 
profitable and sustainable agricultural sector contributing to a better life for all’ (Department 
of Agriculture 2001: 3). Land reform is identified as critically important for ensuring ‘broad-
based participation in the agricultural mainstream’, not for altering agrarian structure 
(Cousins and Scoones, 2009: 20). 
The neoliberal approach taken by the government has been rationalised on the basis of 
maintaining efficiency in the agricultural sector and retaining investor confidence. 
Alexander (2006) however argues that efficiency and equity are not (and cannot be) 
achieved simultaneously when it comes to land redistribution, and thus maintain that the 
landless poor are not finding reparation through the market (Alexander, 2006: 13). Further, 
Byres (2006: 227-229) asserts that neoclassical development economists have since 
accepted that planning and state interventions, including land reform, were necessary in poor 
economies before the market could come into its own. As Byres (2006: 228) notes, in the 
Washington Consensus there was no place for land reform of any kind. The beneficiaries of 
structural adjustment are seen to be efficient farmers at any scale.   Walker and Dubb (2013) 
assert that increased black ownership of the land can be achieved through the market but a 
land reform programme aimed at improving livelihoods and tenure security for the rural 
poor has to be driven by the state.  So there is need to shift to a more welfare state model 
and not a neoliberal approach.  
With only 1.9% of the national budget devoted to land reform, far below the needs of 
achieving the stated aims of agrarian reform, it is obvious that the government has neither 
the capacity nor the will to accomplish the enormous task of alleviating land inequalities 
(Budget Review, 2017). The 2017 budget offered very limited evidence to suggest radical 
transformation, particularly in terms of land reform, is about to be accelerated.  Spending on 
agriculture, rural development and land reform will only increase 2% from just less than 
R26billion in 2016-17 to R26.5billion in 2017-18. It will increase to about R30bn in 2019-
20.  Of this amount, the budget allocated for land redistribution has declined 3%, from 
R1.23billion in 2016-17 to R1.19billion in 2017-18. The allocation for restitution increased 
2.5%, from R3.17billion in 2016-17 to R3.25billion in 2017-18 (Phakathi, 2017).   
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The lack of finances accorded to this process also speaks to the poor standing and negotiating 
ability of the Department of Land Affairs (now Rural Development and Land Reform) 
within the government bureaucracy. The administrative complexity poses another set of 
problems for the advocates of swift action on agrarian reform. Transactions within the 
framework of the land reform programme take up to two years to complete. These long 
bureaucratic cycles serve to limit the number of potential farmers able to benefit from the 
best opportunities (Anseeuw and Alden, 2011: 25) 
So the LPM emerges as important given the failure of the institutions in place to achieve 
results.  However similar to #FeesMustFall, a flaw of the LPM has been its rights based 
classical approach to land reform and trying to change one thing—that is trying to achieve 
land tenure without changing the system as a whole.  Radical agrarian reform is that land 
reform must take place in the context of a systemic shift away from neoliberalism but the 
LPM has largely based its land struggle on colonial dispossession and a rights based 
approach (as a result have faced the same problems as described by du Toit, 2013 discussed 
in chapter three and Bebbington (2010 in chapter two).   
The fundamental demand for the LPM was not for agricultural land but for formal ownership 
of the lands that had been forcefully taken by the apartheid government from blacks into the 
hands of private white owners.  They did not provide any economic reasoning behind this 
demand. No proofs on foundations such as work, production or large rural estates.  The 
absence of this type of proof does not invalidate any aspirations to agriculture that LPM may 
have but it does show that agriculture is secondary in relation to racial and rights issues 
associated with land policies in South Africa (Rosa, 2012: 4).Being black means one is a 
victim of expropriation and this condition supersedes the realm of production, the 
market/economy.  So land reform to LPM is not just about units of production, it is about 
justice.   As a result the LPMs actions have been easy for the establishment to delegitimise 
(Rosa, 2014: 51-53). The LPM is caught between the discourses on rights and the 
developmental agenda and has little to offer in terms of agrarian transformation in South 
Africa  The immediate concern is to take back land but claims based on ancestors and 
heritage are largely regarded as sentimentalist or populist and are generally sidelined (Rosa, 
2014: 51-53).  
Unlike the MST in Brazil which developed a discourse on the probability and intensive use 
of land for subsistence agriculture.  In offering an alternative to the mainstream agriculture 
policies in the country, they were able to come up with an alternative mode rural 
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development.  They converted the term ‘land’ to mean an agrarian means of production, a 
source of subsistence through labour and the movement was able to spread and adapt to 
different groups. That form enabled government to act in the name of development 
providing credit, education and subsidies to rural citizens (Rosa, 2014: 51-53).   
Or the approach by the Chavez Governement in Venezuela who “framed its policies as an 
explicit counter to neo-liberal development ideology and has reasserted a more activist role 
for the state in economic and social policy. In the agrarian realm the government has 
introduced policies aimed at developing an agricultural regime that is tropical, sustainable, 
agro-ecological, and socialist, and that will guarantee national food sovereignty. A 
centrepiece of the government’s agricultural policies is a land reform programme that 
purports to place smallholders at the core of this agrarian transformation” (Lavelle, 2013: 
134) 
A point of economic contention is the viability of land reform in South Africa. With 
arguments for and against redistributive land reform often hinging on the notion of viability.  
Viability clearly has a major impact on the way land and agrarian reform is conceived and 
planned for.  As with the student struggles, the politics is one things, but the really key 
question is whether the alternatives that are being proposed are economically viable.  
Justifications for public expenditure and budget allocations can be offered if programmes 
and projects are deemed viable.  
5.3.2. The politics of the Landless People’s Movement 
LPM has generally followed the development described in previous chapters. LPM arose in 
the context of the increased commodification of a public good (in this case land) as a result 
of the neoliberal policy stance taken up by government. The ‘willing buyer willing seller’ 
land redistribution policy has seen the alienation of the black majority who are landless and 
the stunted progress of the land redistribution reform policy in South Africa.  
Based on the failure of the government’s ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model of land 
reform, the movement is calling for a review of this policy and its replacement with a new 
and more effective process not so tightly based on the market. Arguably this is one of the 
weaknesses of the LPM.  Similar to #FeesMustFall, LPM’s demands were focused on simply 
rejecting one oppressive policy without providing an economically sound reasoning and 
achievable goal.  The movement was able to articulate clearly what it does not want however 
did not clearly articulate what they do want instead.   
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Despite pressure from LPM, the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model remains non-
negotiable (Greenstein, 2004: 33). However, the increased emphasis on land redistribution 
cannot be separated from the rise of LPM, and at the very least indicates the broad appeal of 
its basic demands (Greenstein, 2004: 32).  The LPM has directly challenged the ANC’s 
construct of ‘the nation’, and has opened up new areas for political contestation. (Greenstein, 
2004: 33). The movement’s efforts have had visible impact on the living conditions of the 
community (Sinwell, 2015: 84). 
Following the initial and much publicised rise of LPM, some elements of the hegemonic 
bloc have become more vocal about their opinions on land redistribution. Both the SACP 
and COSATU have made public statements calling for the speedier and more effective 
implementation of the official land reform programme (Greenstein, 2004: 31). However this 
has had little impact considering the general trend to date is that government has tended to 
be more responsive to the calls of capital and business than to the ANC’s own alliance 
partners or the LPM. This is an important point to note.  Similar to #FeesMustFall, LPM has 
been successful in highlighting the surface problems.  They have been able to reveal the 
problem and get the process going.  What is lacking is the real structural changes and impact.   
The basic demands of the movement include the rapid and wide redistribution of land to the 
landless, and secure tenure for all.  The movement also calls for an end to evictions, whether 
on farms or in informal and other settlements, and a process of transferring land to those 
residing and working on it. The LPM’s daily efforts have thus been largely defensive, 
focused on preventing evictions from rural farms and urban settlements and apartment 
complexes. LPM’s modus operandi has largely been driven by a deep frustration at the 
failure of patient engagement with the state’s land reform programme to deliver. In some 
cases, community groups have waited for seven years or more without tangible progress in 
resolving land claims or in transferring land (Greenstein, 2004: 31).   
LPM has adopted a number of tactics to highlight its demands for redistribution of land and 
secure tenure. Its current program of action includes: organising and mobilising large 
numbers of Africans evicted from white farms along with labour tenants with a view to using 
the moral power of highly publicised land invasions.  Land occupations have been identified 
as part of the repertoire of actions the movement is willing to carry out (Greenstein, 2004: 
30). They have identified unproductive, unused or underused land and land belonging to 
abusive white farmers as the focus for initial redistribution (Greenstein, 2004: 2). Mass 
occupations of vacant or abandoned rural land are also fairly widespread. In rural areas, 
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there are a number of recorded occupations by groups onto land they have claimed through 
the restitution process, but have not received after a long period of time. Labour tenant 
occupations on functioning commercial farms are far less common, because of the much 
greater potential for violent opposition from landowners (Greenstein, 2004: 31).   
The other type of mobilisation that formed the base of the LPM, is spontaneous organisation 
to resist invasion on existing land access and prevent evictions for those already occupying 
pieces of land. In the informal urban settlements, especially around Gauteng. LPM spread 
rapidly by coming to the defence of residents in generating or organising the new struggles 
(Greenstein, 2004: 15). 
LPM also created links with other organisations opposing the government's neoliberal 
policies with more global organisations such as the NGOs which work in the field with 
labour tenants and evictees.  LPM has also made contact with other social movements for 
land reform particularly with Brazil’s Landless Worker’s Movement (MST). (Alexander, 
2004: 12).  The is a key point of interest considering one of the sanguine lessons from the 
Latin American case includes that making horizontal alliances with allied groups helps 
social movement gain traction in achieving their goals.    
What is interesting is that LPM, tried an alternative strategy: taking the government to court.  
As a result, in 2009, the people of Protea South were promised water, better and more 
sanitary Ventilated Improved Pit toilets, street lights, electricity in their shacks and that they 
would not be evicted against their will but the ANC never heeded to the court ruling 
undermining the victory (Sinwell, 2015: 84).   
LPM has also undertaken march after march in an attempt to force the government to deliver 
but to no effect.  The state has responded with increasing repression. State and institutional 
violence has various tactics including bringing charges which are then later dropped.  
Residents of informal settlements around Johannesburg marched to the provincial premier’s 
office in the city centre to demand a moratorium on evictions and to be included in 
development planning in their areas. In April 2002 farm workers and labour tenants 
marching in the rural town of Ermelo were arrested by police for an ‘illegal gathering’. 
Charges were later dropped. Police forcibly dispersed them, arresting 72 and detaining them 
for 3 days in Johannesburg Central police station. Charges were later dropped (Greenstein, 
2004: 33). In 2003, seven LPM youth members were arrested on false murder charges and 
were kept in jail for three months before their trial, at which the charges were dropped. An 
101 
 
attempt to hold a small gathering in Thembelihle in Gauteng on Election Day was met with 
high levels of police aggression, the jailing of protestors and the intimidation and torture of 
LPM members in police custody overnight.  
The reliance by the state on coercive responses to LPM indicates that there is a perceived 
threat to its power.   The movement must have struck a nerve, because the state has resorted 
to repressive tactics and even torture by the police to undermine the LPM struggle.  This 
violent response suggests a vulnerability to the criticisms highlighted by the campaign, in 
particular the abysmal record of land redistribution ten years after democratisation, the rise 
in forced removals and evictions, and the failure of parliamentary democracy to design an 
acceptable process for resolving (rather than managing) long-standing social problems 
(Greenstein, 2004: 33). 
However, at present, the LPM movement lacks the political or organisational strength to co-
ordinate and sustain such actions (Greenstein, 2004: 31). The Anti-Privatisation Forum 
(APF) and the Anti-Eviction Campaign were some social movements that also rose up in 
2001 following Bredell (Hart, 2008: 681).  LPM could have formed meaningful alliances 
with these movements amongst others since they generally coalesce around the same 
grievances.  The World Conference against Racism in 2001 and the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002 for example provided platforms for these and other allied 
social movements to forge connections amongst themselves as well as with related 
movements globally and with sympathetic donors (Hart, 2008: 681).   
There are still groups that are struggling for their land rights but remain outside the scope of 
any LPM influence.  However for the local people, it remains important to be aware that 
there is a movement out there.  The idea of mass occupations remains a popular expression 
of frustration and desire for rapid redistribution of land. The fact the movement was able to 
mobilise such a great number of protesters is more indicative of the importance of the land 
question in South Africa (attested by its high drawing power) than of the strength or force 
of the LPM (Rosa, 2014: 6).  
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at two specific social movements in South Africa.  Looking at how 
the social movements developed and how effective they have been in changing economic 
development in the country.  The #FeesMustFall movement was a great success in pushing 
the government to rethink the provision of public goods namely tertiary education.  The 
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Landless People’s movement, though not as elaborate has also made great strides in 
advancing the call for land redistribution also forcing government to heed the push from 
below.  The following chapter will conclude the research and summarise the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
What this research set out to do was to bring the literature on economics and political agency 
(particularly, social movements) together in order to consider whether social movements 
may offer a solution to South Africa’s economic development problems.   
What was established early on through the theory was the role and relevance of social 
movements in the economic development project.  Social movements emerge as a result of 
people becoming frustrated with their economic status quo and thus participate in political 
activities such as social movements in order to challenge their economic status quo and 
demand change.  So in this way social movements act as vehicles to facilitate economic 
change.  They give individuals a voice to challenge decision makers as well as an 
opportunity to mobilise and collectively engage with decision makers on issues that affect 
them.  The underlying idea is that political decision makers usually display an inertia to 
change and often times require a kick in order to make policy changes.  Social movements 
allow individuals to provide that kick and thus force political elites to heed the push from 
below and effect social and economic changes. 
The role of social movements is also closely related to the underlying political economy.  
There have been a number of development strategies put in place in different countries in an 
attempt to realise economic development.  Two competing strategies that feature in this 
regard are the neoliberal model and the developmentalist state model.  What the literature 
has revealed is that the neoclassical model is characterised by a weakened role of the state 
in economic development.  The state’s role is mostly one of the night watchman intervening 
only in so far as to maintain a stable and conducive environment for the advancement of 
capital. The state aligns itself behind the interests of capital.  As a result the neoclassical 
model deepens inequalities and brings about economic growth but neglects equity.   
 In both South Africa and Latin America, liberalisation and democratisation brought some 
gains including economic growth and some benefits to the poor.  However there is a real 
sense of getting stuck. In the 1990s and the early 2000s in South Africa there seemed to be 
growth without redistribution.  The case was more complicated in Latin America where 
there were also some improvements in the distribution of income.  However subsequent to 
the 2008 crisis things soured and there is increasing recognition that the problem is not just 
distributional but the growth path itself is a problem. 
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There has since been an increasing nostalgia for the developmental state paradigm especially 
in both South Africa and Latin America.  What this entails is a more state led development 
model with an alignment towards welfare.  However, scholars such as Chibber warn that it 
is important to consider why the 20th century developmentalist state paradigm failed before 
reverting back to it.  The early developmentalist state provided rapid economic development 
and industrialisation at first but this fizzled out into stagnation and increased rent seeking 
over time which paved the way for the rise of neoliberalism.  Chibber blames its demise on 
the early developmentalist state model’s reliance on a working alliance between the state 
and national capitalists.  So naturally it follows that carrying on with the same model will 
lead to the same trajectory where the economic development project eventually becomes 
somehow ‘stuck’. What this highlights is the need for some other economic model in the 
development project.   
However, the emergence of a new economic development is not simply a question of 
economic considerations.  It is inherently political in nature. In order for the economic model 
to shift, the politics must shift it. The twin situation of the economics being stuck and the 
politics unable or unwilling to get it unstuck results in a deadlock. This consolidates the 
emergence and role of social movements.  Social movements emerge as an alternative form 
of politics that can pry the formal politics out of its inertia.  However their ability to do so 
depends on the prevailing democracy.  Liberal democracy (constitutions, elections, rule of 
law) is not enough to protect citizen participation in decision making.  Social movements 
emerge outside liberal democracy to try and provide people with a voice.  However in the 
presence of a neoliberal democracy, social movements face repression from the state and 
are often unable to achieve any meaningful structural change.  Social movements need to be 
organised and focused on contesting structural and systemic change in order to be 
formidable in the face of state repression.  
Following the collapse of apartheid, South Africa found itself in a unique position.  The 
newly democratically elected government had to address the socio-economic inequalities 
that had been caused by the apartheid era and provide equitable redistribution of resources.  
Initially the neoliberal paradigm emerged as the leading economic development model in 
South Africa with rapid economic development and redistribution being the key targets.  For 
example through economic growth models such as GEAR in 1996 which were inherently 
neoliberal.  However over time, the economic growth path of South Africa began to stagnate 
and there was an increasing interest in shifting to a more developmentalist state approach to 
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economic development.  The NDP in 2010 revealed the emerging interest in redirecting the 
development model towards a more developmentalist approach.  The clear issues were that 
there were deep structural economic problems such as widening inequality, poverty and 
growing unemployment that plagued the country.  However South Africa has failed to 
change its development model so economically South Africa is seemingly stuck.  The 
neoliberal model in place has not produced the desirable economic growth path while at the 
same time there is a failure to shift to the developmentalist state paradigm due to, in part, 
the politics of the country. 
Politically, there is an apparent hegemony of the ANC.  The ANC believes in a single party 
led politics and development.  And this can be in part attribute to the history of the politics 
in the country.  Before independence there was a single clear unifying mandate amongst the 
political actors and that was to abolish the apartheid regime. However this surface unity 
papered over significant differences in the nature of the state and economic policy.  Post-
independence, the ANC assumed that this unity would continue and that all political actors 
would simply fall in line and form part of the new order.  Further South Africa has shifted 
from a liberal democracy to a neoliberal democracy. The state and institutions are aligned 
behind an elitist national capitalist class in the country.  As a result politically South Africa 
is also ‘stuck’ as the state has displayed a reluctance towards shifting towards more 
developmentalist policies as these go against neoliberal philosophies.   
Given this background, the effectiveness and role of social movements in South Africa is of 
interest.  In the early 1990’s social movements were aligned towards challenging the 
apartheid regime in the country. After independence especially from the mid-2000s as the 
growth path in South Africa slowed down and the inequality and poverty issues deepened, 
there was increased frustration amongst individuals especially the marginalised poor black 
people.  This saw an increase in social movement activity and the emergence of new social 
movements which are characterised by protests.  The new social movement (protests) are 
largely fragmented dealing with single issues such as specific service delivery issues.  The 
increase in protest action manifests the increasing dissatisfaction with the current processes 
of democracy in the country.  Because people feel increasingly alienated from the state, they 
feel that protests are the only and most effective way to get the attention of government and 
force the government to listen.  On the other hand due to the hegemony of the ANC, the 
state’s response has largely been to silence protests often responding to protests with violent 
106 
 
disdain.  So what this reveals is that the politics of the country needs to shift as well.  There 
is a need for the deepening of democracy in South Africa further than just being able to vote.   
Looking at the social movements themselves, the quality of social movements in South 
Africa comes into question.  Social movements especially in South Africa have been 
somewhat focused on a rights based approach.  They tend to seek radical transformation and 
highlighting injustices and infringements on people’s rights.  Social movements have been 
successful at mobilising people and creating an environment in which the demands of 
marginalised people are heard.  However, the literature has revealed that social movements 
usually involve radical activism of small groups on narrowly defined single issues.  As a 
result social movements have been unsuccessful at causing significant sustainable structural 
changes.  The general tendency is that providing the kick from below is not enough to effect 
real change on a structural level.  Things tend to revert once the pressure form social 
movements eases.  The government often pretends to heed social movements putting in 
place superficial measures such as the formations of commissions to ‘look into’ whatever 
issue has been raised without any true tangible changes following.  Social movements tend 
to flare up but just as quickly die down and become invalid without actually having effected 
any sustainable generalist structural changes.   Leaderless, radical and unstructured social 
movements get easily dismissed because for the most part they usually demand social 
change without a clearly defined and convincing economic viability and achievability plan.  
What this highlights is the need for higher quality, better organised social movements with 
a clearly envisaged economic plan.   
The Latin American case provides some sobering lessons.  There does seem to be progress 
economically as well as politically in Latin America.  The hard lessons that emerge is the 
need for more radical rather than classical agendas from social movements. The focus should 
be on considering the deeper structural issues rather than focusing on rights issues or social 
issues.  For example looking at the MST in Brazil, their focus was on radical land reform. 
To a larger extent their model was based on redistributing land from landowners with large 
pieces of land but with little capacity to utilise it to those who landless people who were 
skilled but had no land.  So the issue was largely economic and the MST were therefore able 
to achieve more systemic change.  Whereas the LPM in South Africa were more focused on 
classical land reform where the primary objective was to give land back to black families 
who were unfairly dispossessed by the oppressive apartheid regime. The main issue was 
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largely about social redress and no mention was made of the economics of land reform hence 
they have been largely unsuccessful at achieving their goal.   
Further, there is a need for a politically wider space for social movements.  How social 
movements relate to power is important.  The structure and internal political organisation of 
social movements is important.  Flat, leaderless movements (such as the ones that 
characterise South African protests) are good but they tend to blow over quickly.  There is 
a need for higher quality, hierarchical and more organised social movements in South Africa 
in order to effect deeper structural changes.  Peasants in Bolivia for example formed 
alliances and used an organised and hierarchical, structured approach to push their 
government from the inside. In South Africa social movements remained largely fragmented 
and as result have remained outside and unable to penetrate the existing political structures 
and create an environment where government is receptive to their demands.  A dilemma 
emerges here.  Some argue that social movements are effective through being outside the 
hegemony because the danger is that institutionalism may lead to corporatism and therefore 
demobilisation.  But the Latin American case provides a hard lesson that social movements 
need to be organised and structured.  So the dilemma is how can social movements 
participate in legitimate processes and be inside the hegemony but without losing their 
autonomy? In order for social movements to be effective several factors come into play.  
Both the political space that social movements interact with and the social movements 
themselves need to mature and advance. There needs to be a wider political space with a 
deeper meaning of democracy.  While social movements should be able to be better 
organised and institutionalised without the risk of jeopardising their autonomy and without 
facing the threat of demobilisation. The quality of social movements’ contestation also needs 
to advance and align with deeper structural economic issues and questions in order to 
influence the economy beyond a superficial single issue level. 
In answering the main research question: are social movements a viable tool in providing 
economic development in South Africa? Social movements can play an important role in 
shifting the developmental model to a different better model (whatever that may be) that 
stimulates economic development. Social movements emerge as important where the 
development model in place has failed to produce a satisfactory growth path.  They can act 
as an important lever in the political economy to provide the push necessary to develop an 
economically viable and sustainable development model. 
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